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ABSTRACT 
On 27 April 1998, the European Union (EU) removed the People's Republic of China 
from its list of non-market economies (NMEs) due to the progress made under China's 
economic reforms. After that, it has applied a hybrid anti-durnping policy towards 
imports from China, including the use of the analogue country method, conditional 
market economy treatment, one country one duty rule and individual treatment. 
However, there has been no significant change as far as the EU anti-dumping authority's 
practice is concerned. This is inconsistent with China's current economic status as a 
transitional economy with many sectors very close to a market economy. 
This thesis analyses the implementation of the policy and explores its legal problems 
and issues from both a theoretical and practical standpoint. The study begins by 
examining the origin of EU anti-dumping legislation - the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) anti-dumping rules. It identifies the legal problems of EU 
anti-dumping practice in the context of China's economic reforms starting from 1979. 
In order to suggest solutions to several of the problems thus identified, comparative 
studies are made to reveal alternative strategies by illustrating the anti-dumping 
legislation of the U. S, Australia, New Zealand and Japan insofar as it is applicable to 
China. Due to China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on II 
December 2001, new issues and disputes may arise with regard to the FU's 
anti-dumping practice. With regard to all of these issues, this thesis finally attempts to 
propose solutions to both the EU and China. 
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Introduction 
1. Purpose of the study 
This thesis explores the legal problems and issues that have arisen in the application of 
the current European Union (EU)1 anti-dumping legislation2as it is applied against the 
People's Republic of China. It analyzes these problems from both a theoretical and 
practical standpoint. The origin of EU anti-dumping legislation is found in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATTý framework and, for this reason, it is important 
to recall the development of the GATT rules themselves. The study must be seen against 
the background and in the context of Chinese economic reforms that have been put in 
place since 1979. After more than twenty years' efforts, up to now, China has successfully 
transformed from a state trading country to a transitional economy. Failing to 
accommodate this change, the current EU anti-dumping legislation towards China has 
turned to be rather problematic in practice. These issues are analyzed in the chapters that 
follow. The thesis also attempts to suggest solutions to several of the problems thus 
identified. To reach such solutions, comparative studies are used to reveal alternative 
strategies and to provide useful insights into EU practice. Due to China's accession to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), new issues and disputes may arise with regard to the 
I Technically, the anti-dumping legislation is made under the power conferred on the EC by the Treaty 
establishing the EC. However, since EU is a commonly understood term, 
'EU anti-dumping 
legislation' will be used instead of 'EC anti-dumping legislation' throughout this thesis unless 
otherwise explained. 
2 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports 
frorn countries not members of the European Community, OJ 1996 
L 56/1, amended by Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2331/96 of 2 December 1996, OJ 1996 L 317/1; Council Regulation (EC) No 
905/98 of 27 April, OJ 1998 L 128/18; and Council Regulation 
(EC) No 223 8/2000 of 9 October 2000, 
OJ 2000 L 257/2; Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002 of 5 November 2002, OJ 2002 L305/1. 
They are all available from <http: //europa. eu. 
int/comm/trade/policy/dumping/legis. htm> (I 
December 2002). 
3 The Uruguay Round Agreements, available from 
<Iittp: //www. wto. org/engIish/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e. 
htm#finalact> (I December 2002). 
EU's anti-dumping practice. Solutions to all of these issues are suggested for both sides in 
the conclusion of this thesis. 
It is important for the purpose of this thesis to define some key concepts here. The first is 
based on a distinction between market economies (MEs) and non-market economies 
(NMEs). Generally speaking, NME refers to the country where goods and resources are 
t4 allocated by government planning agencies rather than by prices freely set in a marke . 
Normally, NME has the same meaning as state trading country or state-controlled country. 
The classification of NME and ME is not scientific nor sustainable in the reality of today, 
because there is no purely free market nor totally centrally controlled economy but rather 
a spectrum of national economies with more or less state control of certain economic 
activities. 5 Further and worse, since the GATT did not define the concepts of ME and 
NME nor did it provide any guideline to the categorization, this issue is left to the national 
authorities of the GATT Contracting Parties with huge discretion. In fact, the room for 
flexibility has been so widely used that these countries categorize MEs and NMEs 
according to their own criteria. As a result, former Communist countries are normally 
regarded as having NMEs, while the developed western countries are viewed as having 
M6 Es. 
Like NME, ME is a very complex concept, but no international organization or 
agreement provides its definition. ME is a term to measure the certain level of economic 
development of a sector or industry. It stresses that transactions, including prices, are 
basically regulated by market forces rather than state control. Generally speaking, it asks 
for enterprises' rights to allocate their own resources and the freedom to make 
business 
decisions and a fair competition environment sustained by sound legislation. 
4 John H. Jackson (co-editor), Legal Problems of International Economic Relations 3d edn., 
(New 
York: West Publishing, 1995) at p 1139. 
5 This issue is further analyzed in the section IV of chapter one. 
6 This issue is fully illustrated in section 11 of chapter 
five. 
I? 
In the wide spectrum of economic structures, different industries of a same country may 
have different economic development levels. Therefore, some sectors may be ME or 
close to ME while others are not. However, in the context of anti-dumping legislation. 
importing countries normally classify exporting countries into ME and NME. In that case, 
a country that has most of its industries as ME should be regarded as an ME, and ME 
treatment should be applied to these countries in default. 
China was generally regarded as an NME when its economy was operated on a strict 
state-controlled basis before 1979. However, after more than twenty years' economic 
reform, it has become a transitional economy whose development of many sectors is very 
close to market economies. This fact is well recognised and confirmed in the world by its 
accession to the WTO. 7 
The second key concept is the concept of dumping itself. According to the GATT 
anti-dumping rules, a product is considered to have been dumped if the export price is 
lower than its normal value. In the ordinary course of trade, the normal value is based on 
the domestic sales price of the import! However, in case of 'imports from a country 
which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all 
domestic prices are fixed by the State', 9 GATT allows its contracting parties to adopt 
7 China's economic reforms and progress obtained are illustrated in chapter four. 
8 'A product is to be considered as being introduced into the commerce of an importing country at less 
than its normal value, if the price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the 
comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption 
in the exporting country, or, in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either (i) the highest 
comparable price for the like product for export to any third country in the ordinary course of trade, or 
(ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus a reasonable addition for selling 
cost and profit. ' 
Para 1, Art. VI of the GATT 1994. Available from: 
<http: //www. wto. org/english/docs_e/legal-e/gatt47_01_e. htm> (I December 2002) 
9 The second Supplementary Provision to paragraph I of Article VI in Annex I to GATT. 
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other methods to determine the normal values of the imports. This provision provides the 
basis for national anti-dumping laws to establish the rules with regard to state trading. 
Instead of being dropped, surprisingly, the rule enacted in 1947 has been automatically 
transposed into the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement in 1994.10 Therefore, in contrast to 
significant advancements in many other areas covered by the GATT provisions, its 
current anti-dumping rules relating to state trading remain as vague as they were 50 years 
ago. As a result, most WTO Members apply different rules to calculate normal values of 
imports from NMEs, which will basically artificially increase the dumping margin of the 
products concerned. " Therefore, whether the exporting country is regarded as an NME is 
crucial to its trade interests in anti-dumping proceedings. 
Under the GATT anti-dumping framework, the EU provides different rules to calculate 
normal values of products imported from MEs and NMEs respectively. With regard to the 
former, the normal values of their exports are 'based on the prices paid or payable, in the 
ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country"'. While as 
to the NMEs, especially 'those to which Council Regulation (EC) No 519/94 applies, ' 
3 
normal values shall be determined on the basis of the price or constructed value in an ME 
third country, or the price from such a third country to other countries, including the price 
actually paid or payable in the Community for the like product. ' 14 In the meantime, since 
all imports from NMEs are considered to emanate from a single producer, a single rate is 
applied to all producers from NME exporting countries in order to avoid circumvention of 
10 Article 2 (7), Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 (WTO Anti- Dumping 
Agreement). Available from: <http: //www. wto. org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01-e. htm> (I 
December 2002). 
11 This issue is examined specifically in chapter one. 
12 Article 2 (1) of Council Regulation (EQ No 384/96. 
13 Council Regulation (EQ No 519/94 of 7 March 1994 on common rules for imports from certain 
third countries and repealing Regulations (EEC) 
Nos 1765/82,1766/82 and 3420/83, OJ 1994 1,67/89. 
14 Article 2 (7) of Council Regulation (EQ No 384/96. 
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the anti-dumping duties, that is the channelling of exports through the exporter with the 
lowest duty rate. This is the so-called one country one duty rule. Both the rule and the 
analogue country method are regarded as the EU's traditional NME treatments. 15 
The EU used to regard China as an NME for the purpose of antýdumping. 16 Due to 
China's economic reform since 1979 and the dramatic progress obtained afterwards, the 
EU eliminated China from its list of NMEs in 1998 and introduced conditional market 
economy treatment (MET). 17 However, since the criteria for the new treatment are 
extremely stringent, only few Chinese exporters can actually get it. 1 8 For this reason, 
most Chinese products involved in EU's anti-dumping investigations are still subject to 
the analogue country method and the one country one duty rule. Consequently, almost all 
of them are judged to have been dumped, so that they have to either make satisfactory 
undertakings to revise the price or to suffer anti-dumping duties for certain periods. As a 
result, most of these Chinese exporters have to give up their business in the European 
market. 
Under the EU anti-dumping legislation, Chinese exports are subject to a 
disproportionately high number of anti-dumping measures. There are 170 anti-dumping 
measures in force covering 63 products and 33 countries determined by the EU 
institutions by 30 June 2002. Among them, 34 measures are concerned with China, which 
accounts for 20 percent of overall cases although imports from China only account for 7 
percent of the total EU imports. 19 So, it appears that China has now become the primary 
15 This issue is fully analyzed in chapter three. 
16 Council Regulation (EC) No 519/94. 
17 Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98 of 27 April 1998 amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on 
protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community. OJ 1998 
L 128/18. 
18 The reasons are explained in chapter three. 
19 , Trade in Goods' EU International Trade Statistics 
<http: //europa. eu. int/comm/trade/goods/stats. htm> (I December 2002). 
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target in the EU's anti-dumping practice among all exporting countries since August 1979 
when the first anti-dumping investigation against Chinese exportS20 was initiated. 
Furthermore, the anti-dumping duties charged by the EU on Chinese exports are very 
high. Up to I January 2002, there were 91 antýdumping proceedings launched by the EU 
against Chinese exports. In 69 cases, Chinese exports were found to have been dumped 
and anti-dumping measures were subsequently taken towards them .21 Most of the 
anti-dumping duties imposed in these cases were very high - especially when the one 
country one duty rule was applied, i. e. a single duty rate was charged, there are only 8 
cases whose rate of duty charged was under 20 percent. 22 
Here, we should note three inconsistencies in EU practice by examining the relevant data. 
1. The increasing anti-dumping measures taken by the EU do not agree with Chinese 
current economic status, which has fundamentally changed after reforms initiated in the 
last two decades. 
The methods that the EU adopts to determine the normal value of products exported from 
China were based on the former Chinese economic structure and its government policy -- 
central state control twenty years ago. However, since 1992 when China officially 
confirmed its current policy to accelerate the transformation of the country into a 
market-oriented economy, reforms have been designed and implemented to make 
state-owned enterprises operate as independent economic entities and to be fully 
responsible for their profits and losses. As a result, dramatic changes in China's economic 
20 80/1116/EEC: Commission Decision of 4 December 1980 accepting undertakings offered by the 
exporters of saccharin and its salts originating in China and the United States of America and 
terminating the proceedings concerning imports of saccharin and its salts from China, Japan and the 
United States of America. OJ 1980 L 331/4 1. 
21 It is collected by the author from the WTO and the EUs anti-dumping statistics 
<http: //www. wto. org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e. htm> and 
-littp: //europa. eu. int/comm/trade/policy/dumping/reports. 
htm> (I December 2002). 
22 Ibid. 
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structures and development took place, and the prices of over 90 percent of final goods 
are now determined by market forces, a factor which has been confirmed by the World 
Bank. 23 According to these significant changes, most countries (such as the United States, 
Australia, New Zealand and Japan) which used to regard China as an NME have changed 
their anti-dumping policies towards China and granted individual treatment to Chinese 
state-owned enterprises after the investigation is initiated. This has proved to be more 
rational and practical as can be seen in the cases discussed later. 24 However, the EU seems 
to have responded less to the fundamental changes resulting from the Chinese economic 
reform. Though in Council Regulation No. 905/98,25 it deleted China from the list of 
NMEs and agreed to grant conditional MET to Chinese exporters who meet certain 
criteria. This is no doubt a big step forward, but things have not changed significantly 
because the criteria set in the new Regulation are too severe and impractical to meet the 
26 need of actual situations . As a result, most 
Chinese companies involved in antýdumping 
proceedings are still subject to the analogue country method in the calculation of their 
normal value and one country-one duty when determining anti-dumping duties. 
Furthermore, anti-dumping investigations initiated by the EU in 1999 reached 12, which 
is the highest number compared with the past years. 27 The fact shows that the EU's new 
anti-dumping policy against China has not achieved the objective to fit the changes 
resulting from the Chinese economic reform, and this also brings about the following two 
inconsistencies. 
Considering the past twenty years, the number of the total EU's antimdumping cases 
23 World Bank Discussion Paper No. 215, China: Reform and Development in 1992-1993. 
24 Alternative anti-dumping approaches towards China are examined 
in chapter five. 
25 Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98. 
26 This issue will be fully analyzed in chapter three. 
27 'Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices - Semi-Annual Report under 
Article 16.4 of the 
Agreement - European Communities', 
WTO Document Code: G/ADP/N/59/EEC. 26/01/2000 
<http: //www. wto. org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e. 
htm> (I December 2002). 
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has gone down, while those against China has risen sharply. From 1979 to 1998, the 
number of the EU's anti-dumping cases against third countries decreased. The average 
cases initiated per year declined from 42 ten years ago to 33 within the residual ten years, 
while cases concerning China increased from an average 2.3 per year in the first ten years 
to 4.6 in the last ten years, which occupied from 5.5 percent of the total EU's 
28 anti-dumping cases for the former period to 13.8 percent for the later ten years . 
3. The actual effect of the EU's anti-dumping policy towards China is not consistent 
with the objectives of anti-dumping policy (i. e. to restore fair competition, offset the 
injury and limit the sharply increasing quantity of dumped goods rather than exclude 
them from the EU). But, in fact, statistics of imports from China suffering from the effects 
of EU's anti-dumping measures show that they exceed their original purpose. Due to the 
factors discussed above, most Chinese exporters involved in investigations suffer very 
high anti-dumping duties so that they are virtually excluded from the European market 
since then. 29For example, China exported more than 200 million bicycles to the EU in 
1991, but since the anti-dumping duty as high as 30.6 percent was imposed in 1993, it has 
been excluded from the European market gradually. Similarly, colour televisions from 
China have almost disappeared from the European market now after being levied 44.6 
percent anti-dumping duty 30 . From this point, 
it is easy to see that the virtual effects of the 
EU's anti-dumping policy obviously deviate from its purpose! 
These inconsistencies, both in the legislative framework of the EU and in the practical 
28 'The EU's Anti-Dumping Practice against China' (Chinese) 
<http: //www. ec3286. com/report/zhengce/002. htm> (I December 2002). 
29 t There were still thirty-one Chinese products subject to anti-dumping measures in the cases initiated 
between 1988 and 1994. In the majority of these cases, the rates of duty were above 20 percent. In a 
number of cases, the rates of duty were even above 50 percent. ' Donghui Fu, 'EC Anti-Dumping Law 
and Individual Treatment Policy in Cases Involving Imports from China' (1997) 31(l) Journal of 
World Trade, 73 at p 76. 
30 'Anti-Dumping Measures against China Sharply Decrease Chinese Exports' 
--Iittp: //www. peopledaily. com. cn/zcxx/2000/08/0821 
IO. html> (I December 2002). 
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effects of the application of the rules, form the subject of study of this thesis. It is here 
argued that there is real urgency in providing such an analysis and a genuine need to 
formulate practical solutions. The needs are pressing on both sides. It is argued that the 
current rules undermine fair competition in the EU market and, eventually, may lead to 
retaliatory measures being taken against the EU. Furthermore, Chinese-EU relation may 
be undermined if the current policy continuous to be followed. 
As previously discussed, the current EU's anti-dumping rules against China already 
exceed this purpose, which is to offset the injury and discourage increasing impacts of 
dumped imports. In fact, imports from China, where anti-dumping measure have been 
taken, have decreased rapidly. In the long term, this will have deleterious effects on the 
economic development of the EU itself. 
In addition, the anti-dumping measures imposed on Chinese exporters by the EU are 
likely to stimulate trade retaliation actions by China in the future. China has developed its 
own anti-dumping legislation since January 21,1997, when the Chinese State 
Commission for Economy and Trade announced it was setting up investigation 
mechanisms to combat dumped and subsided imports into the People's Republic of 
China. 31 On 25 March of the same year, China formally promulgated its legislation on 
anti-dumping - the Regulation on Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Measures. The 
32 
current law was amended on 31 October 2001. Article 56 provides: 
Where a country (region) discriminatorily imposes anti-dumping measures on the 
exports from the People's Republic of China, China may, on the basis of the actual 
31 Craig Pouncey, 'The New Anti-Dumping Law of the People's Republic of China: the Dragon Bites 
Back' (1997) 3(4) Int. T. L. R, 143 at p 143. 
32 Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Anti-Dumping, adopted at the 
46th Executive 
Meeting of the State Council on 31 October 2001, promulgated 
by Decree No. 328 of the State 
Council of the People's Republic of China on 26 November 
200 1, and effective as of I January 2002. 
WTO Document Code: G/ADP/N/l/CHN/2. <http: //docsonline. wto. org/gen_search. asp> (I 
December 2002). 
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situations, take corresponding measures against that country (region). 
Therefore, we should have the worry that China may use its anti-dumping legislation 
against products imported from the EU to retaliate against the latter's unjustified 
measures suffered by Chinese exporters. China entered the WTO on II December 200 1, 
which will greatly strengthen its economic growth and increase its share of world trade. It 
is estimated that China's real imports from Western Europe will increase from 28,571 
33 Million US Dollars in 1995 to 50,182 Million US Dollars in 2005, and it will become 
the EU's second largest economy and trading partner next to the US in twenty years, 
rather than the I Oth largest trading partner of today. 34 Therefore, if the EU does not adjust 
those undue points in its current anti-dumping legislation against China and if its 
anti-dumping measures are found to have been unduly imposed on Chinese exports, 
China will have the capability to adopt similar actions to imports from Europe and 
exclude the European exporters from the Chinese market. From this point of view, the 
consequence of such retaliation measures towards the EU cannot be underestimated. 
Furthermore, when we consider the consequences of the EU anti-dumping legislation and 
practice against China, Chinese exporters are those who suffer the adverse effects directly. 
This constitutes the largest obstacle to the development ofEU-China trade relations. Here, 
we should make one point clear: the development of exports from China to the EU is not 
only in the interest of China but also in the interest of the EU. The two sides are at 
different levels of economic development: the EU needs a large amount of cheap and low 
value-added products that can be well supplied by Chinese exporters, while China 
imports expensive and high-technology products from the EU. This means that a 
substantial part of Chinese products are not in direct competition with the products of EU 
33 D Bhattasali and M Kawai, 'Implications of China's Accession to the World Trade Organization' at 
p 18. < http: //www. worldbank. org. cn/English/content/wto-implications. pdf> 
(I December 2002). 
34 Yukon Huang, 'Realizing China's Potential' 
<http: //www. worldbank. org. cn/engIish/content/529z6l4659 I. shtml> (I December 2002). 
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industry. Furthermore, Chinese products provide an economic advantage for the EU's 
processing industry and European consumers. Based on this point, to develop a sound 
trade relationship for closer cooperation between the EU and China is very important. 
The negative policy of the EU that encourages anti-dumping actions against Chinese 
products will definitely affect the interests of both sides and undermine their relations. 
Particularly now that China has entered the World Trade Organization, its economic 
reforms will be further deepened based on free market principles. So, if the EU does not 
adjust its current policy, the 'analogue country' and 'one country one duty' approaches for 
Chinese exporters will certainly stimulate greater controversies. 35 
11. The structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. It begins by explaining the development and key 
concepts of the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 
(Anti-Dumping Agreement), which provides a legal framework for the EU antiýdumping 
legislation. Chapter two examines the main substantive and procedural rules of the EU's 
anti-dumping regulations applicable to China. The following chapter identifies the legal 
problems and issues arising from the above legislation in practice. Together the first three 
chapters constitute the theoretical and practical analysis of the EU anti-dumping 
legislation towards China in this thesis. The following chapter elucidates China's current 
economic situation and prospects after more than twenty years' reforms. It thus presents 
the need for the EU to adopt an anti-dumping policy which corresponds to China's 
economic development. In order to suggest solutions to the problems and issues 
identified in chapter three, chapter five makes a comparative study of other developed 
countries' anti-dumping legislation applicable to China. Due to China's accession to the 
WTO, new legal problems and disputes may arise with regard to the EU's antýdumping 
practice towards China. They are illustrated in chapter six. Finally, in chapter seven, the 
35 China's economic reforms and prospects are analyzed in chapter four. 
thesis concludes by proposing solutions to all the issues identified above for both EU and 
China. 
Ill. Chapter outlines 
Chapter one focuses on the analysis of the GATT anti-dumping legislation, which 
provides the framework for EU's anti-dumping law. The legislation in force includes 
Article VI of the GATT and the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. This chapter analyzes 
the nature, history, objectives and main provisions of these rules, especially those 
regulating imports from state trading countries. It concludes by identifying two practical 
problems arising from the legislation with regard to state trading countries. First, the rules 
are too out of date to accommodate the current situation of transitional economies 
properly. Second, they are too simple and vague to be applied by the WTO Members 
fairly. They are also the key reasons behind the legal problems arising from the EU's 
current anti-dumping legislation towards China. 
Chapter two elaborates the EU anti-dumping legislation. First, it examines the 
evolution of the rules, especially those applicable to China. Second, it 
introduces the objectives, key concepts and contents of the Regulations in 
force. Finally, it gives a general analysis of the enforcement of the rules with 
regard to China. Thus, this chapter provides a theoretical basis to further 
discuss problems and issues arising from these rules in the next chapter. 
Chapter three focuses on unreasonable factors in the current EU's 
anti-dumping policy towards China. It examines four different methodologies 
adopted by the European Commission, 
36 including: analogue country method. 
conditional market economy treatment, one country one 
duty rule and 
36 The European Commission is the authority in EU's anti-dumping investigations. 
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individual treatment. For each of them, the relevant rules in force, outcomes 
of the enforcement and legal problems arising in practice will be analyzed 
respectively. Therefore, this chapter constitutes a significant part of the thesis. 
Chapter four examines China's economic reform of foreign trade, enterprise, pricing and 
financial systems and their development prospects after its accession to the WTO on II 
December 200 1. Pre-reform conditions, progress made after the reform, relevant 
legislation, and commitments made on China's accession to the WTO are illustrated 
respectively for the four areas. Of crucial importance in this chapter is the Report of the 
Working Party on China's accession to the WTO . 
37 This report provides the analysis - 
economic and legal - which corroborates the central argument of this thesis that the EU, 
by failing to take into account the very real changes that have occurred in the Chinese 
economy, is acting unreasonably in its application of its anti-dumping regime. 
Chapter five examines alternative approaches to anti-dumping legislation applicable to 
China. First of all, it introduces anti-dumping legislation of the U. S., Australia, New 
Zealand and Japan briefly. It then enumerates the different approaches adopted by these 
countries to identify NMEs, calculate normal values of imports from these economies and 
determine anti-dumping duties for dumped products. In particular, it makes a 
comparative analysis of legislative amendments made by these countries due to China's 
economic reforms. Based on case studies,, these approaches have turned out to be more 
reasonable and fair than that of the EU in practice, because these countries have adjusted 
their anti-dumping policy to the extent that can better accommodate the present economic 
situation of China as a transitional economy. The comparative study made in this chapter 
provides important references to proposals given to the EU in the conclusion of the thesis. 
Chapter six explores new issues and disputes that may arise with regard to the EU's 
37 , Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China', I October 200 1, WTO Document Code: 
WT/ACC/CHN/49. <http: //docsonline. wto. org/gen_search. asp> (I December 2002). 
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anti-dumping practice after China's accession to the WTO as a developing country. First, 
it analyzes Article 15 of the GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement and its application in the 
Indian Bed Linen case. 38 This provision basically provides a developed country 
Member's obligation to actively consider the possibility of constructive remedies prior to 
imposition of an anti-dumping measure that would affect the essential interests of a 
developing country. Second, it illustrates the special and differential treatment (SDT) for 
developing and least-developed country Members under the WTO dispute settlement 
system. After that, it enumerates three types of foreseeable EU-China anti-dumping 
disputes after China's accession to the WTO. Finally, it indicates potential difficulties for 
China to invoke the above-mentioned provisions to protect its trade interests against the 
EU's anti-dumping decisions. In this way, chapter six deepens the study of this thesis 
from a prospective point of view. 
Chapter seven provides the conclusion to this thesis. Firstl it summarizes the legal 
problems and issues arising from the EU's current anti-dumping legislation towards 
China. Second, it emphasizes the urgency tDfind solutions to these problems. Third, it 
examines their underlying reasons from the perspective of both the EU and China. Finally, 
based on the study made in the previous chapters (i. e. the theoretical and practical 
analysis of the legislation, the illustration of China's economic development, the 
comparative study of alternative approaches of anti-dumping legislation towards China, 
and the deduction of new issues and disputes that may arise with regard to the EU's 
anti-dumping practice due to China's WTO membership), it attempts to propose 
corresponding solutions to the problems and issues posed previously. Thus, this chapter 
becomes the highlight of the thesis. 
38 , European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India', 
Report of the Panel, WTO Document Code: WT/DS141/R. Available from: Available by searching 
through <http -//docsonl i ne. wto. org/gen_search. asp> (I December 2002). 
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IV. Some comments on methodology 
A. Analysis methods 
Five different types of research methods will be used to analyze issues in this thesis: 
statistical, explanatory, descriptive, comparative and prescriptive analysis. 
Statistical analysis is applied to identify legal problems and issues arising from the EU 
anti-dumping legislation towards China. They can be shown clearly by examining the 
statistics relating to EU-China trade of different years, such as the total anti-dumping 
measures taken by the EU vis-a-vis those imposed on Chinese exports, overall imports of 
the EU vis-a-vis those from China. 
As to the explanatory analysis, it will be used to examine the nature of the EU's 
anti-dumping law against China. Those basic notions and fundamental questions will be 
explained in this way. They include: 
1. What are the major principles and basic purpose of this law? 
2. When and how should it be applied? 
3. What kinds of problems and difficulties arising when it is put into practice and why? 
4. Why we need to consider those side effects? 
5. How can we attempt to adjust the current measures to offset the unfavourable effects? 
The descriptive analysis is designed to examine some of the EU's typical anti-dumping 
cases against China, such as the Bicycles case in 1993,39 in which the EU refused to grant 
39 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474/93 of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imports into the Community of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China and 
collecting definitively the provisional anti- dumping duty OJ 1993 
L228/1. 
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individual treatment to Chinese producers/exporters, including joint-ventures with 
foreign investment, even many Hong Kong companies. This case set out the principles 
that were subsequently applied by the EU in dealing with Chinese exporters. Since that 
case, a single anti-dumping duty was imposed in respect of all exporters in China and 
applied to all Chinese products exported to the EU, regardless of the different dumping 
margins established for each of the producers or exporters concerned. In this way, a 
Chinese exporter who does not practice dumping is subject to an anti-dumping duty if 
other Chinese exporters are dumping their products. Such a description of cases is 
expected to support and to further understand the key ideas in this dissertation. Besides, I 
will use this method to describe the favourable results of China's economic reforms, 
which include those on price, enterprise, financial and traditional foreign trade systems. 
With regard to the comparative and prescriptive analysis methods, they will be used in 
chapter five of this thesis. After examining and demonstrating the unreasonable factors in 
the current EU's anti-dumping measures against China, I will analyze the anti-dumping 
policies of the U. S., Australia, New Zealand and Japan. These countries, whencompared 
with the EU, are much more flexible and therefore justified in their practices, because 
they are fully aware of the changes of China's economic structure after reform and they 
have made corresponding adjustments to their previous policies. This comparative 
approach yields insights into the approach taken by the EU and provides valuable 
pointers as to how the EU approach might be reformed. It is argued that the EU's 
anti-dumping practice should be consistent with the purpose of the anti-dumping 
measures: to offset the injury and restore fair competition. 
B. Sources of the database. 
As far as the database and references needed are concerned, they can 
be categorized into 
six types: opinions and suggestions from relevant officials and scholars 
directly through 
interviews, experience of positively involving EU's anti-dumping proceedings towards 
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NMEs by doing internship in relevant law firm, current legislation in force, typical cases 
of recent years and literature review. 
1. Interviews 
The EU's anti-dumping policy towards China is a very sensitive political issue to the 
EU-China trade relationship, particularly because there has been no significant change 
considering the implementation of the amended legislation, and the EU still treats China 
as an NME in most of its anti-dumping proceedings. Therefore, there is little official 
information relating to the disputes publicly available. For this reason, this thesis draws 
upon the legal and economic expertise, information and opinions obtained in interviews 
conducted with officials of the European Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation of the People's Republic of China (MOFTEC). 
The purpose of the interviews was to get opinions about the EU's current antimdumping 
practice towards China, including: Chinese official standpoint towards the EU practice, 
real difficulties for Chinese exporters to get the conditional MET, the EUs response and 
arguments towards these issues, prospects of China's economy and the development of its 
anti-dumping legislation, proposals for possible adjustments of the EU policy and 
strategies suggested to Chinese exporters. 
Information thus obtained has been incorporated into relevant sections of the thesis to 
support my argument. In particular, original analysis was extended and new ideas and 
issues were brought out through interviews. For example, chapter six examines new 
issues with regard to the EU's anti-dumping practice towards China after the 
latter's 
accession to the WTO. It also proposes necessary strategies 
for China and enumerates 
potential difficulties that it may encounter at that time. All of these 
ideas generated from 
interviews in Brussels with experienced anti-dumping lawyers. In addition, during 
interviews, communication with professionals and experts offered me opportunities 
to 
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test my argument in the thesis and the depth of my research. In this way, interviews 
constitute a very important part of this study. 
These interviews were semi-structured and each lasted between 45 to 120 minutes. A list 
of these interviews is provided in tables one and two below. In the course of some 
meetings, certain officials provided insights relating to some of the key issues discussed 
in this thesis. They also requested that on certain sensitive issues I did not attribute the 
point they raised directly to them. Throughout this thesis, I have incorporated the analysis 
where relevant without attributing the points raised to any particular individual. 
2. Intemship in law firm 
Anti-dumping is a very complex and technical issue. In order to identify the unreasonable 
factors of the EU's current anti-dumping practice towards imports from China, and to 
understand the real difficulties that Chinese exporters experience when they apply for the 
conditional MET in the EU's anti-dumping proceedings, experience of positively 
involving in these proceedings is necessary. Therefore, I did an internship under the 
supervision of professionals in Hammond Suddards Edge, Brussels. The law firm is 
famous for its excellence to representing exporters from NMEs in the EU's an&dumping 
investigations. 
The internship lasted for six weeks, during which I participated in filling an&dumping 
questionnaires for exporters from NMEs and MEs, and analysing other issues of 
anti-dumping arising after the investigation ended, such as the continuation and 
reapplication of undertakings. Particularly, the practical issues that I encountered during 
my internship led me to consider new disputes that might arise towards the EUs 
anti-dumping practice after China's accession to the WTO . 
40 Therefore, such experience 
significantly contributes to the study of this thesis. 
-40 This issue is fully analyzed in chapter six. 
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3. Legislation in force. 
They are the most important sources needed in this study. They include: 
- GATT rules 
The 'General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947' and the 'Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. Both 
will be considered because they provide the basic framework for GATT Members' 
anti-dumping laws'. 41 
- The EU anti-dumping legislation 42 
The current EU anti-dumping legislation against China will be fully analyzed throughout 
this thesis. 43 They include: Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96,2331/96,905/98, 
2238/2000 and 1972/2002,44 and other legal documents establishing criteria to grant the 
individual treatment. 45 
- Other developed countries' anti-dumping legislation relating to China. 
46 
They include the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Anti-dumping 
legislation of these countries will be analyzed and compared with that of the EU in 
chapter five. 
41 They are examined in chapter two. 
42 Available from <http: //europa. eu. int/comm/trade/policy/dumping/legis. htm> (I December 2002). 
43 The legislation is addressed in chapter two. Legal problems and issues arising from it are analyzed 
in chapter three. 
44 Seefn 2 above. 
45 Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on protection against 
durnped imports from countries not members of the European Community /*COM/97/0677 final - 
ACC. OJ 1998 C70/15. Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on 
protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community 
/*COM/2000.0363 final - ACC 2000/0160. 
4" These legislation is available by searching through <http: //docsoniine. wto. org/gen_search. asp> (I 
December 2002). 
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- Chinese Foreign Trade Law and the Law on Joint ventures. 
It is essential to study them when we consider the basis to calculate the normal values of 
products imported from China and to judge the nature of certain Chinese exporters (i. e. 
whether they are State-trading enterprises or not). 
4. Typical cases of recent years (case studies). 47 
They include anti-dumping cases against China initiated by the EU and other developed 
countries such as the U. S., Australia, New Zealand and Japan. They are used to explain 
both the principles used by anti-dumping authorities and to illustrate vividly the key ideas 
and problems outlined in the thesis. 
5. Literature review. 
The literature review needed in this study includes the research of anti-dumping 
textbooks, articles and reports from journals, websites of main international organisations, 
such as the EU, WTO and World Bank. All of these supply the latest information and 
arguments relating to the issues discussed in the thesis. They are listed in the 
Bibliography. 
Throughout the literature search, I have not found any academic opinions opposite to my 
central arguments in the thesis. In fact, except for the EU's own analysis in its 
anti-dumping regulations and legal proposals, most of the literature is critical of the EU's 
over stringent anti-dumping practice towards imports from China. The secondary sources 
cited in this thesis support the central argument that the anti-dumping practices of the EU 
have the effect of protecting EU industry and act as a protectionist device rather than 
correcting the specific problem for which the anti-dumping regulations were designed. 
47 
See 'Table of Cases'. 
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Table One: Interview details (China) 
10 July 2001 Beijing Jingchun Shao, Professor of Law, University of Beijing. 
12 July 2001 Beijing Weiping Huang, Professor & Dean, School of Economics, 
Rerimin University of China. 
13 July 2001 Beijing Dawei Chen, School of Economics., Renmin University of f 
China. 
17 July 2001 Beijing Xiangjun Gao, Director of the Legal Department, Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery 
and Electronic Products (CCCME). 48 
19 July 2001 Beijing Yu Ma, Senior Research Fellow, Chinese Academy of 
International Trade & Economic Cooperation Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. 
23 July 2001 Beijing Shuguang Xia, Bureau of Fair Trade for Imports and Exports, 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, the 
People's Republic of China. 
3 August 2001 Kunming Pingwei Wu, Manager to the Import & Export Departmen 
Yunnan Malong Chemical Construction Community-, LTD. 4 
Table Two: Interview details (Brussels) 
24 June 2002 Lingchen Pu, Counsel and Lawyer, Eversheds. 
25 June 2002 Jing Shen, Attorney at Law, Theodore goddard. 
27 June 2002 Richard King, Lawyer, White & Case. 
27 June 2002 Hui Zhao, Lawyer, White & Case. 
12 July 2002 Martin Lukas, Administrator of the Directorate-General for Trade, 
European Commission. 
48 This interview was carried out by phone. 
49 Yunnan Malong Chemical Construction Community, LTD is the first Chinese company which got 
the EU's market economy treatment. 
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Chapter One 
The GATT Framework 
Introduction 
If a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it charges on its home 
market in the ordinary course of trade, the product is considered as being dumped. Since 
dumped goods are likely to cause material injury to domestic industries of the importing 
country, international trade policies recognize that dumping is a practice to be condemned 
Therefore, governments of the importing country can take action against dumping in 
order to protect their domestic industries. Today, the Agreement on the implementation of 
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 (often called the 
'Anti-Dumping Agreement')' and Article VI of GATT operate together and provide the 
framework for the WTO Members' anti-dumping legislation. They allow governments to 
take action against dumping where there is genuine ('material') injury to the competing 
domestic industry. Typically the action is to impose extra import duty on the dumped 
product from the exporting country, so that its price can be brought closer to the 'normal 
value' and the injury to the domestic industry of the importing country can be removed. 
Though the rules do not pass any specific judgment in any anti-dumping case, they 
discipline the Members' anti-dumping actions and regulate how their governments can or 
cannot react to dumping. 2 
1 'Anti-Dumping' <http: //www. wto. org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/antidum2. htm> (I December 2002). 
The legislation is available from the WTO website. 
<http: //www. wto. org/engIish/docs-e/iegal_e/legal-e. htm#finalact> (I December 2002). 
24 Trade into the Future: the Introduction to the WTO Agreement on Subsidies, Safeguards: 
Contingencies, etc' <http: //www. wto. org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif e/agrm7_e. htm> (I 
December 2002). 
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This chapter focuses on the analysis of the GATT anti-dumping legislation. It consists of 
four parts. The first provides a concise description of the development of the rules. The 
rules in force at present have evolved over four stages: anti-dumping rules prior to GATT, 
Article VI of GATT 1947, the GATT Anti-Dumping Code and The Uruguay Round 
Anti-Dumping Agreement. I chart the progress and character of each of them. Part two is 
the key section of this chapter. In it I analyze the AntimDumping Agreement in detail. The 
nature and objective of the Agreement, its main contents, key concepts and procedural 
requirements are illustrated in this part. Since this study is about the EU antirdumping 
legislation against China, which is based on the GATT antimdumping rules with regard to 
state-trading countries, I illustrate provisions dealing with state trading issues in the 
General Agreement in part three. This section contains two types of rules: one is Article 
XVII of the GATT 1994 that focuses on state trading enterprises (STEs) specifically, 
another is the GATT anti-dumping rules with regard to state trading countries3. Some of 
the issues analyzed are not relevant to the theme of my thesis, but they are discussed here 
for the completeness of the description of the GATT rules, so they will not be dealt with 
further. 
In the last part of the chapter, I analyze three practical problems that have arisen from the 
GATT anti-dumping provisions against exports from state trading countries. 
1. They do not specify whether the anti-dumping authority or exporting country bears 
the burden of proof of state trading issues. 
2. The rules are too old to regulate the current situation properly. 
3. They are too simple and too vague to be applied by the WTO Members fairly. 
These problems are noticeable because they leave wide discretion to the WTO Member's 
3 it is the second interpretative note to paragraph I of Article 
VI in Annex I to 'General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994'. 
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national authorities with regard to NME issues, and they are likely to lead to judgments 
which are particularly adverse to the so-called state-trading countries. In fact, under some 
WTO Members' NME methodologies, their authorities use 'nearly unlimited discretion 
to detect dumping where none exists and calculate related dumping margins at their 
Will. 14 It no doubt undermines the fair competition principle of international trade. 
In summary, this chapter analyzes the GATT anti-dumping rules in force, which provides 
the framework for the EU anti-dumping legislation with regard to China. It explains and 
analyzes key concepts and general procedural requirements for anti-dumping measures, 
and thus forms the conceptual basis for the dissertation. 
1. The development of GATT anti-dumping rules. 
'A product is to be considered as being dumped, i. e. introduced into the commerce of 
another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported 
from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of 
trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country. 5 
Dumping is a traditional way to increase exports or capture a new market for a particular 
product. However, it is likely to cause material injury or to threaten the economic benefits 
of the home producers in the importing country. Consequently, the latter will take 
corresponding action to stop this dumping practice and offset the injury. 
A. Development of anti-dumping rules prior to GATT. 
At the beginning of the last century, many industrialized countries realized the 
unfavorable effects of dumping, and regarded it as an unfair method of competition that 
4 Alexander Polouektov, 'Non-Market Economy Issues in the WTO Anti-Dumping Law and 
Accession Negotiations, Revival of a Two-Tier MernbershipT (2002) 36 (1) Journal of World Trade I 
at p 3) 1. 
5 Art. 2 (1), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
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should be curbed. So, it was held that the importing country has the right to protect itself 
by taking anti-dumping measures. In order to protect the domestic industry and limit the 
foreign exporter's dumping practice, Canada first pointed out in 1904 that an 
anti-dumping duty should be imposed on imported products whose export prices was 
lower than its fair market value in the exporting country. 6 Since then, many other 
industrialized nations such as New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom and the 
United States have enacted anti-dumping laws. The purpose of the legislation was to 
offset the injury caused by dumped goods with anti-dumping duties. 
B. Article V1 of the GAM 
Due to the increasing volume and high speed development of global trade, dumping 
became an issue calling for international attention. Consequently, anti-dumping 
legislation was developed as binding international rules for the first time within the 
GATT framework when the latter came into force on I January 1948. The rules on the 
application of anti-dumping measures were set out in Article VI. They establish the 
criteria to determine dumping, 7 state the purpose for which anti-dumping duties may be 
imposed 8, and prescribe conditions under which the measures can be taken. 
There are three important features of these rules which confine the application of 
anti-dumping measures. Article VI stipulates that anti-dumping measures may only be 
taken when products are introduced into an importing country at less than their normal 
value. So the definition of normal value is crucial to the appreciation of the rules. Article 
VI enumerates methods for the application of 'Normal Value' as: 
a. 'The comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product 
6 J. Viner, Dumping -A Problem in International Trade (Chicago, University of Chicago, 1923) 
(Reprints of Economic Classics, New York, Kelley, 1966), 192. 
7 Art. VI (1), GATT. 
8 Art. VI (3)), GATT. 
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when destined for consumption in the exporting country'; or 
b. 'The highest comparable price for the like product to any third country in the 
ordinary course of trade'; or 
C. 'The cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus a 
reasonable addition for selling cost and profit'. 9 
Article VI then provides that before any anti-dumping or countervailing duty may be 
imposed by an exporting country, the importing country must have determined that the 
effect of the dumping 'is such as to cause or threaten material injury to an established 
domestic industry or to materially retard the establishment of such an industry". 
Finally, the rules state the maximum level of the antiýdumping duty that can be levied, i. e. 
the duties imposed on dumped products may not be greater than the dumping margin' 1. 
Based on these points, on the one hand, we can state that the General Agreement set forth 
ground rules at the international level. It is clear that these rules are based on the purpose 
of anti-dumping measures, i. e. to offset injury caused by dumping and restore fair 
competition rather than limit norinal exports. So, it was a significant step forward. 
However, practice shows that the rules were seriously flawed and were not precise 
enough to achieve the aim of anti-dumping legislation. 
First, the GATT anti-dumping rules are not precise and complete enough. In particula-, 
they ignored the procedures that should be followed when anti-dumping measures are 
taken. Therefore, the rules actually left too broad a scope for various interpretation and 
implementation by the GATT Contracting Parties. In short, they were not well 
9 Art. VI (1), GATT 
10 Art. VI (6)(a), GATT. 
II Art. VI (2), GATT. 
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implemented according to their purpose. 12 
Second, as one of the original Contracting Parties of the GATT, the United States took the 
advantage that it was exempt from the injury requirement under the GATT 'grandfather 
clause. ' 13 Under it, the US only complied with part 11 of the Agreement 'to the fullest 
extent not inconsistent with existing legislation. ' Consequently, Article VI was not 
binding on one of the main Contracting Parties. It reduced the effectiveness of Article VI 
in practice, because those GATT major Contracting Parties applied anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures far more than others. From this point of view, further 
improvement to Article VI of GATT was needed. 
C. The GATT Anti-Dumping Code. 
Due to the defects of the rules in Article VI, negc)tiations on anti-dumping issues were 
highlighted in the Kennedy Round which began in 1963. The conclusion of the 
'Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT' (also referred to as the 'GATT 
Anti-Dumping Code') in Geneva, on 30 June 1967, was deemed to be a significant 
achievement. At first, it imposed binding obligations on all Contracting Parties, who 
pledged formally to revise their national legislation and make it consistent with the code 14 . 
Thus, the rules became more effective. Besides, it provided more precise rules governing 
the criteria and procedures to be followed when determining dumping and injury. 15 In 
addition to that, the Code also established a permanent Committee on antýdumping 
practices, whose task is to review regularly the anti-dumping legislation of the 
12 John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations 
nd 
2 edn., (London : MIT Press, 1997) at p 256. 
13 GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (hereinafter cited as GATT, BISD), Vol. 1, at p. 
81 (Geneva, 1952). 
14 Art 14,1967 GATT Anti-Dumping Code. 
15 Arts. 2 and 3,1967 GATT Anti-Dumping Code. 
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Contracting Parties and the measures that they take to implement it. 16 
The 1967 GATT Anti-Dumping Code was updated during the Tokyo Round mainly 
because of 
the growing dissatisfaction of the European Community with the interpretation of the 
injury requirement by US authorities and the simultaneous realization in the 
Community that certain Code requirements, notably the causation standard, might be 
too stringent. 17 
Consequently, a new 'Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT' was 
concluded on 30 June 1979. Compared with the former Anti-Dumping Code, it provided 
more realistic criteria of dumping by requiring the segregation of injury caused by 
dumping from injuries caused by other factors, and then an assessment of injury caused 
by the dumped products. Furthermore, the new code stipulated more explicit criteria for 
assessing the injurious effects of dumping on the importing country's domestic industry 
as well as more detailed rules about price undertakings. 18 
D. Uruguay Round Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
Anti-dumping measures were an important subject in the Uruguay Round which 
concluded the 'Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994' (Anti-Dumping Agreement). It was included in Annex IA of the 
WTO Agreement with other multilateral agreements automatically binding on all WTO 
Members. It revises the rules governing the application of anti-dumping measures 
contained in the 1979 Anti-Dumping Code, and takes over the proposals from two major 
16 Art. 17,1967 GATT Anti-Dumping Code. 
17 Ivo Van Bael & Jean-Francois Bellis, Anti-Dumping and other Trade Protection LaWs Of the EC 3rd 
edn. (Bicester: CCH Europe, 1996) at p 28. 
18 Art. 4.1979 GATT Anti-Dumping Code. 
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groups in the negotiation: the US and the European Community (EC)19 as well as 'Japan 
20 and most of the newly industrialized countries (NICs)' . 
Although the basic foundations remain intact, the 18 Articles of the new Agreement 
substantially amend most of the 16 Articles of the 1979 AntiýDumping Code, and there 
are two new annexes dealing with verification procedures and the use of best information 
available in cases of non-cooperation. Provisions dealing with issues such as sales below 
cost, 'symmetry' and 'comparison of weighted average normal values to weighted 
average export prices or duty as a cost in refund cases' were introduced in the new 
agreement. 21 Besides, it changed some procedural provisions with regard to provisional 
duties and reviews. Finally and most important of all, a new Dispute Resolution 
Understanding ('DSU') replaced the old compromise and conciliation system of GATT 
panels. Compared with the latter, it is more powerful and effective in solving disputes 
through the new Dispute Settlement Body ('DSB). 
From the analysis above, we can see that the GATT anti-dumping rules were revised 
better to meet the real needs of international trade. They were developed to be more 
precise and more easily applicable than before. They leave less scope for interpretation 
by the GATT Contracting Parties, and they attempt to avoid antýdumping rules being 
utilized as a means of excluding exports from other countries to overprotect domestic 
industry. The rules have been revised several times because of an important fact: the 
GATT legislators stress that anti-dumping rules should be observed as a tool to restore 
fair trade rather than eliminate due competitive trade practice of foreign exporters. This is 
the original purpose of the GATT framework of anti-dumping rules. It is fundamental for 
the Contracting Parties to bear this in mind when they later codify and implement their 
19 Here I use 'European Community' because the EU was not established until the Treaty on 
European Union entered into force on I November 1993. 
20 Bael & Bellis, fn 17 above at p 29. 
21 Ibid. 
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own anti-dumping legislation. It also shows that according to the purpose of restoring fair 
trade, anti-dumping rules should be developed in the trend to better accommodate to new 
conditions and issues arising. 
IL Current GATT anti-dumping rules in force. 
A. Nature and objectives of the rules. 
At present, both the GATT Article VI and the An&Dumping Agreement of 1994 operate 
together to standardize anti-dumping measures according to their nature: a too] to restore 
fair competition of international trade. 
On the one hand, the rules recognize the possible adverse effects, i. e. material injury on 
22 industries of an importing country caused or threatened by dumped products. Therefore, 
they allow importing countries to take action against such practices to protect domestic 
producers and restore fair competition. These countries can achieve this objective by 
imposing anti-dumping duties or accepting price undertakings from exporters on a 
reasonable basis. 
On the other hand, 'the important feature claimed in respect of antiýdumping legislation is 
that it does not restrict trade as such, but merely requires trade to operate fairly. *2- ' So it 
regulates an importing country's anti-dumping action by both establishing standards to 
judge key factors concerned (such as the fact of dumping and injury) and by setting up 
anti-dumping procedures. 
Based on these points, the rules justify importing countries' anti-dumping action 
and make it an exception to the GATT basic principles, i. e. non-discrimination 
22 Art. VI (1), GATT 
23 J Cunnane & C. Stanbrook, Dumping and Subsidies. - the Law and Procedures Governing the 
ImpositiOn of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties in the European Community. (London: 
Fluropean Business Publications, 1983) at p 2. 
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with regard to all Contracting Parties. In most cases, anti-dumping measures are to 
impose extra import duty on certain product from the particular exporting country 
so as to remove the injury to domestic industries of the importing country and 
bring the dumped product's price closer to its normal value. 
B. Main contents of the rules. 
1. Article V1 of the GATT 
As we analyzed in Part LB above, Article VI of the GATT provides preconditions that 
have to be met before the importing state is entitled to impose an an&dumping duty. The 
most important precondition is the requirement that before any action can be taken 
against any dumped product, the importing country should demonstrate that the product 
'causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a 
"4 Contracting Party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry. ' Also, 
Article VI stipulates that the anti-dumping duties may not be greater than the margin of 
dumping or the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have been granted. In addition, 
it provides that no product shall be subject to both anti-dumping and countervailing duties 
for the same situation of dumping or export subsidization, 25 and these duties may not be 
applied if the price difference is due to the exemption of the imported product from duties 
or taxes which would have been borne if the goods had been destined for consumption in 
the country of origin or exportation, or due to the refund of such duties or taxes. 26 
2. Agreement on implementation of Article V1 of the GATT 1994. 
The Anti-Dumping Agreement clarifies and expands Article VI. It provides more precise 
legal definitions and procedures governing anti-dumping. According to GATT Article VI, 
24 
Article VI (6)(a), GATT. 
2s Article VI (5)ý GAIT. 
26 Article VI (4), GATL 
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it also allows the goverrurnent of an importing country to act against dumping where there 
is material injury to the competing domestic industry. But before doing that, the 
government has to show much more evidence that dumping is taking place. In addition to 
that, the government also should calculate the extent of dumping (how much lower the 
export price is compared to the exporter's home market price), and show the definite 
causal relationship between the two of them. Finally, it must follow the an&dumping 
procedures specified in the Agreement, which is the most significant difference compared 
with the Article VI of GATT. 
In this way, the Agreement comprises three kinds of rules: first, standards to judge the 
facts that constitute dumping; second, requirements to assess injury; third, procedures 
that governments must follow when they determine dumping and take anti-dumping 
action. 
C. Substantive rules and key concepts. 
Article I of the Anti-Dumping Agreement establishes the basic principle that 'an 
anti-dumping measure shall be applied only under the circumstances provided for in 
Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in 
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. 27 That is to say, an importing state can 
take anti-dumping measures only after it determines three facts according to the 
Agreement: dumped imports, material injury to domestic industries and the causal 
relationship between them. 
1. Determination of dumping. 
Article 2 provides detailed rules to determine dumping, which should be calculated on the 
(, round of fair comparison between the export price of goods concerned and the normal 
27 Article 1, Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
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value. The latter refers to the price of the imported product in the country of origin or 
export in the ordinary course of trade. 
It provides three methods to calculate a product's 'normal value'. The most applicable 
one is based on the price in the exporter's domestic market. When this cannot be applied, 
two alternatives are available: the price charged by the exporter in another country, or a 
calculation based on the combination of the exporter's production costs, other expenses 
and normal profit margins. 
2. Determination of injury. 
Article VI of GATT provides that material injury includes three situations: 
a. Material injury itself, 
b. Threat of material injury to an established industry in the territory of a Contracting 
Party; 
c. Material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry. 
Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides more detailed rules about the 
determination of injury. It specifies that it 'shall be based on positive evidence and 
involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the 
effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) 
the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products. -28 It also 
contains rules as to the key factors that should be considered when the government of an 
importing country determines injury. In Article 3.5, it emphasizes that demonstration of a 
causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry 
shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence. In addition to dumped imports, 
28 Article 33 (1), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
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the authorities shall also examine other factors that may cause the injury, where the 
adverse effects on the domestic industry of the importing country cannot be attributed to 
dumped imports. 
A new provision in the Anti-Dumping Agreement is Article 3.3 on cumulative evaluation. 
It authorizes cumulation of imports from countries which are simultaneously subject to 
anti-dumping investigations. In this matter, authorities must: 
a. determine whether the volume of dumping from each exporting country is not 
negligible; 
carry out a cumulative assessment on the effects of the dumped imports 'in light of 
conditions of competition between the imported products and the conditions of 
competition between the imported products and the like domestic product. ' 
3. Definition of domestic industry. 
In Article 4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the domestic industry is interpreted for the 
purpose of assessing injury and causation. It refers to 'the domestic producers as a whole 
of the like products 29 or to those of them whose collective output of the products 
constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products except 
that: 
(i) when producers are related to the exporters or importers or are themselves importers of 
the allegedly dumped product, the term 'domestic industry' may be interpreted as referring 
to the rest of the producers; 
(ii) in exceptional circumstances the territory of a Contracting Party may, for the 
production in question, be divided into two or more competitive markets and the 
29 According to Article 2.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in the absence of a like product, the one that 
has characteristics closely resembling those of the imported dumped products will 
be considered. 
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producers within each market may be regarded as a separate industry if (a) the producers 
within such market sell all or almost all of their production of the product in question in 
that market, and (b) the demand in that market is not to any substantial degree supplied by 
producers of the product in question located elsewhere in the territory. In such 
circumstances,, injury may be found to exist even where a major portion of the total 
domestic industry is not injured, provided there is a concentration of dumped imports into 
such an isolated market and provided further that the dumped imports are causing injury 
to the producers of all or almost all of the production within such market. ' 30 
D. Procedural requirements. 
The objective and original purpose of the GATT anti-dumping procedural rules is to 
ensure the transparency of proceedings, a full opportunity for both the exporting and 
importing state's domestic producers to defend their interests, and sufficient explanations 
made by investigation authorities for their determination. 31 
1. Initiation and subsequent investigation. 
With regard to anti-dumping investigations, the detailed procedural requirements of the 
Agreement focus on the sufficiency of petitions, establishment of time limits for 
investigations, access to information needed by all parties concerned and opportunities 
for them to present their views and arguments. 
Article 5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement stipulates requirements for the initiation of an 
investigation. It provides that such investigations should be initiated with a written 
request submitted by or on behalf of a domestic industry. 'If it is supported by those 
domestic producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50 per cent of the total 
30 Article 4 (1), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
31 . Anti-Durnping' <http: //www. wto. org/french/tratop_f/adp_f/antidum2. htm> (I December 2002). 
35 
, 32 production of the like product produced by that portion of the domestic industry , this 
application can be regarded as the request which is made by or on behalf of the domestic 
industry. However, no investigation can be initiated if domestic producers who support 
the request are less than 25 per cent of the total production of the like product produced 
by the domestic industry. The article also specifies that in special circumstances without 
such a written application, the authorities concerned can decide to initiate an investigation 
only if they have sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and a causal link to justify the 
initiation of an investigation. 33 In order to avoid meritless investigation being continued, 
Article 5.8 provides for immediate termination of investigations if the volume of dumped 
imports is negligible 34 or the dumping margin is de minimis. 35 As well, the duration of 
investigations is set in Article 5.10, which requires the authorities concerned to complete 
investigations within one year or no more than 18 months after the procedure is initiated. 
Article 6 specifies detailed rules on the process of investigation. It includes rules on the 
notification to interested parties and the collection of evidence. They operate together to 
ensure the transparency of investigations and the sufficiency of opportunities for patties 
concerned to comment. Furthermore, the Article stipulates the application of sampling. 
An individual dumping margin normally should be determined for each known exporter 
or producer, but when the number of exporters, producers, importers or types of products 
involved is too large to be determined as usual, the authorities are entitled to apply 
sampling techniques. 36 
32 Article 5 (4), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
33 Article 5 (6), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
34 i. e. dumped imports from a particular country is found to account for less than 3 per cent of imports of 
the like product in the importing state. Article 5 (8), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
35 Le. durnping 't-nargin is less than 2 per cent, expressed as a percentage of the export price. ' Article 5 
(8), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
36 Article 6 (10), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
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2. Provisional measures. 
Article 7 specifies conditions under which provisional measures can be imposed and the 
relevant time limits that should be observed. Under the rule, provisional measures may be 
applied only after: 37 
a. an investigation has been initiated and carried out lawfully according to the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement; 
b. a preliminary affirmative determination on dumping and consequent injury to 
domestic industry have been made; 
c. such measures are regarded necessary to prevent injury caused by dumped imports 
during the investigation. 
It also provides that provisional measures shall not be applied sooner than 60 days from the 
date of initiation of the investigation. 38 
3. Price undertakings. 
Article 8 relates to undertakings to revise prices or cease exports at dumped prices, which 
may suspend or terminate an investigation without imposing provisional measures or 
anti-dumping duties . 
39However, such price undertakings can be accepted only after a 
preliminary affirmative determination of dumping, injury, and causality has been made 
by the authorities of the importing state. 40 It also emphasizes that undertakings suggested 
by the authorities of the importing state should be made by the exporter on a voluntary 
37 Article 7 (1), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
38 Article 7 (3), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
39 Article 8 (1), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
40 Article 8 (2), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
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basis. 41 After a satisfactory undertaking is accepted by the former, the investigation 
should be continued at the request of the exporter or the authorities. If a negative 
determination of dumping, injury or causality is found in the end, the undertaking shall 
lapse automatically. 42 
Imposition and collection of duties. 
Article 9 stresses that an anti-dumping duty should be less than the margin of dumping if 
such a lesser duty is adequate to remove injury of the domestic industry in the importing 
state 43. In order to ensure that the anti-dumping duties do not exceed the dumping margin 
calculated during the investigation, Article 9.3 introduces a new method to be applied in 
respect of the collection of duties and refunds for the two collection systems operated in 
the world at present: the retrospective assessment of duties and the prospective 
determination of duties. Article 9.4 sets forth rules for the authorities of an importing 
state to calculate the amount of duties by using sampling according to Article 6.10. 
Finally, an accelerated review by the authorities of the importing state to calculate 
individual margins of dumping for new exporters is required in Article 9.5. The new 
exporters refer to those who did not export during the original period of investigation and 
is not related to any exporter subject to anti-dumping duties. 
Article 10 states that both provisional and final anti-dumping duties cannot be imposed 
44 
unless the facts of dumping, injury and their causality have been determined . It specifies 
that if the determination of the anti-dumping duty is based on the fact of material injury, 
the anti-dumping duty may be collected since provisional measures were imposed. The 
difference between the definitive anti-dumping duty and the provisional duty should be 
41 Article 8 (5), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
-12 Article 8 (4), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
13 Article 9 (1), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
44 Article 10 (1), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
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refunded if the former is less than the latte ý5 . Article 10.6 also stipulates that in certain 
exceptional situations (such as massive dumped products appear within very short 
periods), a definitive duty 'may be levied on products which were entered for 
consumption not more than 90 days prior to the date of application of provisional 
measures9. 
5. Duration, termination, and review of antýdumpihg measures. 
Article II addresses the duration and termination of anti-dumping duties as well as 
requirements for periodic review of the measure. It provides that any interested party has 
the right to request the authorities to examine the necessity of the continued imposition of 
the duty. If, as the result of such a review, the authorities determine that the injury is 
unlikely to continue if the anti-dumping were removed or varied, then it shall be 
terminated immediately. 46 The 'sunset' review is specified in Article 11.3 that any 
definitive anti-dumping duties are to be terminated no later than five years after they are 
first applied, unless the authorities determine after a review that the expiry of the duty 
would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. Anyreview 
shall be carried out according to provisions of Article 6 and shall normally be concluded 
within 12 months from the date when it is initiated 47 . These provisions on review also can 
be applied to price undertakingS48. 
6. Public notice. 
Article 12 provides detailed rules on public notice. Notice is given by the authorities of 
the importing countries, and shall be forwarded to exporters concerned and other 
45 Article 10 (3), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
46 Article 11 (2), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
. 47 Article 11 (4), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
48 Article 11 (5), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
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interested parties known to the authorities. This is intended to increase the transparency 
of anti-dumping procedures and the determination of the measures, so that decisions on 
49 the imposition of anti-dumping measures can be based on sufficient facts . 
When an anti-dumping investigation is initiated, the authorities shall give public notice, 
and the GATT Contracting Parties whose products are subject to the investigation as well 
as other interested parties will be therefore notifiedo. Public notice shall also be given of 
the determination of preliminary measures. It includes detailed explanations for the 
preliminary determination of dumping and injury, and relevant law and non--confidential 
facts referred t05 1. When an investigation is concluded with a negative determination of 
dumping, public notice will be given. If an affirmative imposition of a definitive 
anti-dumping duty is determined or a satisfactory price undertaking is accepted, a public 
report will be set forth to notify the suspension of the investigation. Article 12.3 also 
stipulates that its provisions on public notice 'shall apply mutatis mutandis to the 
initiation and completion of reviews Pursuant to Article II and to decisions under Article 
10 to apply duties retroactively'. 
7. The committee and dispute settlement. 
Article 16 establishes a Committee on Anti-Dumping Practice. Its composition, time for 
conference and responsibility are provided in the first paragraph of the Article. GATT 
Contracting Parties shall report all its preliminary or final anti-dumping actions taken to 
the Committee on time, and semi-annual reports are required to be submitted by the 
Contracting Parties to notify anti-dumping actions taken within the preceding six months. 
Article 17 sets forth that the Dispute Settlement Understanding is applicable to 
49 , Anti-Dumping', seefn 31 above. 
50 Article 12 (1), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
51 Article 12 (2), Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
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consultations and settlement of disputes under this Anti-Dumping Agreement. If a GATT 
Contracting Party considers that its due benefit under this Agreement is nullified or 
impaired directly or indirectly, it may request in writing consultations with the 
Contracting Party(s) concerned. If the Contracting Party initiating the consultations 
considers that they fail to achieve a mutually agreed solution, and final actions are finally 
taken by the importing country, it may refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB). According to paragraph 5 and 6 of the article, the DSB shall estaffish a panel at 
the request of the complaining party. It shall examine disputes from both fact and 
interpretation of the Agreement. A special standard of review is established to prevent 
dispute settlement panels from making decisions which are unreasonable. 
8. Final provisions. 
Article 18 stresses that GATT Contracting Parties shall take anti-dumping actions 
according to this Agreement strictly. They must ensure the conformity of their 
anti-dumping laws with the Agreement, and they shall inform the Committee of any 
changes in their anti-dumping laws and regulations. Meanwhile, the Committee shall 
review the implementation and operation of the Agreement annually. 
Among all of the above rules, those governing the determination of normal value, 
undertakings and anti-dumping duties are particularly important to the research of the EU 
anti-dumping legislation towards China. Therefore, they will be further discussed 
throughout this thesis. 
1/1. GATT rules on state trading. 
Generally speaking, international trade is based on the theory of comparative advantage, 
and countries can reap economic benefits by expanding their international trade. In the 
context of GATT principles, it shall be carried out on a fair and non-discriminatory basis. 
41 
However, if a government controls an enterprise directly or interferes in its 
decision-making indirectly, it may act through the firm to provide protection against 
imports or to advance exports to the detriment of foreign producers. As a result, it will 
influence world trade in an uneconomic direction and demolish the principles observed in 
the GATT. Thus, the drafters of the General Agreement paid special attention to the state 
trading issue. They attempt to place the state trading enterprise in the same competitive 
position with private traders, and thus to remove the possible trade distortion resulting 
from the government involvement in an enterprise's decision-making and trade 
activities. 52 
Consequently, Article XVII of the GATT 1994 focuses on state trading enterprises (STEs) 
specifically, and numerous other Articles refer either directly or indirectly to state trading 
under different topics. They are essentially to ensure that STEs 'operate on the basis of 
commercial considerations and in a non-discriminatory manner', and 'do not serve to 
implement otherwise WTO-inconsistent measures, such as quantitative restrictions or 
subsidies 5.53 
A. Article XVII of the GATT 1994 and the definition of STEs. 
Article XVII is the principal article dealing with STEs and their operations. It sets out the 
basic idea that STEs' purchases or sales involving either imports or exports should be in 
accordance with the GATT general principles of non-discrimination and transparency. 
The Article does not attempt to make an actual definition of STEs but, in its first 
paragraph, it enumerates three types of enterprises that they refer to: 
(i) 'State enterprises' (that is, owned by the State); 
52 , STR: Why Regulate State Trading? ' 
<http: //www. wto. org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/eol/e/wto05/wto5_9. htm> (I December 2002). 
53 , STR: The Rules' <http:, I/www. wto. org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/eol/e/wtoO5/wto5_12. htm> (I 
December 2002). 
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Enterprises granted special privileges by the State (for example a subsidy or 
subsidy equivalent); 
Enterprises granted exclusive privileges (i. e. a monopoly in the production. 
consumption or trade of certain goods). 
From this point of view, if a private corporation or enterprise receives some special right 
or privilege from the State, which results in a position to influence the level or direction of 
trade,, it could also be considered as a state trading enterprise. 
In order to increase the transparency of the use of state trading to implement various 
trade-related policies, it also requires that GATT Contracting parties shall notify their 
STEs to the WTO annually. So, a clear definition of a state trading enterprise which is 
notifiable is necessary. As a result of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations, the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of GATT 1994 was 
concluded. One of its main features is the 'working definition of state trading enterprise' 
contained in paragraph 2 of the text as: 
'Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing boards, 
which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including statutory 
or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their 
purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports'. 
From this definition, we can once again infer the important criteria for a STE are that it 
enjoys exclusive or special rights or privileges, which are normally unavailable to other 
private enterprises in the same field. These rights and privileges give the enterprise 
advantages over others, and thus influence imports or exports by its buying and selling 
activities. 
Here, we should also stress one point that 'the WTO does not seek to prohibit or even 
43 
discourage the establishment or maintenance of STEs, but rather to ensure that they are 
54 used and operated in a manner consistent with WTO principles and rules' 
B. GATT anti-dumping rules with regard to state trading. 
In addition to the core provisions in Article XVII and the Understanding, a number of 
other GATT Articles also deal with state trading under different topics. In the context of 
the GATT anti-dumping rules, this issue is taken into special account when products 
exported from a state trading country are initiated with an anti-dumping investigation by 
an importing country's domestic industry. In that case, the GATT antimdumping rules are 
applied to state trading countries and non-state trading countries in a similar way except 
that the methods to calculate normal value of products exported from the former are 
different. 
The second interpretative note to paragraph I of Article VI in Annex I to the GATT 1994 
states that: 
It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or 
substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed 
by the State, special difficulties may exist in determining price comparability for the 
purposes of Paragraph 1, and in such case importing Contracting Parties may find it 
necessary to take into account the possibility that a strict comparison with domestic 
prices in such a country may not always be appropriate. 
This provision provides the basis for national anti-dumping laws to establish the rules 
with regard to state trading. It points out the possible difficulties when calculating the 
normal value of products from a state trading country. However, it does not specify 
-, \, -hether the anti-dumping authority or the exporting country bears the burden of proof of 
state trading issues. Furthermore, it is too simple and does not provide any alternative 
S4 Ibid. 
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criteria or methods to establish it. 55 Unfortunately, this rule remained unattended, was 
conveyed by negotiators to a new text and linked to Article 2.7 of the \ý70 
Anti-Dumping Agreement. 56 Therefore, the GATT rules on dumping actually give the 
importing country the discretion to determine normal value of allegedly dumped imports 
originating in state trading countries in the way that they like. 
When we refer to this rule, we should notice that it is applicable only 'in the case of 
imports from a country which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its 
trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State'. It has a fundamental problem 
with the implementation of this provision because today, no country would practically 
qualify under the criteria. 57so , great care should be taken when determining the normal 
value of products exported from countries that are in a transitional period from NMEs to 
MEs. That is to say, their products' normal value cannot be treated exactly in the same 
way as goods exported from those countries described above, and the domestic price 
should be the main reference to determine the normal value of exports from these 
countries in this case. 
IV. Practical problems arising when the GATT anti-dumping 
rules are applied to state trading countries. 
Nowadays, Article VI of the GATT and the Anti-Dumping Agreement work together and 
govern the application of anti-dumping measures taken by Members of the WTO. They 
provide a framework for the Member's anti-dumping legislation. Considering their 
effects at the world level, the most noticeable practical problem arising when the GATT 
anti-dumping rules are implemented is that they are likely to be used by an importing 
5-S These issues will be further discussed in section IV of this chapter. 
56 
, \Iexander Polouektov, 
fii 4 above at p 13. 
S7 
p 14, Ibid. 
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country as a way to protect its domestic industry. It can be seen that some countries apply 
their anti-dumping laws as a method of creating a new barrier to trade. 58 For example. 
when a provisional duty is levied after an investigation is initiated by an importing 
country, a period of risk and uncertainty to exporters of certain products concerned is 
created at the same time. In this way, anti-dumping measures can virtually cause 
restrictions and distortions on international trade flows. However, with regard to exports 
from state trading countries which are involved in an anti-dumping investigation, far 
more practical problems appear when the GATT anti-dumping rules are applied. 
A. No provision identifies the burden of proof of state trade issues in the 
GATT. 
The GATT anti-dumping rules do not specify which side in antiýdumping investigations 
bears the burden of proof with regard to state trading identification. So, GATT 
Contracting Parties with relatively stronger economic strength such as the EU and U. S. 
introduce a unilateral interpretation of this sensitive issue. They take the lead to 
determine which economies are state-trading countries all by themselves. In this way, 
they transfer the burden of proof to these so-called state-trading countries or NMEs. As a 
result, according to the current anti-dumping legislation of most WTO Members, if an 
exporter from an NME asks for MET in anti-dumping investigations, it bears the very 
heavy burden of proof to demonstrate that it operates under market principles and meets 
the criteria for the MET established by the authority of the importing country. 59 
This gap of the GATT anti-dumping rules, therefore, becomes the principal factor 
resulting in the discriminatory treatment towards NMEs and transitional economies in 
anti-dumping proceedings of today. 
58 Jackson, fn 12 above at p 256. 
59 This issue is fully illustrated in section 11 of chapter three. 
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B. The GATT anti-dumping rules on the state trading issue 60 seem to be oLt 
of date and impractical. 
The Protocol was enacted together with the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 1947. 
and it has been in force since 1948. While half a century has passed, most state trading 
countries of these early days have turned to become transitional economies, but the 
Protocol still is the basis for WTO Member's anti-dumping legislation dealing with 
exports from these countries. 
Here, state trading countries have the same meaning as non-market economies (NMEs), 
which generally refer to the character of those centrally planned and state-controlled 
countries. At the time when the Agreement was concluded, most of them were 
developing countries. Compared with others, they were less developed, and their 
economic development was completely based on strict government control and budget. 
Free market and fair competition principles were ignored, and products' prices were 
determined by the state rather than the market. Under those circumstances, the drafters of 
the GATT took these issues into account and put forward corresponding resolutions to 
offset the unfair trading factors that may arise when those developing countries 
participated in international trade. As a result, they enacted the provision discussed 
above 61 ) and it was effective 
indeed, well observing the international trade principles (i. e. 
fI ree trade and fair competition)*. 
However, after more than 50 years' development, the world's economy has undergone 
fundamental changes, especially in those developing countries and communist countries, 
such as China and the former Soviet controlled states. They were completely NMEs in the 
1950's, while after half a century's reform and construction5 they have seen tremendous 
progress in their economic field. As a result, most of them are now in a transitional period 
60 - I. e. the second interpretative Note to Article VI of the GAIT. 
61 Ibid. 
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towards market economies (MEs). The governments do not impose strict control and 
rigid management on their countries' economy anymore. As the basic rules to develop the 
economy, free market and fair competition principles have gained more and more 
attention from the government. They are better respected than ever before, and prices of 
products are determined by them rather than states. With regard to international trade, 
their export prices are also mostly constructed by the market. 
Here, a good example can be given by examining the economic development of the 
People's Republic of China, of which dramatic changes have taken place due to economic 
reform policies since 1979. The reform was designed to accelerate the transformation of 
the country into a market-oriented economy. Consequently, the prices of over 90 percent 
of its final goods are now determined by market forces rather than government. This is a 
62 fact which has been confirmed by a World Bank Report. Furthermore, China entered 
the WTO on II December 200 1. By negotiating and offering specific commitments 
relating to all WTO disciplines, including trading rights, pricing policies and state trading, 
it is no longer a state trading country within the meaning of the second supplementary 
provision to Article VI, GATT. Based on these facts, though today China is not yet a fully 
rnarket-oriented economy, it is a country in transition from a centrally government 
planned economy to a market-oriented economy. So, it definitely cannot be regarded and 
treated as a state trading country like before. 
Generally speaking, countries of this kind are defined as 'transitional economies'. They 
have the characteristic of market and NMEs, but they develop to the direction of the 
former and have much less control on the economy than before. This definition covers a 
wide spectrum of economic structures. Some states are nearer to the traditional definition 
of state trading than others who are closer to free MEs. Furthermore, within each 
62 'China: Reform and Development in 1992-1993', World Bank Discussion Paper No. 215, 
- -Iittp: //www-wds. worldbank. org/servIet/WDS-1Bank_ServIet? pcont=detaiIs&eid=000009265-3970 
716144524> (I December 2002). 
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transitional economy, some aspects are more liberalized than others. Thus, the situation is 
highly complex. From this point of view, these states cannot be simply treated as 
state-trading countries by using the 'analogue country' method to calculate the normal 
value of their exports when judging whether the products are dumped. With regard to this 
issue, a set of more fair and reasonable methods and rules specifically for transitional 
economies should be adopted. 
The GATT anti-dumping legislation towards NMEs was enacted in 1947.63 Instead of 
being dropped, it has been automatically transposed into the WTO Anti-Dumping 
Agreement in 1994.64 Therefore, in contrast to significant advancements in many other 
areas covered by the GATT provisions, it is almost as vague as it was 50 years ago. 
Reconsidering the current GATT anti-dumping rules, they regulate exports from either 
MEs or NMEs. however, they have nothing to say with regard to transitional economies. 
This is a gap in the rules, and it becomes a great deficiency which results in intense 
disputes these days, because today only a few completely state-trading countries exist 
while more and more transitional economies appear on the world stage. From this point of 
view, the GATT rules do not set forth new provisions, so it cannot accommodate these 
changes of the transitional economies. Consequently, the gap of the rules leaves too broad 
a scope for the GATT Contracting Parties, and allows them to apply the rules for NMEs to 
transitional economies. In this way, they can easily reach the conclusion that exports from 
those countries are dumped. Obviously, it is neither fair nor reasonable. 
C. The GATT anti-dumping rules on the state trading issue are too simple 
and vague to be applied by WTO Members properly. 
'rhe second interpretative Note to Article VI of the GATT is the only rule specially 
63 It mainly refers to the second supplementary provision to paragraph I of Article VI in Annex I to 
GATT 1947. 
64 Article 2 (7), Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994. 
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providing for exports from state trading countries in the legal context of the GATT and 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
From the definition of dumping analyzed above, we can see that the normal value of a 
product is the key factor to judge whether it is dumped. As to products exported from 
non-state trading countries, their normal values are usually decided by their prices in their 
domestic markets. But with regard to state trading countries, the notd55 merely provides 
that 'a strict comparison with domestic prices in such a country may not always be 
appropriate' without giving any further suggestion. This is obviously too vague. 
A simple recognition of 'inappropriateness' of a strict comparison with domestic prices 
in state-trading countries has over the years evolved into a trade policy instrument that 
not only is absurd from the economic viewpoint, but also eminent in its unfairness. 66 
Besides, the rule does not give any guidance regulating the procedure of calculating the 
normal value of exports of these countries. As a result, it virtually gives the WTO 
Members the freedom to determine the normal value of allegedly dumped imports 
originating in state trading countries and corresponding dumping investigation 
procedures in the way that they regard proper. This is likely to result in unfair judgement 
against those exporting countries indeed. 
For example, in the absence of a GATT regulation on how to determine the normal values 
of exports from a state-trading country, the EU often uses the analogue third country 
method to calculate them (i. e. select an ME third country and refer to its domestic sales 
price of the like product concerned to determine its normal value). Article 2(7)(b) of the 
EU's Anti-Dumping Regulation 67 provides that the exporters in a state-trading country 
65 i. e. the second interpretative Note to Article VI of the GATT. 
66 Alexander Polouektov, fn 4 above at p7. 
67 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports 
fi-on-i countries not members of the European Community, OJ 1996 L056/1. 
50 
are only granted 10 days to comment on the selection after the Commission's notice 
indicates the reference country contemplated. 'Given the complexity of the comparison 
of production processes in different countries and the difficulties in gaining access to 
detailed information, this period of 10 days will be far too short to submit meaningful 
comments. ý68 It will definitely decrease the chance for exporters to participate in the 
process of the selection of the analogue third country, and will increase the discretionary 
power of the EU authorities to determine the normal value of products concerned. As a 
result, a dumping practice is likely to be found under this circumstance, and it is definitely 
unfair to state-trading countries. 
From these points of view, the GATT anti-dumping rules with regard to state-trading 
countries have some practical problems, so that when they are assimilated by the WTO 
Members into their own legislation, they may result in unfair factors which are adverse to 
state-trading countries involved in anti-dumping investigations. This violates the purpose 
and the trend of development of anti-dumping rules that we discussed before. 
Consequently, the fair competition principle of international trade is undermined to some 
extent, and it is harmful to the world's overall economic development. 
Conclusions 
This chapter analyzes the history, purpose and provisions of the GATT antiýdumping 
rules, which provides a framework for its Contracting Parties' an&dumping legislation. It 
especially focuses on the rules regulating exports from state trading countries. 
The GATT anti-dumping rules in force include Article VI of the GATT and the 
Anti -Dumping Agreement. They work together and govern the application of 
68 P. V. Schueren, 'New Anti-Dumping Rules and Practice: Wide Discretion Held on a Tight LeashT 
(1996), 33(2) Common Market Law Review, 282. 
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anti-dumping measures taken by Members of the WTO. 
The rules are applied to state trading countries and non-state trading countries in a similar 
way except that the methods to calculate normal value of their exports are different. 69 
There are several practical problems arising from the current GATT anti-dumping 
legislation with regard to exports from state trading countries arising from the fact that 
the law does not specify who bears the burden of proof of state-trading, the rules are too 
out of date to accommodate the current situation of transitional economies properly, and 
they are too simple and vague to be applied by the WTO Members fairly. In that case, 
they sometimes result in unfair factors when the WTO Members determine dumping and 
take anti-dumping actions against exports from the so-called state trading countries, 
which consequently undermine the fair competition principle of international trade. 
In this chapter, the GATT anti-dumping rules are analyzed as a base to discuss one of its 
Contracting Parties - the EU anti-dumping legislation later on. In the next chapter, the 
development and provisions of the EU's anti-dumping rules with regard to the People's 
Republic of China will be examined. Due to the legal gap of the GATT an&dumping 
rules, there arise some problems when the EU takes anti-dumping measures against 
exports from China. These issues will also be considered in the next chapter. 
69 The second interpretative note to paragraph I of Article VI in Annex I to the 
GATT 1994. 
52 
Chapter Two 
The European Union's Anti-Dumping Legislation 
with regard to the People"s Republic of China 
Introduction 
Though the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) antýdumping rules provide 
the legal framework for its Member's anti-dumping legislation, only after they are 
incorporated by the European Union (EU) anti-dumping rules, will they have binding 
effects on the EU's Member States. 
I elaborate the EU anti-dumping legislation in this chapter. The chapter focuses on three 
issues: the evolution of the rules, their main content and the enforcement of the EU's 
anti-dumping rules with regard to the People's Republic of China. 
In the first section, the development and history of the EU anti-dumping 
legislation will be analyzed. This anti-dumping legislation is enacted in the 
form of Council Regulations by the European Community (EC) 1 and 
Commission Decisions by the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
respectively. The two sets of rules used to govern different imports. The EC 
anti-dumping Regulations are applicable to dumped imports from third 
countries outside the EC, and the ECSC anti-dumping Decisions govern 
imports listed in the Annex to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC Treaty) 2 and related instruments. The ECSC 
II use 'European Community' here in order to distinguish it from the European Coal and Steel 
Community. 
2 Annex 1, ECSC treaty. 
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Decisions have been progressively amended to bring them into line with EC 
anti-dumping Regulations. 3 Therefore, in this section, I will discuss the 
evolution of the EC anti-dumping Regulations first, then analyze the 
amendments made for the rules applicable to China in recent years, and 
finally briefly introduce the development of the ECSC anti-dumping 
Decisions. 
The second part of the chapter will make a general introduction to the EU 
anti-dumping legislation. Since the ECSC Treaty expired on 23 July 2002, 
Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 4 replaces Commission Decision No 
2277/96/EC SCI 5 and governs products listed in the Annex to the ECSC 
Treaty .6 That is to say, Regulation 384/96 is the EU's current anti-dumping 
legislation in force. Therefore, its objectives, key concepts, main substantive 
rules and procedural rules will be explained carefully in this part. 
In the first two sections, the terms 'EC' and 'Community' are used instead of 
'EU' for two reasons. First, it needs to be distinguished from the ECSC when 
their anti-dumping legislation is compared. Second, since the EU was not 
3 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports 
from countries not members of the European Community, OJ 1996 L 56/1, amended by 'Council 
Regulation (EC) No 905/98 of 27 April 1998 amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on protection 
against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community', OJ 1998 L 128/18; 
'Council Regulation (EC) No 2238/2000 of 9 October 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on 
protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community', OJ 
2000 L 257/2; and 'Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002 of 5 November 2002 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on the protection against dumped imports from countries not members of 
the European Community, ' OJ 2002 L305/1. 
4 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports 
from countries not members of the European Community, OJ 1996 L 56/1. 
5 Commission Decision No 2277/96/ECSC of 28 November 1996 on protection against dumped 
imports from countries not members of the European Coal and Steel Community OJ 1996 L 308/11. 
6 Council Regulation (EC) No 963/2002 of 3 June 2002 laying down transitional provisions 
concerning anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures adopted pursuant to Commission Decisions No 
2277/96/ECSC and No 1889/98/ECSC as well as pending anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
investigations, complaints and applications pursuant to those Decisions. OJ 2002 L 149/3. 
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established until the Treaty on European Union entered into force on I 
November 1993,, 1 use the term 'EC' when analyzing its Regulations 
published before that date. 
The last section of this chapter is about the enforcement of the EU's 
anti-dumping rules with regard to China. In this part, first, the general 
situation relating to enforcement will be introduced. Second, main features of 
the enforcement of the rules will be summarised and analyzed. Finally, 
problems of the EU anti-dumping legislation towards China will be indicated 
by enumerating three inconsistencies of facts. 
With regard to rules analyzed in the first two parts, some of them are not relevant to the 
central argument of my thesis. They are discussed here for the completeness of the 
description of the EU anti-dumping legislation, so they will not be dealt with further. 
Those applicable to non-market economies (NMEs) and China are the highlights of this 
thesis, and they will be fully examined in the next chapters. 
In short, this chapter elaborates the EU anti-dumping legislation by analysing 
its evolution, key concepts, substantive and procedural rules, main 
f 
differences between provisions applicable to market economies (MEs) and 
those for NMEs. Also, the current situation and problems of the enforcement 
of the rules applicable to China are examined. Thus, it provides a solid 
theoretical base for the next chapters, where problems and issues of the 
current EU anti-dumping legislation towards China will be further explored 
and analyzed. 
/. The development of EU anti-dumping legislation. 
The EU is committed under international law to observe the rules of the GATT, 
so its anti-dumping legislation is based on GATT provisions. As we discussed 
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in the first Chapter, relevant provisions include Article VI and the Agreement 
on the implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 (Anti-Dumping 
Agreement). However, they only take effect to the extent that they are 
incorporated by the EU's legislation. 7 
The EU anti-dumping legislation is enacted as Council Regulations of the EC 
and Commission Decisions by the ECSC respectively. But since the latter 
Decision has been codified according to the current EC8 anti-dumping 
Regulation 9, and its rules are quite similar to the provisions of the latter, so, 
in the following section, I will discuss the evolution of the EC anti-dumping 
Regulation at first, then explore the changes of the rules applicable to China, 
and introduce the development of the ECSC Decision briefly afterwards. 
A. The evolution of the EC anti-dumping rules. 10 
The history of the EU anti-dumping legislation can be traced as early as 1957, 
and its development can be divided into two stages. 
1. The transitional period from 1958 to 1968. 
In 1957, the Treaty establishing the European Community (Treaty of Rome) 
was signed in Rome. For the first time, it established a customs union between 
Member States, which aims to contribute to the progressive abolition of 
restrictions on international trade and the lowering of customs barriers. 
" It 
7J Curmane & C. Stanbrook, Dumping and subsidies. - the law and procedures governing the 
imposition of anti-dumpimg and countervailing duties in the European Community. (London: 
European Business Publications, 1983) at p 10. 
8, EC' is used here to be distinguished from the ECSC. 
() Council Regulation 384/96 as amended. 
10 1 use 'EC' in this section in order to distinguish it from the ECSC. 
11 Article 1 -3) 
1 (ex Article 110), Treaty establishing the European Community. 
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also states that the Common Commercial Policy shall be based on uniform 
principles to take measures protecting trade in case of dumping or subsidies., 2 In this 
way, the Treaty of Rome provides an important legal base for the development 
of the EC's 13 anti-dumping legislation. 
According to the Treaty, the transitional period was from 1958 to 1972. 
Within the time limit, since the Community did not have a uniform 
anti-dumping regulation, Member States took protective measures against 
dumped imports according to their own anti-dumping laws. They included 
rules of the following countries: 
Belgium-the Import, Export and Transit of Goods Law of September 11, 
1962.14 
France-Article 19 of the Customs Law. ' 5 
Germany-paragraph 21 of the Customs Law. ' 6 
Italy-Law No. 39 on the Imposition of anti-dumping and Countervailing 
Duties of January 11,1963.1' 
Luxembourg-the Import, Export and Transit of Goods law of August 5, 
12 Article 133 (ex Article 113), Treaty establishing the European Community: 'The common 
commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, 
the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of unifon-nity in measures of 
I iberal ization, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in case of dumping 
or subsidies. ' 
13 1 use 'EC' here in order to distinguish it from the ECSC. 
14 Moniteur Belge of October 27,1962. 
15 Journal Officiel of December 18,1966. 
16 See Siebentes Gesetz zur Anderung des Zollgesetzes of June 30,1966, BGB 11542. 
17 Gazetta Ufficiale No. 40 of February 12,1963, at p. 761. 
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1963.18 
Netherlands-the Import and Export of Goods Law of July 5,1962.19 
However, the need for uniformity of laws arose soon due to the fact that any 
anti-dumping duty imposed nationally could be circumvented by indirect 
imports from other Member States, because there is free movement of goods 
within the Community. That is to say, imposition of anti-dumping or 
countervailing duties by individual Member States was inconsistent with the 
objectives of the Customs Union. This led the European Commission to 
submit a proposal to the Council in May 1965 for a uniform Regulation on 
protection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries which were 
not members of the EEC . 
20 Later, the European Communities concluded the 
agreement on the first anti-dumping Code 21 with other GATT Contracting 
Parties in 1967.22 The provisions thus became binding on individual Member 
States. At the end of 1967, the Commission revised its 1965 proposal. It was 
approved by the Council as Regulation (EEC) No. 459/68 23 , which came into 
to force on July 1,1968. 
The EC's 24 first anti-dumping Regulation basically incorporated the 1967 
GATT anti-dumping Code into EC law and allocated the task of enforcing the 
18 Memorial Lux. of August 10,1963. 
19 Staatsblad No. 295/1962. 
20 Beseler & Williams, anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Law. - The European Communities. (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986) at p 22. 
21 The first Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT (also referred to as the 'GATT 
Anti-Dumping Code') was signed in Geneva on 30 June 1967. 
22 68/041 UEEC: Council Decision of 27 November 1967 concluding multilateral agreements signed 
as a result of the conference on trade negotiations of 1964- 1967 OJ 1968 L305/1. 
23 Replation (EEC) No 459/68 of the Council of 5 April 1968 on protection against dumping or the 
granting of bounties or subsidies by countries which are not members of the European Economic 
Community OJ 1968 1_93/1. Eng. Spec. Ed. p. 80. 
24 , EC' is used here in order to be distinguished with the ECSC. In addition, the EU was not 
established until 1993. 
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new legislation among the institutions. 25 
2. The development of the EC's antýdumping legislation from July 1, 
1968 to March 6,1996.26 
In the following years, the Community's first anti-dumping Regulation was 
amended several times. 
The first amendment was made by Regulation (EEC) No. 2011/73 27 on some 
procedural points in order to intensify the role of the Community institutions 
in this area and to supplement the procedure for consultation. 
The rules were revised with Regulation (EEC) No. 1411/77 
28 for the second 
time in 1977 following the accession of the United Kingdom, Denmark and 
29 Ireland to the EC . 
In 1979, significant changes were made to Regulation 459/68. Regulation 
1681/7 930gave a revised interpretation of causality and introduced new rules 
to determine the normal value of imports from NMEs. Following the 
conclusion of the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, 
XVI and XXII (Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code) as a result of 
25 Ivo Van Bael & Jean-Francois Bellis, Anti-Dumping and other Trade Protection Laws of the EC 3rd 
edn. (Bicester : CCH Europe, 1996), 3 8. 
26 1 use 'EC' in this section because the EU was not established until 1993. 
27 OJ 1973 L206/3. 
28 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1411/77 of 27 June 1977 amending Regulation (EEC) No 459/68 on 
protection against dumping or the granting of bounties or subsidies by countries which are not 
members of the European Economic Community OJ 1977 L 160/4. 
29 Beseler & Williams, fn 20 above at p 23. 
Here I use 'EC' because the EU was established later. 
30 Regulation 1681/79, OJ 1979 L 196/1. 
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the Tokyo Round negotiations, the new Community legislation-Regulation 
3017/7 93 1 not only consolidated various amendments made before, but also 
made several very important innovations on legislation about subsidy and 
countervailing duties. Considering the experience gained by the Community 
and other major trading countries in an anti-dumping and countervailing field, 
it brought in some new rules to determine injury, which simply required that 
'dumped or subsidized imports were causing material injury, rather than proof 
that they were the major cause of injury as required under Regulation 
459/68 532 . Besides, procedural amendments were made for more transparency 
of anti-dumping proceedings, which entitled parties to the right to acquire 
information used against them. In addition, the procedure for extending 
provisional duties was simplified. 33 
In 1982, Regulation 3017/79 was revised to stipulate that reviews of 
anti-dumping measures could not be held until one year after the conclusion 
34 
of the proceedings. 
The Regulation was replaced by Regulation 2176/84 35 in July 1984. The new 
rules brought in a 'sunset clause' for the first time, i. e. anti-dumping duties 
will lapse automatically five years after imposition. 
In June 1987, the Regulation was amended again by introducing rules on 
circumvention. It allowed the extension of anti-dumping duties to products 
31 Regulation 3017/79, OJ 1979 L339/1. 
32 Van Bael & Bellis, fn 25 above at p 39. 
33 Beseler & Williams, fn 20 above at p 27. 
34 Regulation 1580/82, OJ 1982 L178/9. 
3s Regulation 2176/84, OJ 1984 L201/1, corrected at OJ 1984 1-227/35. 
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assembled within the Community 36 by companies related to an exporter who 
is subject to anti-dumping measures at that time. 37 
Regulation 2176/84 was replaced by Regulation 2423/88 in July 1988,38 in 
which several changes were made. One of them was: 
The introduction of the possibility of increasing the duty where it was 
proven that the exporter bore the cost of it (the anti-absorption duty). 
Another provision clarified the treatment of discounts and rebates when 
normal value and export prices were determined on the basis of prices 
actually paid. 39 
Other changes included the treatment which should be given to trading 
companies; guidelines to grant allowances (i. e. the adjustments for 
differences in level of trade and quantities were formally abolished). In 
addition, the procedure about sunset reviews was clarified as was that 
concerning the calculation of refunds. 40 
Regulation 2423/88 was amended in March 1994 from two aspects: first, it 
prescribed that definitive anti-dumping measures would be adopted by 
majority vote rather than by a qualified majority as in the past. 
41 Second, 
US-style strict time-limits were introduced. 
42 
36 1 use 'Community' here in order to distinguish it from the ECSC- 
37 Regulation 1761/87, OJ 1978 L167/9. 
38 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 of II July 1988 on protection against dumped or subsidized 
imports from countries not members of the European Economic Community OJ 1988 
L209/1, 
corrected at OJ 1988 L264/58. 
39 Van Bael & Bellis, fn 25 above at p 39. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Regulation 522/94, OJ 1994 L66/1 0. 
4' Regulation 521/94. OJ 1994 L66/7. 
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On 31 December 1994, Regulation 3283/94 43 replaced Regulation 2423/88. It 
strengthened amendments made before and incorporated the provisions of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement. Experience in the application of Regulation 
3283/94 showed the need for further amendments in order to facilitate its 
application. These amendments were incorporated into Council Regulation 
384/96. 
In March 1996, the new Regulation was published as a consolidated version of 
44 
anti-dumping legislation of the EC. For the first time, the new Regulation 
separated out the rules relating to anti-dumping from those relating to 
subsidies. It also introduced several significant new rules. They are: the 
re-introduction of the adjustments for differences in quantities and level of 
trade (abolished in 1988), the re-introduction of anti-circumvention rules and 
the elimination of anti-absorption provisions. 45 
The Regulation took effect after it was published on 6 March 1996. It is the 
basis of the EU anti-dumping legislation in force, and I will analyze its main 
provisions later in this chapter. 
3. Amendments made in recent years. 
a. Council Regulation (EC) No 2331/96.46 
On 2 December 1996, the E C47 amended Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 
43 Regulation 3283/94, OJ 1994 L349/1, as amended by Council Regulation 355/95, OJ 1995 L41/2. 
44 1 use 'EC' here in order to distinguish it from the ECSC. 
45 Van Bael & Bellis, fn 25 above at p 41. 
-16 Council Regulation (EC) No 2331/96 of 2 December 1996 amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on 
protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community. OJ 1996 
1-317/1- 
47 1 use 'EC' here in order to distinguish it from the ECSC. 
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with Council Regulation (EC) No 233 1/96. It mainly revised the rules applied 
to comparison of normal value and export price. These amendments need not 
be discussed further in the context of this thesis since they are not directly 
relevant to the main argument. 
b. Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98.48 
Considering the significant progress received from the economic reforms of 
Russia and the People's Republic of China, and in order to accommodate these 
changes, the E C49 issued Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98 on 27 April 
1998. It deleted the two states from the list of NMEs, and agreed to determine 
the normal value of their exports with rules applicable to MEs, if the 
producer(s) under investigation can demonstrate that market conditions 
prevail by meeting criteria set in the new rules. 50 
c. Council Regulation (EC) No 2238/2000.51 
Due to the similar reasons mentioned above, the EC 52 revised Council 
Regulation (EC) No 384/96 again with Regulation (EC) No 2238/2000 on 9 
October 2000. The rule acknowledges the process of economic reform in the 
Ukraine, Vietnam, Kazakhstan and countries which are Members of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) at the date of the initiation of the relevant 
48 Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98 of 27 April 1998 amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on 
protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community. OJ 1998 
L 128/18. 
49 1 use 'EC' here in order to distinguish it from the ECSC 
50 This issue will be further analyzed in the next section - The development of the EU's anti-dumping 
rules applicable to the People's Republic of China. 
51 Council Regulation (EC) No 2238/2000 of 9 October 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 
on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community. OJ 
2000 L257/2. 
52 1 use 'EC' here in order to distinguish it from the ECSC. 
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anti-dumping investigation 53, and grants their exports similar treatment as 
that which is applicable to the People's Republic of China. 
Based on these rules in force, up to now, only Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
North Korea, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan are still subject to strict 
canalogue country method' to determine the normal value of their exports. 
Other countries which used to be regarded as NMEs now have the opportunity 
to be treated as MEs, provided they meet the conditions set in the new 
Regulation. Regardless of their actual effects, the rules, undoubtedly are 
more practical and flexible than ever before. 
d. Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002.54 
On 5 November 2002, EU enacted Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 384/96. The new legislation brings several significant changes to the 
old rules relating to NME issues. First, it deletes Russia from the list of countries that are 
subject to the conditional MET under Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98. 
Therefore, Russian exporters are entitled to the MET automatically in the EU's 
anti-dumping proceedings afterwards. Second, it formally enumerates the criteria of 
individual treatment in the EU Regulation for the first time. 
In addition, it explains the concepts of 'related parties' and 'particular market situation' in 
the context of the old rules, and provides guidelines to the use of data when costs 
associated with the production and sale of the product under investigation are not 
reasonably reflected in the records of the party concerned. 
53 Today, Albania, China, Georgia, Kyrgystan and Mongolia have entered into the World Trade 
Organization. 
54 Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002, OJ 2002 1-305/1. 
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B. The development of the EU's anti-dumping rules applicable to 
the People's Republic of China. 
Trade cooperation between the E C55 and the People's Republic of China has 
increased rapidly since the establishment of official diplomatic relations in 
1975.56 After twenty years of development, China has become the EU's fourth 
most -important supplier in the world. However, unfortunately, it also is the 
EU's primary target for its anti-dumping practice at present. 
Following the first EU-China trade agreement57 signed in 1978, the EU began 
to initiate anti-dumping investigations against imports from China frequently. 
From 1979 when the first case was brought against saccharin from Chinaý 8 to 
March 2001, there have been 91 anti-dumping investigations with regard to 
imports from China initiated by the EU by far. 59This situation results from 
the EU's special anti-dumping rules with regard to the People's Republic of 
China. 
The development of the EU's anti-dumping rules applicable to China can be 
divided into two stages: 
55 1 use 'EC' here because the EU was not established until 1993. 
56 Jianyu Wang, 'A Critique of the application to China of the NME Rules of Antidumping Legislation 
and Practice of the European Union' (1993) 33(3) J. W. T., 117 at p 117. 
57 Council Regulation (EEC) No 946/78 of 2 May 1978 concerning the conclusion of the Trade 
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the People' s Republic of China, OJ 
1978 L 123/1. 
58 80/1116/EEC: Commission Decision of 4 December 1980 accepting undertakings offered by the 
exporters of saccharin and its salts originating in China and the United States of America and 
terminating the proceedings concerning imports of saccharin and its salts from China, Japan and the 
United States of America. OJ 1980 L 331/ 4 1. 
59 , Anti-Dumping Statistics, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Cooperation, PRC' 
<http: //www. moftec. gov. cn: 7777/Detail. wct? ReclD=O&SelectlD=IO&ChanneIID=9428&Page=I> 
(I December 2002). 
65 
1. China was regarded as an NME. 
First of all, as the legal framework of EU anti-dumping legislation, GATT 
provides the definition of dumping and establishes relevant rules for 
transactions in the ordinary course of trade, where prices are determined by 
supply and demand under normal competitive conditions in free and open 
markets. 60 So, difficulties arise when determining whether imports from 
state-trading countries (i. e. NMEs) are dumped or not. In those countries, 
prices as well as exchange rates are centrally planned by governments 
regardless of free market and fair competition principles. The methods to 
determine normal value in anti-dumping investigations and criteria to judge 
dumping practices are not applicable to those countries. Therefore, it states 
that the importing parties may find it necessary to take account of the fact that 
a strict comparison with the domestic price in the exporting country may not 
61 always be appropriate. 
According to this provision, for the first time, the Commission introduced 
rules to determine the normal value of imports from NMEs in 197 9.62 
However, since the GATT suggests no alternative criteria applicable to 
state-trading countries, the EU adopted two approaches. 
a. The'analogue country method' in Regulation 384/9663 
In this case, normal values of exports from state-trading countries are 
determined with the prices of like products from a third ME. As to the concept 
60 Art. VI (1)(a), GATT. 
61 The second interpretative note to paragraph I of Article VI in Annex I to the 
GATT. 
62 Regulation 1681/79, OJ 1979 L196/1. 
63 Art 2(7), Council Regulation 384/96. 
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of state trading or NME, Regulation 384/96 did not give a clear definition. 
Instead, it listed a number of third States outside of the EU as NMEs in 
Regulation 519/94,64 and most of them are Communist and developing 
countries. They are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, the People's 
Republic of China, Georgia, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kyrgystan, Moldavia, 
Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and 
Vietnam. 
b. One country one duty rule. 
It is presumed that in an NME, all production and natural resources are fully 
controlled by the State, so all imports from the country are considered to 
emanate from a single producer. For this reason, once dumping practice is 
confirmed by the EU, in order to prevent circumvention 65 ,a single rate is 
applied on all exports. Based on this theory, the EU generally imposes a 
uniform anti-dumping duty on exporters originating in the NME. 66 
Following the process of economic reform in these NMEs, which led to the 
emergence of firms in which market-economy conditions prevail, some 
proposals were made with regard to the application of the EU's anti-dumping 
regime. The one of 1997 67 provides an exception to the one country one duty 
64 Regulation 519/94, OJ 1994 L67/89. 
65 i. e. transfer exports through the exporter with the lowest duty rate. 
66 Article 9(5) of the Regulation (EC) No. 384/96 provides: 'An anti-dumping duty shall be imposed in 
the appropriate amounts in each case, on a non-discriminatory basis on imports of a product from all 
sources found to be dumped and causing injury, except as to imports from those sources from which 
undertakings under the terms of this Regulation have been accepted. The Regulation imposing the 
duty shall specify the duty for each supplier or, if that is impracticable, and as a general rule in the 
cases referred to in Article 2 (7), the supplying country concerned. 
67 Proposal to the Council Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96, COM/97/0677 
final - ACC, OJ 1998 C70/15 
67 
rule, which allows the Commission to grant 'individual treatment 168 to a 
company which can demonstrate that it operates independently from the 
State . 
69 Exporters should meet eight criteria to qualify for individual 
70 
treatment . 
Due to the considerable overlap between the traditional individual treatment criteria and 
conditional market economy treatment (MET) criteria, 71 only exporting producers that 
can fulfill the requirements for market economic status can qualify for individual 
treatment. 72 Therefore, in order to make the rules more logical and fair, the criteria of 
68 i. e. the company who can demonstrate that it operates independently from the State will receive 
individual dumping margin based on its own export prices rather than based on that of third ME. 
69 This issue will be analyzed in the section IV of chapter three. 
70 Annex I of Proposal to the Council Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96, 
COM/97/0677 final - ACC, OJ 1998 C70/15: 
i) The majority of the shares should belong to genuinely private companies and no State officials 
should appear on the board or in a key management position the fact that the company concerned is 
controlled by a foreign investor will be considered a relevant indication of independence. 
ii) The land on which the facilities of the company are built should be rented from the State at 
conditions comparable to those in an ME or purchased (e. g. proper contractual lease). 
iii) The company should have the right to hire and dismiss employees and the right to fix salaries. 
iv) The company should have full control over its supply of raw materials and inputs in general. 
v) The supply of utilities should be guaranteed on the basis of proper contractual terms. 
vi) Proof is given that profit can be exported and capital invested can be repatriated (only in case of 
foreign investment, e. g. joint ventures). 
vii) The export prices should be determined freely the fact that export sales are made to a related party 
located outside the country in question will be a decisive factor. 
viii) Freedom to carry out business activities should be guaranteed, in particular in respect of the 
following: 
there should be no restrictions on selling on the domestic market 
- the right to do business cannot be withdrawn outside proper contractual 
terms 
- quantities produced for export should 
be determined freely by the company in accordance with the 
traditional demand of its export markets. 
71 Criteria for market economy treatment are provided in Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98. 
72 Recital 5.33, Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on protection 
against durnped imports from countries not members of the European Community 
/* COM/2000/0363 
final - ACC 2000/0160 
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individual treatment were amended in June 2000 to refocus on those areas having a direct 
impact on the export activities of the exporting producer. 73 In that case, the exporter 
concerned has less burden of proof than before, and he needs to show that he is free to 
determine export prices and quantities, as well as their terms and conditions. 74 
However, even after the revision was made, only a few Chinese exporters 
under EU's anti-dumping investigations were granted individual treatment. 
This reflects the fact that even the revised Regulation was difficult to apply in 
practice. 
Under such circumstances, imports from China were still subject to the 
analogue country method and one country one duty rule. So most exports 
involved in anti-dumping investigations were found dumped and 
consequently high anti-dumping duties were imposed. 
The latest legislation of individual treatment was enacted in November 
2002.75 For the first time, the EU provides criteria for the treatment in its Council 
73 ibid. 
74 Recital 54, ibid, provides new criteria for individual treatment: 
i) Exporters are free to repatriate capital and profits (applicable to wholly foreign owned firms orjoint 
ventures). 
ii) Export prices and quantities, and conditions and terms of sale are freely determined, and the 
majority of the shares belong to genuinely private companies. State officials appearing on the board or 
in key management positions should be in a clear minority. The presumption is that a State- controlled 
company cannot guarantee its independence from State interference, and the burden rests with the 
exporter to prove otherwise. 
iii) Exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate. 
iv) State interference is not such as to permit circumvention of measures if exporters are given 
different rates of duty. 
75 Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002 of 5 November 2002 amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 
on the protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community. 
OJ 2002 1-305/1. 
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Regulation. 76 Compared with the old rules, the criteria given in Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1972/2002 are more specific. In particular, it added an additional requirement relating 
77 to a firm's personnel . However, whether this idea is reasonable and whether there will 
be more Chinese companies get the individual treatment under the new criteria can be 
known only after the law is fully implemented. 
2. Conditional MET. 
The practice that treats China as a complete NME is not consistent with the 
change in the economic status of China due to her economic reform since 
1979. In fact, the reform enables China to transfer itself into a 
market-oriented economy country. However, the inconsistency not only 
results in the fact that most Chinese exporters involved in anti-dumping 
investigations will have high duties imposed on them, but it also impedes 
further trade cooperation between China and the EU. So, the Chinese 
government called for revision of the EU's stringent policy. In addition, the 
fact that more and more developed countries such as Australia and New 
Zealand treat China as a transitional economy according to the achievements 
of its economic reform, the EU proposed to amend its anti-dumping rules 
76 Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002 provides five criteria for individual treatment: 
(a) in the case of wholly or partly foreign owned firms orjoint ventures, exporters are free to repatriate 
capital and profits; 
(b) export prices and quantities, and conditions and terms of sale are freely determined; 
(c) the majority of the shares belong to private persons. State officials appearing on the board of 
Directors or holding key management positions shall either be in minority or it must be demonstrated 
that the company is nonetheless sufficiently independent from state interference; 
(d) exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate; and 
(e) State interference is not such as to permit circumvention of measures if individual exporters are 
given different rates of duty. 
77 Art. 1 (6), Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002. 
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applicable to China and Russia at the end of 1997 . 
78As 
a result, Council 
Regulation (EC) No 905/98 79 entered into force on 27 April 1998. 
The new Regulation, on the one hand, deletes China from the list of NMEs; on the other 
hand, establishes five conditions to assess whether the Chinese producers operate their 
business under market economy conditions. To benefit under the rules relating to 
conditional MET, exporters must demonstrate five criteria. 80 
Only when the exporter meets all of the criteria, will it be treated with 
provisions applicable to MEs, i. e. use their domestic price as the normal value 
to compare with its export price. 
On paper, the new policy seems to be much more reasonable than the old one. 
However, in fact it has not been a significant change in the approach taken by 
the EU. Most Chinese exports treated under the new rule are still found 
dumped and subsequently high anti-dumping duties are imposed on them. 
Why? There are two crucial reasons: first, the criteria set in the new 
78 Lianyin, Chen. 'Changes and Adjustments Made on European Union's Anti-Dumping Policy with 
regard to China' in Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & 
Exporters (ed. ), How to Respond to Foreign Countries' Anti-Dumping Practice? ' (Beijing, China: 
Foreign Economy and Trade Publisher, 2001) at p 172. 
79 Regulation (EC) No 905/98, OJ 1998 L128/18. 
80 Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98 provides that: 
'i. Decisions of firms regarding prices, costs and inputs, including for instance raw materials, cost of 
technology and labour, output, sales and investment, are made in response to market signals reflecting 
supply and demand, and without significant State interference in this regard, and costs of major inputs 
substantially reflect market values; 
ii. Firms have one clear set of basic accounting records which are independently audited in line with 
international accounting standards and are applied for all purposes, 
iii. The production costs and financial situation of firms are not subject to significant distortions 
carried over from the former NME system, in particular in relation to depreciation of assets, other 
write-offs, barter trade and payment via compensation of debts, 
iv. The firms concerned are subject to bankruptcy and property laws which guarantee legal certainty 
and stability for the operation of firms, and 
v. Exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate. ' 
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Regulation are not flexible enough to accommodate the change of China's 
current transitional economic status. Second, the EU enjoys too broad a 
discretion when they assess dumping. In that case, both factors easily result in 
unfair judgements adverse to Chinese exporters. This issue will be further 
analyzed in the next chapter. 
C. History and development of the ECSC anti-dumping rules. 
Since coal and steel products were outside the scope of the EC Treaty, they 
were not supervised by EC anti-dumping Regulations. With regard to 
products listed in the annex to the ECSC Treaty, 81 they were governed by the 
Commission Decision on protection against dumped imports from countries 
not members of the ECSC. 
The first anti-dumping duty rule codified by the ECSC is Recommendation 
77/32 9.82 It was adopted as part of the 'Davignon Plan' to help the ECSC steel 
industry cope with economic crisis at that time. The rules were based on the 
contemporary E C83 anti-dumping Regulation except for a few procedural 
modifications which were made to accommodate the differences in the 
institutional structure of the ECSC such as the more active role of the 
Commission (formerly the High Authority) in the decision-making process 
compared with the EC Commission. 
The first amendment to the Recommendation was made by Recommendation 
No. 3004/77/EC SC84 in December 1977. It introduced some provisions to 
81 Annex 1, ECSC Treaty. 
82 Recommendation 77/329/ECSC, OJ 1977 Ll 14/6. 
83 'EC' is used in this section in order to be distinguished from the ECSC. 
84 Commission Recommendation No 3004/77/ECSC , OJ 1977 
L352/13. 
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respond to 'the American trigger price mechanism and laid down the 
ground-work for the subsequent Community basic price system for iron and 
steel products. ' 85 The second amendment was made by Recommendation No. 
158/79/EC SC86 , which provided specific rules dealing with dumped imports 
from state-trading countries. 
Following the enactment of Council Regulation (EC) No. 3017/79, the ECSC 
published its Recommendation No. 3018/79/ECSC 87 . The innovations made 
mainly concerned subsidies and countervailing duties. This Recommendation 
was later revised in 1982.88 The new rules provided that reviews would be 
held only one year later after the termination of the proceedings. 
Subsequently, Recommendation No. 3025/82/EC S C89 was published pursuant 
to a GATT understanding on basic price systems. In 1984, Commission 
Decision 2177/84/ECSC90 replaced the previous rule in order to strengthen 
the enforcement of the rules. It provided that anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties may be imposed by legal instruments such as Decisions, 
85 Beseler & Williams, fn 20 above at p 25. 
86 Commission Recommendation No 158/79/ECSC of 29 January 1979 amending recommendations 
77/329/ECSC on protection against dumping or the granting of bounties or subsidies by countries 
which are not members of the European Coal and Steel Community OJ 1979 L21/14 
87 Commission Recommendation No 3018/79/ECSC of 21 December 1979 on protection against 
dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Coal and Steel 
Community OJ 1979 L339/15 
88 Commission Recommendation No 1995/82/ECSC of 22 July 1982 amending Recommendation No 
3018/79/ECSC on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of 
the European Coal and Steel Community OJ 1982 L215/28. 
89 Commission Recommendation No 3025/82/ECSC of 12 November 1982 amending 
Recommendation No 3018/79/ECSC on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from 
countries not members of the European Coal and Steel Community OJ 1982 L317/17. 
90 Commission Decision No 2177/84/ECSC of 27 July 1984 on protection against dumped or 
subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Coal and Steel Community 
OJ 1984 
1-201/17. 
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which have similar legal effects under the ECSC Treaty as a Regulation has 
under the EEC Treaty. 
Following the publication of Council Regulation 2423/8891, the ECSC issued 
its Decision 2424/88/ECSC. 92 It unified amendments made by the 
contemporary EC anti-dumping Regulation. 
In order to incorporate the rules of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the E C93 
enacted Regulation 384/96 as its consolidated version of anti-dumping 
legislation. Likewise, the ECSC published Commission Decision No 
2277/96/ECSC. 94 
According to the amendments 95 made by the EU to Article 2 of its 
anti-dumping Regulation (rules of comparison of normal value and export 
price and provisions governing dumped imports from NMEs), the ECSC 
revised its former Decision in May 199996 to accommodate these changes. 
Due to the great progress in the economic status in those so called NMEs. the 
EU once again amended its anti-dumping legislation with Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2238/2000.97 Subsequently, the ECSC also enacted Commission 
91 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 of II July 1988 on protection against dumped or subsidized 
imports from countries not members of the European Economic Community OJ 1988 L209/1. 
92 Commission Decision No 2424/88/ECSC of 29 July 1988 on protection against dumped or 
subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Coal and Steel Community OJ 1988 
L209/18 and corrigendum in OJ 1988 L273/19. 
93 1 use 'EC' here in order to distinguish it from the ECSC. 
94 Commission Decision No 2277/96/ECSC. OJ 1996 L 308/11. 
95 Council Regulation (EQ No 905/98 and Regulation (EQ No 2238/2000. 
96 Commission Decision No 1000/1999/ECSC, OJ 1999 1-122/35. 
97 Council Regulation (EC) No 2238/2000, OJ 2000 L257/2. 
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Decision No 435/2001/ECSC of 2 March 2001 amending Decision No 
2277/96/EC SC. 98 
IL Current EU anti-dumping legislation in force. 
After the ECSC Treaty expired on 23 July 2002, Council Regulation (EC) No 384/9e9 
replaces Commission Decision No 2277/96/ECSC'OO and governs products listed in the 
Annex to the ECSC Treaty. 101 Therefore, the EU anti-dumping legislation in force 
currently is Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 and its amendments made--Regulation 
(EC) No 2331/961 02 , Regulation (EC) No 905/981 
03 
, Regulation (EC) No 2238/20001 
04 
and Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002.105 It governs imports from third countries 
not Members of the EU. 
A. Objectives and Principles of the EU's anti-dumping Regulation. 
As a Contracting Party to the GATT, the EC established its anti-dumping 
legislation under the GATT legal framework. 
Pursuant to the objectives of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to restore fair 
international competition, the EU' s anti-dumping Regulation should ensure 
98 Commission Decision No 435/2001/ECSC, OJ 2001 L63/14. These amendments were made to 
parallel to the revised anti-dumping Regulation. 
99 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96, OJ 1996 L56/1. 
100 Commission Decision No 2277/96/ECSC, OJ 1996 L 308/11. 
101 Council Regulation (EC) No 963/2002 of 3 June 2002 laying down transitional provisions 
concerning anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures adopted pursuant to Commission Decisions No 
2277/96/ECSC and No 1889/98/ECSC as well as pending anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
investigations, complaints and applications pursuant to those Decisions. OJ 2002 L 149/3. 
102 Council Regulation (EC) No 2331/96, OJ 1996 L317/1. 
103 Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98, OJ 1998 L 128/18. 
104 Council Regulation (EC) No 2238/2000, OJ 2000 L257/2. 
105 Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002, OJ 2002 L305/1. 
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Ca level playing field for all producers on EU market'. 106 On the one hand, it 
restricts or punishes manufacturers outside the EU who undercut their 
competitors by dumping, which will boost their market share or drive the 
competition from the market. On the other hand, it provides the norm of 
anti-dumping, so that anti-dumping measures will not be abused to exclude 
reasonable imports. In other words, its impact on EU trade should not be 
exaggerated. 
In the EU's anti-dumping Regulation, 107 Article I establishes four principles 
to be observed when the law is applied. They concern the scope of the 
Regulation and three basic concepts, i. e. dumping, exporting country and like 
product. 
B. Substantive rules and key concepts. 
1. Determination of dumping. 
Article 2 provides detailed rules to determine dumping. First of all, it defines 
two key concepts: 
Normal value shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in 
the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting 
country. 
Export price shall be the price actually paid or payable for the product 
when sold for export from the exporting country to the Community. 
' 08 
106 , Trade Policy Instrument: on Guard for Unfair Practice' 
<http: //trade-info. cec. eu. int/europa/2001newround/pol. htm> (I December 2002). 
107 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96, OJ 1996 L 56/1. 
108 Art. 2(8), Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96. 
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The rule also provides principles to determine normal value and export price 
when there is no direct source available. However, these methods to 
determine normal value are only applicable to MEs. As far as NMEs are 
concerned, there is another procedure: selection of analogue country, which 
means the normal value of imports from these countries should be determined 
by that of a like product in a third ME. As to the selection of such an analogue 
country, Article 2(7) lays down that: 
an appropriate market economy third country shall be selected in a not 
unreasonable manner, due account being taken of any reliable information 
made available at the time of selection. Account shall also be taken of time 
limits; where appropriate, a market economy third country which is subject 
to the same investigation shall be used. 
From the rule quoted above, we may find out that the selection of an analogue 
country is a very complex issue and process. Because, today, there are hardly 
two different areas which have similar economic development levels as well 
as the same manufacturing costs. However, the rule simply stipulates that 
such a selection should be made in 'a not unreasonable manner'. The words 
here are rather vague and leave extremely broad discretion to relevant EU 
authorities to make judgement. 
Furthermore, Article 2(7) stipulates that: 
the parties to the investigation shall be informed shortly after its initiation 
of the market economy third country envisaged and shall be given 10 days 
to comment. 
This rule seems to be reasonable at first glance. However, most 
NMEs are 
developing countries. So. it is hard to imagine that a developing country is 
77 
able to collect the necessary information of the third ME and then make 
comment within such a short period. Even a developed country may find it 
difficult to achieve. This rule is obviously unfair to the NME. 
The inappropriate wording and the time limit provided in the rule are clearly 
unreasonable. There are further unfair factors in the rules with regard to 
NMEs, and all of these will be analyzed carefully and logically in the next 
chapter. 
In addition to the provisions analyzed above, Article 2 also specifies 
procedures to make comparison of normal value and export value and 
methods to calculate dumping margin. 
2. Determination of injury 
Article 3 of the EU's anti-dumping Regulation covers rules to assess the 
injury of dumped imports. Injury should be determined by two factors: the 
volume of dumped imports and their effects on prices of like products in the 
EU; the actual impact of those imports on industry of the EU. Meanwhile, the 
rules emphasize three points: 
a. The existence of dumping: whether there is a significant increase in 
dumped imports and their price. 109 
b. Examination of the injury: other factors that are injuring the Community 
industry shall be taken into account separately with dumped imports; 
'10 
Determination of the effect of the dumped imports shall be based on solid 
109 Ail. 3(3), Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96. 
110 Art. 3(7), Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 
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facts. "' 
c. The actual causal relationship between dumped imports and injury on the Community 
industry. 
3. Definition of Community industry. 
Article 4 provides a general notion of Community industry, which refers to 
the EU producers as a whole of the like products or those whose collective 
output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total EU 
production of the like product. The rule also identifies exceptional situations 
(when producers are related to the allegedly dumped product) and several 
criteria to examine such relationship. 
C. Procedural requirements. 
1. Initiation of proceedings and subsequent investigation. 
Article 5 identifies the requirement to initiate an anti-dumping investigation, 
i. e. a written complaint should be submitted on behalf of the Community 
industry to the European Commission or to a Member State. ' 12 Or, in the 
absence of any complaint, a Member State that possesses relevant sufficient 
evidence shall communicate such evidence to the Commission at once. 
The Article also sets the basic content of a complaint 113 to determine whether 
it is made on behalf of the Community industry 
114 
. Besides, it stresses that an 
investigation can be initiated only when there is sufficient evidence of both 
III Art. 3(8), Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 
112 Art. 5(1), Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 
113 Art. 5(2), Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 
1 14 Art. 5(4), Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 
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dumping and injury to support the complaint. 
Article 6 focuses on the anti-dumping investigation. It specifies time limits 
for an investigation's duration, rules on notification to interested parties and 
collection of evidence. 
2. Provisional measures. 
Article 7 provides prerequisites to adopt anti-dumping provisional measures, 
the amount of the duty that should be imposed and time limit to take 
anti-dumping measures. 
It is noticeable that the first paragraph of the Article sets five prerequisites 
before any provisional duty can be imposed. They are: 
'proceedings have been initiated in accordance with Article 5; 
notice has been given to that effect; 
interested parties have been given adequate opportunities to submit 
information and make comments in accordance with Article 5 (10); 
-a provisional affirmative determination has been made of dumping and 
consequent injury to the Community industry; 
the Community interest calls for intervention to prevent such injury. ' 115 
3. Price undertakings. 
Article 8 stipulates that during the course of an anti-dumping investigation, if 
satisfactory price undertakings are offered by an exporter to revise its prices 
115 Art. 7(l), Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96. 
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or cease exports at the dumped price on a voluntary base, anti-dumping 
proceedings may be terminated without the imposition of provisional or 
definitive duties. The rules also set criteria on acceptable price undertakings. 
In case of breach or withdrawal of undertakings by any exporter, a definitive 
duty shall be imposed in accordance with Article 9.116 
4. Imposition and collection of definitive duties. 
Article 9 specifies the conditions to terminate anti-dumping investigations or 
impose definitive duties. Procedures and time limits to make such decisions 
are also covered by the rule. Pursuant to the GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement, 
an anti-dumping duty should be less than the margin of dumping if such a 
lesser duty is adequate to remove injury of the domestic industry in the 
importing state 1". So, the EU's anti-dumping Regulation emphasizes two 
points on its imposition and collection of definitive duties. 
-A definitive anti-dumping duty can be imposed by the Council only after 
the fact of dumping and injury caused on EU interest thereby are well 
established. 
118 
- 'An anti-dumping duty shall be imposed 
in the appropriate amounts in 
each case ... The Regulation 
imposing the duty shall specify the duty for 
each supplier. 
1195 
However, in accordance with Article 2.7 of the Regulation, Article 9.5 states 
116 Art. 8(9), Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 
117 Art. 9(l), GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
118 Art. 9(4), Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96. 
119 Art. 9(5), Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96. 
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that the second point (i. e. specific anti-dumping duty for individual supplier) 
may not be applicable to NMEs. This provides the legal base for one country 
one duty rule, which significantly guide the EU's anti-dumping practice 
against dumped imports from China nowadays. 
China's effective economic reform has lasted for more than twenty years 
(since 1979), and it enables most Chinese enterprises to manage their 
business by themselves with much more rights than ever before. This results 
in the situation that different enterprises have different market economic 
development levels, which means that Chinese exporters producing the same 
product may have different costs and export prices thereby. 
From this point of view, the EU's one country one duty rule is neither 
practical nor fair to be applied to imports from China. This issue will be 
further analyzed with a few cases in the next chapter. 
Article 10 contains rules about the imposition of anti-dumping definitive 
duties. It mainly provides that the difference shall not be collected if the 
definitive duty is higher than the provisional duty. While if the former is 
lower than the latter, the duty shall be recalculated . 
120 Besides, it provides the 
time limit to impose the definitive duties, i. e. having the prerequisites for 
their imposition, definitive duties can be imposed retroactively on products 
imported during a period of up to 90 days before provisional duties enter into 
force. In no circumstances may they be imposed on products imported before 
the initiation date. 121 
120 Art. 10.3, Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 
12 1 Art. 10.4, Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 
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5. Duration, reviews and refunds. 
Article II provides for the duration of anti-dumping measures as well as 
detailed procedures of reviews and refund. 
It states that generally speaking, an anti-dumping measure shall expire 
automatically five years after its imposition. However, if there is any request 
containing sufficient evidence to show that expiry of the anti-dumping 
measure will lead to a continuation or reoccurrence of dumping or injury, an 
expiry review shall be initiated. While such a review is in progress, the 
anti-dumping measure shall remain in force pending the outcome of the 
review. 122 
Before the anti-dumping measures expire automatically, an interim review 
can be initiated on request if the request contains sufficient evidence to show 
that the measures are no longer necessary to offset the injury. However, such 
an interim review can only be accepted after at least one year since the 
imposition of anti-dumping duties. 
Since the position of an exporter who did not export to the EU during the 
investigation period is problematic, 123 a newcomer review shall also be 
carried out to determine the exporter's individual margins of 
dumping. 124 After consultation with the Advisory Committee and comment is 
made by EU producers, the review shall be initiated and carried out on an 
accelerated basis. 
Any review shall be terminated within one year from the date of its initiation. 
122 Art. 11.2, Council Regulation (EC) No 3 84/96 
123 Van Bael & Bellis, fn 25 above at p 306. 
124 Art. 11 (4), Counci I Regulation (EC) No 3 84/96. 
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Depending on the conclusion of the review, measures shall be repealed or 
maintained. 
Anti-dumping measures are supposed to raise the prices of dumped imports so 
to offset the injury to the Community industry. However, circumstances may 
change over time. Based on this point, Article 11.8 provides a refund 
procedure, so that an importer may request reimbursement of duties collected 
if he can prove that the dumping margin on the basis of which duties were paid, 
has either been eliminated or reduced to a level which is below the level of the 
duty in force. 
6. Anti-absorption review. 
Anti-dumping measures are utilized to raise the price of dumped imports in 
order to offset the injury to the Community industry. However, even after the 
imposition of anti-dumping duties, effects of such measures may not be 
reflected properly if exporters sell products to related importers at the same 
price as that which was clarified before imposition of anti-dumping duties by 
further reducing their export prices. Such a practice is defined as 'absorption 
of duties'. 125 In that case, anti-dumping measures fail to reach their objective. 
To deal with the problem, the EU provides criteria to determine such practice 
and procedures for an anti-absorption review in Article 12. When the 
Community industry demonstrates with sufficient information that there is no 
change in the price of exports which have been charged anti-dumping duty, an 
investigation will be reopened to examine whether the anti-dumping 
measures taken are effective enough. If increased dumping is confirmed at the 
conclusion at the reinvestigation, anti-dumping measures in force shall be 
125 Van Bael & Bellis, fn 25 above at p 315. 
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amended pursuant to procedures specified in this Article. 
7. Circumvention. 
Article 13 of the EU's anti-dumping Regulation focuses on circumvention of 
anti-dumping measures. 
First, it defines circumvention as: 
A change in pattern of trade between third countries and the Community 
which stems from a practice, process or work for which there is insufficient 
due cause or economic justification other than the imposition of the duty, 
and where there is evidence that the remedial effects of the duty are being 
undermined in terms of the prices and/or quantities of the like products and 
there is evidence of dumping in relation to the normal values previously 
established for the like or similar products. 126 
Second, it sets criteria to judge whether an assembly operation in the EU or a 
third country constitutes circumvention against anti-dumping measures. 
Third, its third paragraph provides procedures that investigations of 
circumvention should follow. 
With regard to all the rules analyzed above, some of them are not relevant to the 
central argument of my thesis. They are discussed here for the completeness of the 
description of the EU anti-dumping legislation, so they will not be dealt further. 
However, those relating to NM[Es and China are the highlights of this thesis, and they 
will be fully examined in the next chapters. 
12" Art. 13) (1), Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96. 
85 
M. Enforcement of the EUs anti-dumping rules with regard to 
imports from the People'ýs Republic of China. 
A. General situation regarding enforcement. 
After the first anti-dumping case (Saccharin) about exports from the People's 
Republic of China took place in 1979,127 more than twenty years passed, and 
there have been 91 cases in total initiated by the EU against imports from 
China so far 128. Since 1988, China has become the country whose exports are 
subject to most of the EU's anti-dumping investigations. 129 Considering the 
fact that those initiated by the EU after 1990 account for 70 percent of the 
total 91 cases, there is a trend that more and more anti-dumping investigations 
against exports from China will be carried out by the EU. 
Furthermore, most Chinese exports involved in these anti-dumping 
investigations were found to have been dumped, (up to now, only 20 of the 91 
cases have been terminated without imposition of anti-dumping measures 130), 
and they were charged with rather high anti-dumping duties by the EU 
authority. Among 69 of the 91 cases, Chinese exports were found to have been dumped 
and anti-dumping measures were subsequently taken towards them. 131 Most of the 
127 80/1116/EEC: Commission Decision of 4 December 1980 accepting undertakings offered by the 
exporters of saccharin and its salts originating in China and the United States of America and 
terminating the proceedings concerning imports of saccharin and its salts from China, Japan and the 
United States of America. OJ 1980 L 331/41. 
128 , Anti-Dumping Reports of July 2001, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, PRC'. 
<http: //www. cacs. gov. cn/text. asp? texttype= I& id=273 3 &power--> (I December 2002). 
129 Jingqi, Wang, Anti-Dumping Legislation and Practice, (Beijing: People's Court Press, 2000) at p 
13) 6. 
130 c Anti-Dumping Reports of July 2001, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, 
PRC, 'fn 128 above. 
131 , WTO Anti-Dumping Statistics' <http: //www. wto. org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e. htm> (I 
December 2002); 'EU's Anti-Dumping Statistics' <http: //www. europa. eu. int> (I December 2002) 
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anti-dumping duties imposed in these cases were very high - especially when the one 
country one duty method was applied. 132 There are only 8 cases whose rate of duty 
charged were under 20 percent. 133 Consequently, the Chinese exporters will be 
much less competitive, and some of them have to give up their business in the 
European market. 
From this point of view, the EU's anti-dumping regime constitutes a very 
serious barrier to Chinese exports to access the European market. It is also 
very harmful to the development of trade cooperation and sound relationships 
between the EU and China. 
B. Main characters regarding enforcement. 
Considering anti-dumping cases initiated by the EU towards imports from the 
People's Republic of China, there are five characteristics of the enforcement 
of the rules. 
First, the number of anti-dumping cases towards Chinese exports has risen 
sharply since 1990. As we discussed before, those that took place after 1990 
account for 70 percent of the total 91 cases. From January 1999 till July 2001, 
there were 20 anti-dumping investigations carried out by the EU against 
imports from China. 134 If this trend is followed, it is likely that the EU will 
launch more and more anti-dumping proceedings against Chinese products in 
future. 
Second, there are fewer anti-dumping cases which are terminated with price 
undertakings. During the first ten years from 1979 to 
December 1989,24 
132 This issue will be examined in chapter three. 
133 'WTO Anti-Dumping Statistics, 'fn 131 above. 
134 Ibid. 
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investigations were launched against Chinese exports, among which 8 were 
terminated with price undertakings. However, from January 1990 till now. 
price undertakings proposed by Chinese exporters were seldom accepted by 
the EU. It shows that nowadays, the EU prefers to impose anti-dumping duties 
rather than accept price undertakings on dumped Chinese imports as 
anti-dumping measures. 
Third, anti-dumping duties imposed in recent years are much higher than ever 
before. From August 1979 135 till I January 2002, there were 91 anti-dumping 
proceedings launched by the EU against Chinese exports within that period. In 69 cases, 
Chinese exports were found to have been dumped. 136 Subsequently, anti-dumping 
measures were imposed on these products. In particular, the duties imposed in recent 
years are much higher than ever before. Among the above proceedings initiated 
within the period from August 1979 to I January 1990, there are 4 cases in which the rates 
of duties were above 40 percent. While with regard to those launched between I January 
1990 to I January 2002, the number of such cases reaches II- almost triples. ' 37 
Fourthly, the range of Chinese exports involved in the EU's anti-dumping 
investigations has gradually extended from primary products to finished 
products. From 1979 to 1988,70 percent of Chinese imports subject to 
anti-dumping investigations were mineral and chemical products. While 
during the following ten years, the ratio decreases to 41.7 percent, and there 
are more finished products subject to the EU's anti-dumping investigations 
138 today 
135 The first anti-dumping investigation towards China initiated by the European Community was 
Saccharin (China, Japan and U. S. ), OJ 1980 L331/41. 
136 Fn 131 above. 
137 Ibid. 
138 'The EU anti-dumping legislation against Imports from the People's Republic of China' 
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Finally, the EU has amended its anti-dumping rules applicable to Chinese 
exports several times within recent years. According to the dramatic progress 
obtained from China's economic reform, the EU began changing its 
anti-dumping rules applicable to imports from China gradually. Since the 
Council Regulation (EC) 384/96 entered into force in 1996, the EU has 
amended it several times to accommodate the new changes occurring in those 
former NMEs. As a result, China was eliminated from the NME list in 
December 1997.139 The amendment gives the possibility that provisions 
determining normal value of imports from MEs can be applied to Chinese 
exporters, if they meet the five conditions set in the new rules. 
Though there still are significant inflexible or unreasonable factors in the 
EU's anti-dumping Regulation with regard to China, the amendment is no 
doubt a desirable step forward. It not only reflects the objectives of 
anti-dumping legislation, (i. e. to restore fair competition in international 
trade rather than restrict due imports, ) but also shows the EU's wish to 
develop a sound commercial relationship with China to a certain extent. 
C. Problems arising in the EU anti-dumping legislation with regard 
to imports from the People's Republic of China. 
Examining the statistics of the EU's anti-dumping measures taken since they 
were first utilized in 1970, we may find the following inconsistencies: 
I. The increasing anti-dumping measures taken by the EU do not agree 
with China's current economic status, which has fundamentally changed after 
the reform within this decade. 
<http: //www. ec3286. coi-n/report/zhengce/002. htm> (I December 2002). 
139 Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98, OJ 1998 L 128/18. 
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The methods that the EU adopts to determine the normal value of products 
exported from China were based on China's former economic structure and its 
government policy -- central state control twenty years ago. However, since 
1992 when China officially confirmed its current policy to accelerate the 
transformation of the country into a market-oriented economy, reforms have 
been designed and implemented to make state-owned enterprises operate as 
independent economic entities and to be fully responsible for their profits and 
losses. As a result, dramatic changes in China's economic structures and 
development took place. 140 Prices of over 90 percent of final goods are now 
determined by market forces, a factor which has been confirmed by the World 
Bank. 14 1 According to these significant changes, most countries (such as the 
United States and Japan) who used to regard China as an NME have changed 
their anti-dumping policies towards China and granted individual treatment 
to Chinese state-owned enterprises when the investigation is initiated. 142 This 
has proved to be more rational and practical in later cases. However, the EU 
seems to respond less to the fundamental changes resulting from China's 
economic reform. Though in the new Council Regulation No. 905/98, it 
deleted China from the list of NMEs and agreed to consider individual 
investigation to Chinese exporters who meet certain criteria. This is no doubt 
a big step forward, but things have not changed because the criteria set in the 
new Regulation are too severe and impractical to meet the need of actual 
situations (as will be illustrated in the following chapters). As a result, most 
Chinese companies involved in anti-dumping proceedings are still subject to 
140 China's economic reforms and prospects will be examined in chapter four. 
141 'China: Reform and Development in 1992-1993', World Bank Discussion Paper No. 215, 
<http: //www-wds. worldbank. org/servlet/WDS-IBank_Serviet? pcont--details&eid=000009265_3970 
716144524> (I December 2002). 
142 Alternative anti-dumping approaches of the U. S, Australia, New Zealand and Japan towards China 
will be full), analyzed in chapter five. 
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the analogue country method in the calculation of their normal value and one 
country one duty rule when determining anti-dumping duties. Furthermore, 
anti-dumping investigations initiated by the EU in 1999 reached 12, which is 
the highest compared with that of before' 43 . The fact shows that the EU's new 
anti-dumping policy against China does not achieve the objective to 
accommodate the changes arising from China's economic reform, and this 
also brings about the following two inconsistencies. 
2. Considering the past twenty years, the number of the total EU's 
anti-dumping cases has gone down, while those against China has risen 
sharply. From 1979 to 1998, the number of EU's anti-dumping cases against 
third countries is decreasing. The average cases initiated per year has 
declined from 42 ten years ago to 33 within the residual ten years, while cases 
concerning Chinese exports increased from average 2.3 per year in the first 
ten years to 4.6 in the last ten years, which occupied from 5.5 percent of the 
total EU's anti-dumping cases for the former period to 13.8 percent for the 
following ten years. ' 44 
3. The actual effect of the EU's anti-dumping policy against China is not 
consistent with its objective (i. e. to restore fair competition, offset the injury 
and limit the sharply increasing quantity of dumped goods rather than exclude 
them from the EU). But in fact, statistics of imports from China suffering 
from the effects of EU's anti-dumping measures show that they exceed their 
original purpose. Due to the unjustified factors discussed above, most 
Chinese exporters involved in the investigation suffer very high anti-dumping 
143 , The EU anti-dumping legislation against Imports from the People's Republic of 
China', fn 138 
above. 
144 Ibid. 
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duties so that they are virtually excluded from the European market since then. 
For example, China exported more than 200 million bicycles to the EU in 
1991, but since the anti-dumping duty as high as 30.6 percent was imposed in 
1993ý it has been excluded from the European market gradually. Similarly, 
colour televisions from China almost disappear from the European market 
now after being levied 44.6 percent anti-dumping duty 145 . From this point, it 
is easy to see that the actual effects of the EU's anti-dumping policy 
obviously deviate from its objectives! 
These inconsistencies reflect problems existing in the EU anti-dumping 
legislation towards China. They will be analyzed and explained in detail in 
the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
This chapter elaborates the EU anti-dumping legislation by analysing its 
evolution, key concepts, substantive and procedural rules. In addition, the 
main differences between provisions applicable to MEs and those for NMEs 
are analyzed. In the end, the current situation of the enforcement of the rules 
applicable to China is introduced. So, it provides a theoretical basis for the 
EU's anti-dumping rules with regard to China, which enables us to further 
explore its problems and issues in the next chapters. 
The EU applies different provisions to MEs and NMEs when it determines 
normal value of imports under investigations. It did not give any 
definition of 
NME. ) 
but provided a relevant list in 1994. Due to the signi ficant progress 
14S . Anti-Dumping Measures against China Sharply Decrease 
Chinese Exports Volumes' 
<http: //www. peopledaily. com. cn/zcxx/2000/08/0821 I O. html> 
(I December 2002). 
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obtained from these so-called NMEs' economic reforms of this decade, the 
EU amended its anti-dumping rules in order to accommodate new changes of 
these countries' economic status. Thus, a number of countries were deleted 
from the NME list. China is one of these countries. According to the revised 
provisions, China can be treated as an ME in EU's anti-dumping proceedings 
if exporters can demonstrate that they operate separately from the 
government, i. e. they meet the five criteria set in the new rules. This is a 
desirable step forward. However, since the criteria are applied in an inflexible 
way in practice, most Chinese exports under the EU's anti-dumping 
investigations are found to be dumped. 
Considering the data of the EU's anti-dumping measures, we find some 
inconsistency of facts. They reflect that the EU's current anti-dumping rules 
with regard to the People's Republic of China are problematic. The reasons 
for this will be analyzed in detail in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
Unreasonable Factors in the Current EU's 
Anti-Dumping Policy towards the People's 
Republic of China 
Introduction 
As discussed in the second chapter, the EU revised its an&dumping legislation applicable 
to the People's Republic of China due to the latter's dramatic progress achieved by 
economic reforms during the past twenty years. ' These amendments mainly include the 
adoption of a conditional market economy treatment and the new criteria set to grant 
individual treatment to Chinese exporters. 
One of the most important changes was made towards China's economic status. The EU 
used to regard China as a non-market economy (NME), hence it used the analogue 
country method (apply the domestic price of the like product from a third ME to 
determine the normal value of imports from an NME). Following the enforcement of 
Council Regulation (EC) 905/98,2 if the required conditions are satisfied, producers and 
exporters from China would be allowed to use their domestic sales prices to calculate the 
normal value in an anti-dumping investigation. 
1 China's economic reforms and development prospects will 
be analyzed in chapter four. 
2 Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98 of 27 April 1998 amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on 
protection against dumped imports from countries not members of 
the European Community. OJ 1998 
L 128/18. 
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Another kind of amendment was made to individual treatment. It means that an 
individual dumping margin is calculated for the exporting producer by comparing the 
normal value from the analogue country with the producer's own export prices. It is 
granted where an exporting producer in an NME can show that its export activities are not 
subject to state interference. Individual treatment was first introduced in the Small Screen 
Televisions (SCTVS)3 case in 199 1. The criteria for application of the approach were later 
revised in 1997,4 20005 and 2002 .6 The latest legislation was made on 5 November 
20029 7 which set out five criteria for exporters from NMEs to apply for individual 
treatment. 
Based on these points, there are four separate forms of treatment which are applied 
against Chinese exporters in the EU's anti-dumping investigations at present: 
1. Traditional non-market economy treatment - analogue country method; 
11. Conditional market economy treatment (conditional MET); 
111. One country one duty rule; 
3 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2093/91 of 15 July 1991 imposing a definitive anti- dumping duty on 
imports of small-screen color television receivers originating in Hong Kong and the People's Republic 
of China and collecting definitively the provisional duty OJ 1991 L 195/1. 
4 Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EQ No 384/96 on protection against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community /*COM/97/0677 final - 
ACC. OJ 1998 C70/15. 
5 Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EQ No 384/96 on protection against 
durnped imports from countries not members of the European Community /* COM/2000/0363 final - 
ACC 2000/0160. 
6 Council Regulation (EQ No 1972/2002 of 5 November 2002 amending Regulation (EQ No 384/96 
on the protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community. 
OJ 2002 L305/1. 
7 Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EQ No 384/96 on protection against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community /*COM/2000/0363 final - 
ACC 2000/0160. 
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IV. Individual treatment. 
The analogue country method and the one country one duty rule are the forms of 
treatment traditionally used by the EU in its anti-dumping policy towards China. They 
have come to be more and more problematic due to China's economic reform during the 
past twenty years. Under these circumstances, both the conditional MET and individual 
treatment have been introduced, in order to accommodate the remarkable advances 
brought about by the economic reform in China. They are presumed to bring more 
justification in the EU's anti-dumping practice. However, relevant statistics for recent 
years show the impact of the new approach is rather discouraging. It also makes it clear 
that the application of these new approaches is problematic, at least from a statistical 
point of view. 
The section below analyzes the four different approaches applied by the EU in its 
anti-dumping investigations against imports from China in four sections. For each of 
them, I will at first analyze the rule from both a theoretical and practical basis, then 
enumerate why each can be considered unreasonable by referring to some typical cases. 
In short, this chapter analyzes and comments on the current EU's anti-dumping rules 
towards China, and therefore constitutes a significant part of the whole thesis. 
1. Traditional non-market economy treatment (analogue country 
method) 
The analogue country method is the traditional method to determine the normal value of 
Chinese exports involved in anti-dumping investigations by the 
EU. When a Chinese 
company fails to reach the criteria for conditional MET, such a treatment will 
be applied 
automatically. 
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A. Relevant rules in force. 
In the current EU anti-dumping legislation, it was specified in Regulation 384/96 8 ('basic 
Regulation' thereafter) in Article 2 (A)(7) as: 
In the case of imports from NMEs and, in particular, those to which Council 
Regulation (EC) No 519/94 (5) applied, normal value shall be determined on the 
basis of the price or countries, including the Community, or where those are not 
possible, on any other reasonable basis, including the price actually paid or 
payable in the Community for the like product, duly adjusted if necessary to 
include a reasonable profit margin. 
An appropriate market economy third country shall be selected in a not 
unreasonable manner, due account being taken of any reliable information made 
available at the time of selection. Account shall also be taken of time limits; where 
appropriate, a market economy third country which is subject to the same 
investigation shall be used. 
The parties to the investigation shall be informed shortly after its initiation of the 
market economy third country envisaged and shall be given 10 days to comment. 
B. Outcome of application of the analogue country method. 
From August 1979 when the first anti-dumping investigation was initiated against 
Chinese exports by the European Community' till April 1998 when the EU introduced 
conditional MET for both China, the EU adopted the analogue country method to 
8 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports 
frorn countries not members of the European Community, OJ 1996 
L 56/1. 
9 Here I use 'European Community' because the investigation was 
initiated before the EU was 
established by the Treaty on European Union, which entered 
into force on I November 1993. 
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determine the normal value of all imports from China. There were 72 antimdumping 
proceedings launched by the EU against Chinese exports within that period. In 61 cases, 
Chinese exports were found to have been dumped. 10 Subsequently, the EU imposed 
anti-dumping measures in all these cases. In most cases, the anti-dumping duties imposed 
were very high - especially when one country one duty rule was applied, i. e. a single duty 
rate was charged. In only 4 cases' 1 was the rate of duty charged under 20 percent. 12 
C. Theoretical and practical analysis of the rule. 
1. The wording of the rule is rather vague. 
The rule merely provides that the selection of the reference country shall be made on a 
reasonable basis. It is too vague to regulate such a complex selection of a third ME. Thus, ) 
it leaves great discretionary powers to the EU authorities. 
Generally speaking, all so-called non-market economies are developing countries, and 
market economies are developed countries. Since a certain field or industry cannot 
flourish isolated from others in a country, so its development level should be parallel to 
that of the country. From this point of view, it is unscientific to compare an industry from 
10 , WTO Anti-Dumping Statistics' <http: //www. wto. org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e. htm> (I 
December 2002); 
'Anti-Dumping Statistics of the EU' <http: //ww-w. europa. eu. int> (I December 2002). 
11 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2093/91; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3433/91 of 25 November 
1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint 
lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand and 
definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, OJ 1991 L326/1; 
Council Regulation (EQ No 3664/93 of 22 December 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on imports into the Community of photo albums in bookbound form originating in the People's 
Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty OJ 1993 L333/67-, 
Council Regulation (EQ No 5/96 of 22 December 1995 imposing definitive anti- dumping duties on 
imports of microwave ovens originating in the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia and Thailand and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed OJ 1996 L211. 
12 , WTO Anti-Durnping Statistics' and statistics of the EU official website, fn 10 above. 
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a developing country with that of a third developed country. Even if one is able to find an 
industry of an ME which has similar development level to the corresponding industry in 
an NME, such selection is very complex. 
Furthermore, 'analogue' is a very vague concept, and the EU absolutely has no rule to 
specify the basis of 'analogue'. As a result, it leaves the following important question 
without answer: what does it mean in the context of the analogue country method? Is it 
the development of the countries concerned, or the respective production process, or the 
comparability of the products, or the comparability of the respective industry? 
Without detailed rules to regulate such complex practices, the EU certainly has very 
broad discretion in the selection. Thus, a conclusion that leads to possible high dumping 
margin always occurs, and it is rather unfair to Chinese exporters. Before April 1998, in 
which conditional MET was provided, 72 anti-dumping investigations were launched by 
the EU against China. 84.7 percent of them concluded that Chinese exports had been 
dumped. Among them, when a single duty was imposed on all Chinese exports concerned 
under one country one duty rule, only 4 cases get a relatively low anti-dumping duty, 
which was under 20 percent. 13 
2. The time limit for non-market economies to comment is over strict 
The EU allows parties to the investigation 10 days to comment on the selection of the ME 
third country. From the analysis made above, we may understand that the selection of 
analogue country is very complex. Even the EU authority itself may 
find it difficult to 
gather relevant information, so that in many cases, its 
decision of the selection is 
significantly affected by the availability of cooperation of the 
ME. However, it gives 
Chinese exporters a mere 10 days to comment on the EUs selection of 
the analogue 
13 lbid 
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country. It is obviously impossible to collect the necessary information to do so. 
Therefore, 'this will further curtail the opportunities of exporters to control the process of 
the selection of the reference country and will increase the discretionary power available 
to the Community authorities. ' 14 
3. The analogue country method makes the outcome of the selection 
unpredictable. 
One of the functions of law is to make the outcome of certain practices predictable, so that 
similar mistakes and the corresponding punishments can be avoided in future business. 
However, the analogue country in an anti-dumping investigation will be selected by the 
EU on different bases, which vary from time to time. Therefore, it is never foreseeable to 
Chinese exporters. 
Since the wording of the provisions which regulate the selection of the third market 
economy (ME) is very vague, the EU authority makes its decision based on variable 
factors in practice. In most cases, it adopts the suggestions of the complainant in 
anti-dumping investigations. 15 Though this can be hardly seen from the authority's 
anti-dumping report, it was found during my interviews' 6 that the producers of the 
analogue country proposed are ready to cooperate with the Commission due to the 
arrangement made by the complainant in advance. In addition, as discussed above, 
Chinese exporters can hardly propose any constructive comment on the selection of the 
analogue country due to the tight time limit. Therefore, without any other substantive 
suggestion, the Commission will consequently adopt the third ME proposed by the 
14 P. V. Schueren, 'New Anti-Dumping Rules and Practice: Wide Discretion Held on a Tight LeashT 
(1996), 33(2) Common Market Law Review, 271 at p 282. 
15 John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst, Anti-Dumping Law and Practice. - A Comparative Study, 
(University of Michigan Press: 1990), 77. 
16 Interviews with experienced anti-dumping lawyers in Brussels, June 
2002. 
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complainant. However, in order to support its own argument that the imports concerned 
have been dumped, the complainant normally suggests the analogue country which can 
lead to high dumping margins. In that case, the complainant will definitely never consider 
whether the proposal is fair and reasonable to Chinese exporters. 
In addition to the suggestions of the complainant, the Commission considers the 
following factors to select analogue countries. 17 They are the cooperation of information 
in the analogue country concerned is available; ' 8 the potential analogue is also accused of 
dumping, 19 the potential analogue is the only other producer of the prodUCt; 20 the 
manufacturing process, technical standards and the scale of production are similar 21 and 
the potential analogue is the largest or most efficient free market producer 22 
17 Jianyu Wang, 'A Critique of the Application to China of the Non-Market Economy Rules of 
Antidumping Legislation and Practice of the European Union. ' J. W. T. 1999,33(3), 117 at p 125. 
18 Council Regulation (EC) No 771/98 of 7 April 1998 imposing a definitive anti- dumping duty on 
imports of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating in the People's Republic of China 
OJ 1998 LI 11/1; Commission Regulation (EC) No 45/97 of 10 January 1997 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of sacks and bags made of polyethylene or polypropylene originating in 
India, Indonesia and Thailand OJ 1997 L12/8 
19 When anti-dumping investigation involves in both MEs and NMEs, the Commission tends to use 
one of the MEs as the analogue country. This principle was established in Codeine and its Salts case 
(83/9/EEC: Council Decision of 17 January 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning imports of codeine and its salts originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and 
Yugoslavia OJ 1983 L 16/30). 
20 In Dihydrostreptomycin case (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2054/91 of II July 1991 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's 
Republic of China OJ 1991 L 187/23), Japan was the only ME outside the European Community to 
produce the kind of imports concerned. Therefore, Japan was selected as an analogue country. 
21 In Handbags case (Commission Regulation (EQ No 209/97 of 3 February 1997 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain handbags originating in the People's Republic of 
China OJ 1997 L33/1 1). Indonesia was selected as an analogue country because it has similar 
characteristics and production process with the Chinese handbags. 
22 Silicon metal (Council Regulation (EQ No 2496/97 of II December 1997 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal originating in the People's Republic of China OJ 1997 
L345/1). In this case, Norway was selected as the analogue country, because the Commission regarded 
it as the most important and efficient silicon metal producers in the Nvorld and 
Norway benefits from 
low energy costs, cheap raw material and good exporting conditions. 
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From the above analysis, it can be seen that only the last two bases concern the 
comparative advantages of Chinese exporters. So, they can be regarded to be more 
reasonable than others to a certain extent. However, neither of the two guidelines is 
frequently followed by the Commission, because they may be considered only after the 
Commission fails to find an analogue country with all other methods. Therefore, in most 
anti-dumping investigations relating to China, the EU authority's practice is likely to 
maximize the inherent flaws of the analogue country method. 
As a result, of the 90 anti-dumping investigations against Chinese exports from August 
1979 till I January 2002,29 countries have been selected as analogue countries by the EU 
authority (See Table 3.1). Therefore, it is impossible for Chinese exporters to predict 
which country will be used to determine the normal value in a potential an&dumping 
dispute. As a result, they will not know how to adopt their pricing structures to avoid 
dumping in the European market. From this point of view, the analogue country method 
causes the EU's anti-dumping law to fail to play the important role, i. e. to predict and then 
avoid unfavourable outcomes. 
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Table 3.1. Selection of analogue countries for Chinese exports by the Commission: 
1979-2001. (Note: GNI per capita (2001) of China is $890). 
CountrY23 U. S. A Korea Hong Kong India Spain Yugoslavia 
Times 16 
-6 - 
3 5 1 1 
GNI ($)24 345870 
1 
99400 
1 
255920 
1 
460 
1 
14,860 
1 
940 
Countiry Thailand Japan Australia Sri Lanka Austria South Africa 
Times 4 3 1 1 1 3 
GNI 1 ý970 35,990 19,770 
1 
830 
1 
23,940 
- r2,900 
Country Uruguay Turkey Singapore Norway Taiwan Philippines 
Times 1 2 1 1 2 1 
GNI ($) 5,670 
__ 
25540 2 24,740 
L 
3 5,5 30 
1 1 
19050 
Country EU Poland Malaysia Hungary Brazil Argentina 
Times 2 1 2 1 1 1 
GNI 49240 
- 
39640 4,80 0 
L 
3,060 
1 
6,960 
Country Mexico Canada Indonesia 
Times 3 1 1 
GNI 5,540 21 ý340 
680 
Source: EU Official Journal, various years. 
23 Market Economies selected as analogue countries by the EU in anti-dumping 
investigations towards 
imports from China. 
24 GNI is gross national income (gross national product, or 
GNP. per capita (200 1), Atlas methodology 
(US dollars), World Bank Indicator, available from <http: //www. worldbank. org> 
(I December 2002). 
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These statistics show that the U. S. has become the most common analogue country for 
China chosen by the European Commission in anti-dumping investigations, although the 
two countries have the largest difference (except Japan and Norway) with regard to their 
GNI per capita. With almost 40 times difference of GNI per capita, it is apparent that the 
selection of analogue countries has not been made on a reasonable basis. This is because 
under the Commission's guidelines, analogue countries are selected mainly based on the 
complainant's suggestions and the availability of cooperation from the third ME. 
However, as discussed above, neither of these two factors can be justified to achieve a fair 
comparison between the like products of an analogue country and China in an&dumping 
investigations. Since Chinese exporter's comparative advantages are not considered in 
that case, their normal values based on the analogue country method are normally higher 
than they actually are. This finally leads to an incorrect determination of the existence of 
dumping. 
4. Difficulties may arise in case of non-cooperation of a third ME. 
The experience of application of the analogue country method shows that the 
Commission cannot always get cooperation from the third ME which it considers to be 
the most appropriate country to determine the normal value of Chinese exports concerned. 
Unfortunately, unwillingness of such cooperation tends to increase, because data needed 
by the Commission may be also used as evidence against the third country's own 
producers and exporters in any future anti-dumping proceedings 
initiated by the EU. 
When the Commission encounters such non-cooperation, it can only adopt the 
information provided by another ME, which will generally result in a 
higher normal value 
and dumping margin of exports from the NME concerned. 
From this point of view, the 
analogue country method is neither reasonable to 
be applied by the Commission nor fair 
enough to determine the normal value of Chinese exports. 
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5. The analogue country method denies the fact that individual countries have 
comparative advantages in intemational trade, and it restrains nonmarket 
economies from taking such advantages. 
It should be well recognized that any individual country, regardless of its development 
level, has its own comparative advantages compared with others. And that it is its due 
right to take such advantages in international trade. However, the actual consequence of 
the application of the analogue country method ignores the fact and the right. This 
statement can be illustrated by the outcome that most Chinese exports involved in the 
EU's anti-dumping investigations were found to be dumped and subsequently high 
anti-dumping duties were imposed. Thus, the import prices increase significantly, and the 
exporter therefore is unable to take its comparative advantage in international trade. 
All of these disadvantages of the analogue country method can be seen in the following 
case, which is a typical one to show how dumping margins are artificially maximized 
under that method. 
D. Case analysis. 
1. Outline of the case. 
In November 1993, the Commission received a complaint lodged by the European 
Chemical Industry Council (Cefic) representing the totality of the EU production. The 
Commission accordingly announced the initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning imports of persulphates originating in the People's Republic of China. The 
Commission selected Japan as the third ME to determine the normal value of Chinese 
exports, and therefore came to the conclusion that persulphates imported from China 
were dumped, which caused material injury to the EU industry. As a result, a 
high 
provisional anti-dumping duty of 83 percent was 
imposed on imports of 
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peroxodisulphates (persulphates) originating in China on 17 July 1995.25 Subsequently, a 
definitive anti-dumping duty of the same rate was imposed on 18 December 1995.26 
2. Highlight - selection of the third ME when determining the normal value of 
Chinese exports. 
The Commission officially notified the complainants, the exporters and importers known 
to be concerned and the representatives of the exporting country of the initiation of the 
proceeding and gave the parties concerned the opportunity to make their views known in 
writing and to request a hearing. 
When determining the normal value of the Chinese exports, according to the basic 
Regulation at that time (Article 2 (12) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88), 27 the 
Commission began to select an ME as a reference country. The Commission sent 
questionnaires to known producers of persulphates i. e. in the United States, Taiwan, 
Turkey, Japan, India and Mexico. However, the producer in the USA and Mexico refused 
to cooperate with the Commission, and the producer in Taiwan did not submit sufficient 
information and refused on-the- spot verifications. Producers in Turkey and Japan agreed 
to cooperate with the Commission. Since the information submitted showed that the total 
production of persulphates by the sole producer in Turkey was limited, Japan was 
selected as the reference country. Although the Chinese exporters opposed the choice of 
Japan as reference country and requested that at least the determination of normal value 
for Chinese ammonium persulphate be based on data pertaining to Turkey, the 
25 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1748/95 of 17 July 1995 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of peroxodi su lp hates (persulphates), originating in the People's Republic of China OJ 
1995 L169/15 
26 Council Regulation (EC) No 2961/95 of 18 December 1995 imposing a definitive anti-dumPing 
duty on imports of peroxodisulphates (persulphates), originating in the People's 
Republic of China, OJ 
1995 1-308/61. 
27 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 of II July 1988 on protection against dumped or subsidized 
imports frorn countries not members of the European Economic 
Community OJ 1988 L209/1. 
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Commission considered the advantages of Japan as a suitable reference country, on 
balance, still outweighed the arguments presented in favour of Turkey. Consequently, the 
normal value of persulphate from China was established based on information submitted 
by the two Japanese companies willing to cooperate with the Commission. 
Using the information of the Japanese company to determine the normal value of Chinese 
products, the Commission easily came to the conclusion that the normal value is much 
higher than the export price. Therefore, the imports were dumped, and an anti-dumping 
duty as high as 83 percent was imposed. 
3. Problematic points that should be noticed in the above case. 
First, the selection of the third ME to determine the normal value of imports from NMEs 
is likely to deny the latter's comparative advantages in international trade. 
It is well known that labour is cheaper in developing countries than developed countries 
or market economies. This should be regarded as one of the non-market economies' 
comparative advantages, and it is those countries' due right to benefit from it in 
international trade. In the persulphate case, if we consider the key factor involved in 
manufacture, we may find out that the EU's comparison is absolutely unfair. 
First of all, persulphate production is labour intensive and is a high energy consuming 
industry. It means that the cost of labour is the most important element to constitute the 
overall manufacturing cost of persulphate. In the persulphate case, Japan was the 
analogue country, which has rather high domestic price of persulphates. Applying it to 
establish the normal value of imports from China, the Commission simply came to the 
conclusion that the normal value is much higher than the export price of persulphates 
from China. 
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However, there is a huge difference between the cost of labour in China and Japan. 
According to World Bank statistics, 28 the average labour cost per worker in 
manufacturing in China between 1995-1999 is $729 per year, while that of Japan is 
$31687 per year, which is 43 times higher than the former. So it is ridiculous to select 
Japan as the third ME in the persulphates case. Nevertheless, the EU did so, and as a 
result, Chinese products were found to have been dumped with high dumping margin. 
From this point, we can see an unscientific element existing in the analogue country 
method, i. e. the obvious difference between the labour costs from China and Japan results 
in an unfair judgement. Even if the same industry of the two countries use the same 
technology and have the same procedure to manufacture persulphates, the cost in Japan is 
still higher than that of China. In that case, selection of Japan as the analogue country to 
determine the normal value of the Chinese exports is absolutely unreasonable and unfair. 
Using that methodology, it is not surprising that the Commission finally imposed an 
anti-dumping duty as high as 83 percent on Chinese exporters. 
Second, selection of a third ME whose relevant industry is the major rival in international 
trade to that of the NME concerned may be improper to some extent. 
Decisions of industries in different countries to cooperate or not with the Commission in 
anti-dumping investigations are usually made due to some reasons. These reasons should 
also be taken into account. Especially when one country seems to be eager to cooperate in 
the anti-dumping investigation, and its industry is the very major competitor of that from 
the NME in international trade, then the information supplied by the former should really 
be considered carefully. Data adverse to the NME is likely to be put forward at that time 
in order to weaken its rival's competition capacity in future. 
28 World Bank Statistics of Labour and Employment. 
<http: //www. ignkeywords. com/keyword/keyword. aspx? keyword=www. worldbank-orgdatadatabytop 
icdatabytopic. html> (I December 2002). 
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In the above case, Japan is the second largest persulphate exporter next to China in the 
world. So, the reason why its companies agreed to cooperate with the Commission in the 
anti-dumping investigation may be because information submitted by them would 
obviously result in unfavourable consequences for its biggest rival - Chinese persulphate 
producers in international trade. From this sense, Japan is not the best choice to be taken 
to determine the normal value of persulphates from China. 
Third, information from the third ME available to the Commission does not always mean 
it is the best data to establish the normal value and to make a fair comparisonwith export 
price of products concerned. In the persulphate case, we may find out that Japan was 
selected as the analogue country mainly because the Commission did not have any other 
choice except that, due to others non-cooperation. 
Besides, the case also reflects other defects of the rule discussed in 1.2 of this chapter. On 
the one hand, the rule is rather vague considering the selection of the third country 
without detailed substantive and procedure requirements. On the other hand, due to the 
over strict time limit, the Chinese exporters concerned cannot put forward significant 
opinion about the selection of the third ME. Under this circumstance, the EU almost has 
absolute discretionary power to judge this matter. 
According to the above analysis, those unscientific factors of the traditional non-market 
economy treatment (analogue country method) easily let the EU come to an incorrect 
conclusion that deviates from the facts, and therefore result in the judgment which is 
unfavourable and unfair to exporters of non-market economies. 
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I/. Conditional market economy treatment. 
A. Relevant rules in force. 
In order to meet the need in anti-dumping practice and reward economic reforms taking 
place in the People's Republic of China and Russia, the EU published Council Regulation 
(EC) 905/9 829 on 27 April 1998. It grants market economy status in antýdumping 
investigations to individual enterprises of the two countries. That is to say, when 
exporters of China meet the five criteria set in the rule, their individual dun-ping margins 
could be based on their own domestic sales prices rather than that of a third ME. These 
five criteria are: 
Decisions of firms regarding prices, costs and inputs, including for instance raw 
materials, costs of technology and labour, output, sales and investment, are made in 
response to market signals reflecting supply and demand, and without significant 
state interference in this regard, and costs of major inputs substantially reflect market 
values, 
Firms have one clear set of basic accounting records which are independently audited 
in line with international accounting standards and are applied for all purposes, 
The production costs and financial situation of firms are not subject to significant 
distortions carried over from the former NME system, in particular in relation to 
depreciation of assets, other write-offs, barter trade and payment via compensation of 
debts, 
The firms concerned are subject to bankruptcy and property laws which guarantee 
29 Council Regulation (EQ No 905/98, OJ 1998 L 128/18. 
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legal certainty and stability for the operation of firms, and 
Exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate. 
A determination whether the producer meets the abovementioned criteria shall be 
made within three months of the initiation of the investigation, after specific 
consultation of the Advisory Committee and after the EU industry has been given an 
opportunity to comment. This determination shall remain in force throughout the 
investigation. 30 
B. Specific procedures for the new approach. 
At the early stage in the EU's anti-dumping investigation, procedures were set to examine 
whether the conditional MET can be granted to relevant individual exporters. First of all, 
a special claim to apply for MET must be submitted by a Chinese enterprise. The deadline 
for requesting the special treatment and providing necessary information at the same time 
is 21 days after the publication of the Notice which initiates the investigation in the EU's 
Official Journal. 31 Within three months after that, the Commission should assess the 
information submitted by Chinese exporters and decide whether they meet the five 
criteria for the MET. If the outcome of the assessment is positive, the individual exporter 
will be granted MET, which gives the exporter specific dumping margin at both the 
provisional and definitive stages of the investigation. However, if the application is 
rejected, the exporters will be subject to the analogue country method automatically. 
30 Art. 1, Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98. 
31 Robert M. MacLean, 'Evaluating the Impact of the E. C. 's Conditional Market Economy Principle in 
Chinese and Russian Anti-Dumping Cases' (2001) 7(3), Int. T. L. R. 65 at p 68. 
C. Outcome of the application of the conditional market economy 
approach. 
In order to identify and encourage the remarkable advances brought about by economic 
reform in China, the EU adopts conditional MET to imports from China in an&dumping 
investigations. Hence, 'the proposed changes will be a recognition of the efforts made so 
far by China and Russia to transform their economies. ' 32 The new approach is no doubt a 
big step forward. However, the outcome of its application is not so satisfactory when we 
look at the following statistics and facts: 
From April 1998 when the revised legislation entered into force, out of over 45 
applications for MET, only five Chinese companies and one Russian enterprise met the 
criteria of MET according to the EU's assessment, and therefore were allowed to use their 
domestic price to determine the normal value of exports. The rate of successful 
application is only around 12 percent. The reason for such a low rate is that the criteria to 
grant MET have proved to be extremely strict and difficult for Chinese exporters to 
satisfy in practice. 
33 
The conditional MET was supposed to reflect the actual normal value and dumping 
margin of imports from China. However, on the contrary, the number of fresh 
anti-dumping investigations initiated against China in particular has increased 
significantly compared to the period preceding the change in policy. That is to say, only 
one anti-dumping case was initiated against imports from China in 1998, while it jumped 
to 12 new cases in the following year. In 2000,6 new investigations were launched. In 
other words, 18 new cases have been opened against imports from China in the two-year 
32 Proposal to the Council Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96, COM/97/0677 
final - ACC, OJ 1998 C70/15, pp. 1-2. 
33 R. M. MacLean, fn 31 above at p 65. 
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period immediately following the new approach of conditional MET. 34 
Based on these facts, we can conclude that the EU's new antýdumping policy 
(conditional MET) towards China is not capable of achieving its goal, i. e. to 
accommodate the dramatic changes of the economy in China, and to be more reasonable 
to apply. Furthermore, instead of encouraging China's economic reform, the current 
situation actually has had a negative impact on it. 
D. Unreasonable factors in the application of the conditional MET 
As we have seen, the EU's new approach of conditional MET does not function as well as 
it is supposed to. The following points constitute the major reasons for this. 
1. Very tight time limit for the MET application. 
The Commission requires applicants for conditional MET to provide all information 
needed within very tight time limits. Generally speaking, foreign parties in antýdumping 
investigations have to submit necessary documents 40 days after they receive the 
questionnaires. 35 However, with regard to Chinese exporters who apply for MET, the 
deadline for lodging the application and providing necessary information is only 21 days 
after the publication of notice of initiation of the investigation in the Official 
Journaf 6 
Thus,, the burden for those exporters to bear is extremely tough. 
34 , Summary of the European Union's Anti-Dumping Investigation against 
Chinese Exports from 
1979', <http: //www. cacs. gov. cn/infor/lszl/lszll I. htm> (I December 
2002). 
35 Art. 6 (2), Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96. 
36 fn 31 above. 
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2. The Commission's assessment on whether applicants for conditional MET 
meet the criteria set out in the Regulation is too strict to be reasonable. 
The Commission requires applicants for conditional MET to meet all criteria set in the 
Regulation completely. With regard to the five criteria, if there is any deficiency or flaw 
in documents given by a Chinese exporter, he will be given an absolute objection to MET. 
In that case, the rate for successful application of MET is as low as 12 percent since the 
new approach took effect. It is unfair to those exporters whose requests are refused to 
some extent, because the assessment to grant MET should be made according to the goal 
of the new approach. That is to say, if a Chinese exporter is able to meet most of the 
criteria stipulated in the Regulation, and he can show that the overall management of the 
business is independent of state control, he should then be granted MET. 
3. Use-out Domestic Data Methodologl. 37 
In practice, even if a Chinese company is granted MET in an anti-dumping investigation, 
its domestic price cannot be used as the normal value of the same product from other 
companies whose application for MET is rejected. This is called Use-out Domestic Data 
Methodology. An anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of integrated electronic 
compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's Republic of China was 
initiated on 17 May 2000 . 
38 Ten Chinese exporters applied for MET, and two of theM39 
were granted the new approach by the Commission. One of the exporting producers has 
37 This issue is further analyzed in chapter six. 
38 Council Regulation (EC) No 1470/2001 of 16 July 2001 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of integrated electronic compact 
fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's Republic of China. OJ 2001 L195/8. 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 255/2001 of 7 February 2001 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's 
Republic of China. OJ 2001 L38/8- 
39 Lisheng Electronic & Lighting (Xiamen) Co. Ltd, Xiamen and Philips & Yaming Lighting Co. Ltd, 
Shanghai. 
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sufficient domestic sales volume '40SO its normal value was established on the basis of the 
domestic sales prices in accordance with Article 2(l) of the basic Regulation. However, 
as to other Chinese exporters whose application for MET was rejected, they were still 
subject to the analogue country method. In this case, the normal values of their products 
was determined by relevant information from Mexico rather than the domestic prices of 
the Chinese company which was granted the MET. 
With regard to this practice, the Commission argued that it is consistent with Article 
2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation, which prefers to select a third ME. However, making use 
of the price information of the Chinese company who gets the MET to establish normal 
values for other Chinese producers has two advantages in anti-dumping investigations. 
First, the normal values thus established are more accurate than those determined by the 
price information from a third ME, because they operate under the same economic 
conditions. Second, it enables the Commission to be free of the troublesome process to 
gain cooperation and information from a third ME. Therefore, the Commission's 
argument cannot be easily justified. 
4. Inappropriate adjustment made towards the domestic sales prices of Chinese 
companies which already get the MET 
In a few cases, even if a Chinese company was granted MET, and it had sufficient 
domestic sales volume, its domestic sale prices were not adopted directly to establish the 
normal values of the imports. 
40 Art. 2(2) of the basic Regulation requires that the domestic sales prices can 
be adopted to establish 
normal value of the imports concerned only when the sales represented 
5 percent or more of the sales 
volume of the product concerned exported to the 
Community. 
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In the Zinc Oxide case of September 2001,41 five Chinese exporters applied for MET. 
After verification, the Commission granted three exporters MET because they have 
fulfilled all the criteria. In addition, all of them have sufficient domestic sales volumes in 
accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, their domestic sales 
prices should be directly adopted to establish the normal value of the exports. However, 
the Commission argued that the purchase prices of the basic zinc raw materials for the 
production of zinc oxide appeared to be below market prices by comparing actual prices 
paid by the three companies and zinc quotations on the London Metal Exchange 
42 (LME). For that reason, it made adjustments towards the domestic sales prices of the 
three Chinese companies before using them to establish normal values. As a result, all of 
them were found to have dumped their exports. 
However, the conclusion of the anti-dumping investigation might have been different if 
no adjustment was made. Here the question is: whether or not the adjustment should be 
made towards the domestic sales prices in accordance with international price reference 
such as the LME? In my opinion, the reference of the LME should not be taken into 
account in this case. Otherwise, there is no sense for the Commission to assess whether a 
Chinese exporter fulfils the criteria of the MET. 43 In other words, once a Chinese exporter 
gets the MET, it is a fact that it operates under free market conditions. So, no adjustment 
41 Council Regulation (EC) No 408/2002 of 28 February 2002 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain zinc oxides 
originating in the People's Republic of China. OJ 2002 L 62/7. Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1827/2001 of 17 September 2001 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain zinc 
oxides originating in the People's Republic of China. OJ 2001 L248/17. 
42 LME provides reference prices for the world-wide pricing of activities relating to non-ferrous 
metals, in this case zinc materials and related zinc products. 
43 One of the MET criteria is: 
Decisions of firms regarding prices, costs and inputs, including for instance raw materials, cost of 
technology and labour, output, sales and investment, are made in response to market signals 
reflecting supply and demand, and without significant state interference in this regard. and costs 
of major inputs substantially reflect market values. 
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should be made to establish the normal values of the Chinese products. 
5. Chinese exporters cannot apply for MET during the sunset review. 
With regard to imports from China, the Commission refuses to introduce the 
methodology of the conditional MET in sunset reviews carried out after the new 
legislation came into force. In the Magnetic Disks cases in 2002,44 the Commission 
refused to consider Chinese exporter's application for the MET during the sunset review, 
and continued to adopt the analogue country method. It indicated that during a sunset 
review, pursuant to Article 11.2 of the basic Regulation, measures must either be 
maintained or repealed, but not modified. 45 In the meantime, it suggested that the 
exporters could ask for other methods to establish the normal values only during interim 
review under Article 11.3. However, the criteria to initiate an interim review are very 
stringent. Under Article 11.3, such proceedings can be carried out only if the Commission 
finds 'the circumstances with regard to dumping and injury have changed significantly', 
or the 'existing measures are achieving the intended results in removing the injury 
previously established'. Therefore, it is very difficult for Chinese exporters to persuade 
the Commission to initiate an interim review. 
This puts the Chinese companies into a dilemma, where they normally cannot apply for 
the new approach of the MET in proceedings with regard to the existing an&dumping 
measures. It is particularly unfair to these exporters, because like others companies, most 
of them have obtained great progress from China's economic reforms. Therefore, they 
should have the same right to apply for the conditional MET, and if they are able to meet 
the five criteria of the treatment, the Commission should use their domestic sales prices to 
44 Council Regulation (EC) No 312/2002 of 18 February 2002 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5 microdisks) originating in Japan and the People's 
Republic of China and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of 3,5 microdisks originating 
in Taiwan. OJ 2002 L 50/24. 
45 Para. 19, Ibid. 
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establish the normal values. 
46 
Based on the above point, in order to ensure that all Chinese exporters have the same right 
to apply for the MET, the Commission should provide more flexible criteria to initiate 
interim reviews for those whose exports are currently subject to anti-dumping measures. 
In summary, the proposal for conditional MET is a favourable step forward as to the EU's 
anti-dumping policy against imports from the People's Republic of China. However, how 
the new approach and the basic criteria are applied by the Commission is crucial to the 
actual outcome of the policy. Based on this idea and the analysis made above, the new 
policy is being implemented in a way that effectively excludes the large majority of MET 
applicants from being successful. 
1/1. One country one duty rule. 
A. Relevant rules in force. 
Article 9.5 of the EU's basic anti-dumping Regulation 47 stipulates that 
An anti-dumping duty shall be imposed in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a 
non-discriminatory basis on imports of a product from all sources found to be dumped 
and causing injury, except as to imports from those sources from which undertakings 
under the terms of this Regulation have been accepted. The Regulation imposing the 
duty shall specify the duty for each supplier or, if that is impracticable, and as a general 
rule in the cases referred to in Article 2(7), the supplying country concerned. 
In practice since the early 1990s, the Commission has stressed repeatedly that 
in 
46 Proposal relating to this issue is suggested in the Conclusions of the thesis. 
. 17 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96. 
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anti-dumping proceedings with regard to imports from NMEs, it will generally impose a 
single anti-dumping duty on all exports from such countries on a country-by-country 
basi S. 48 
B. Concept and rationale for one country one duty rule. 
Generally speaking, imports from non-market economies are subject to two 
disadvantages in the EU's anti-dumping investigation. One of them is the analogue 
country method, another is 'one country one duty rule'. In the case of maAet economies, 
individual duties are determined for each exporter automatically, however, a single 
average rate of duty is established on all imports from an NME in an&dumping 
investigations. With regard to imports from the People's Republic of China, 'save in 
exceptional cases, all such exports will be subject to the same general rate of 
anti-dumping duty. 
49 
The rationale for the policy is that all imports from non-market economies are centrally 
controlled by the state, so there is the possibility for them to channel exports through the 
exporter with the lowest duty rate. Therefore, a single rate is applied in order to avoid 
such circumvention of anti-dumping duties. 
C. Unreasonable factors existing in the one country one duty rule. 
Unreasonable factors existing in the one country one duty rule can be analyzed from two 
aspects. 
First, it is extremely unfair to exporters of non-market economies, since most of them 
48 Jianyu Wang, fn 17 above at p 124. 
49 Sebastian Farr, 'Individual Treatment for Exporters in Anti-Dumping Cases: the China Syndrome'. 
(1997) 3(3) Int. T. L. R., 105-107. 
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have undergone economic reforms and restructuring during the last decade. As a result of 
such reforms, producers and exporters from these countries have the decisive right to 
manage their business rather than being subject to strict state control. Therefore, they 
decide their own export price according to their individual operation situation. However, 
the one country one duty rule means that the EU Commission will impose the same 
anti-dumping duty on an NME exporter as others though it does not practise dumping at 
all. So, such a practice at the present stage is unfair and out of date, especially to countries 
like the People's Republic of China, whose favourable outcomes of economic reform 
including enterprise self-management reform is well recognized in the world. 
Besides, the worry of one country one duty (i. e. circumvention of the duties after different 
anti-dumping duties were determined according to different exporters from an NME) can 
be eliminated by detecting import volumes of the individual companies before and after 
the EU's anti-dumping investigation. If imports from the company which was imposed 
with a low duty increased sharply without due reasons after the anti-dumping proceeding 
was terminated, circumvention can be found. In that case, individual treatment can be 
withdrawn or necessary punitive measures can be taken towards specific exporters. 
IV. Individual treatment 
A. Rules in force. 
Originally, there are eight separate criteria to grant individual treatment. However, due to 
the recognition of unreasonable factors existing in the one country one duty rule as we 
analyzed above, reviewing the outcome of the application of individual treatment after 
50 
1997 (when the old provision was issued), the latest legislation was updated in Council 
50 Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EQ No 384/96 on protection against 
dumped imports frorn countries not members of the European Community /*COM/97/0677 final - 
ACC. OJ 1998 C70/15. 
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Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002 
. 
51 It sets five criteria for the conditional individual 
treatment: 
(a) in the case of wholly or partly foreign owned firms or joint ventures, exporters are 
free to repatriate capital and profits; 
(b) export prices and quantities, and conditions and terms of sale are freely determined-, 
(c) the majority of the shares belong to private persons. State officials appearing on the 
board of Directors or holding key management positions shall either be in minority or 
it must be demonstrated that the company is nonetheless sufficiently independent from 
state interference; 
(d) exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate; and 
(e) State interference is not such as to permit circumvention of measures if individual 
exporters are given different rates of duty. 52 
B. Problems of substance in the practical application of the regime 
According to the EU's anti-dumping rules in force, individual treatment means that: 
For companies in NMEs who can prove that their exporting activities are determined 
by market forces and not affected by state influence (based on criteria set by the 
Commission), an individual dumping margin is calculated for them based on a 
comparison of their own export prices with the normal value from the analogue 
coun ry. 
53 
51 Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002 
52 Art. 1(6), Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002. 
53 Recital 8 of Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on protection 
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That is to say, with regard to exporters from non-market economies (especially from 
China) in an anti-dumping investigation, when their application for the conditional MET 
is rejected by the Commission, they still have chance to be granted individual treatment. 
If they meet the five criteria to show that its export activities are not subject to state 
interference, anti-dumping duties will be determined on an individual basis according to 
their export prices. 
However, even the Commission itself has to admit the overlap in the criteria for 
individual treatment has resulted in the fact that only those exporters that can fulfil the 
requirements for full MET are able to qualify for individual treatment. 54 
C. Main reasons for the problem. 
Like the situation of conditional MET, there are mainly two reasons for the problem of 
individual treatment when it is applied by the Commission. 
On the one hand, the criteria to grant individual treatment are not reasonable enough to be 
applied to Chinese exporters. For example, the first criteria to apply for the treatment is 
only applicable to wholly foreign owned firms or joint ventures. That is to say, all state 
owned firms are excluded from enjoying the approach. Also, in practice, state owned 
firms usually are subject to the highest anti-dumping duties by the Commission. This is a 
discriminatory policy, and it is very harmful to Chinese exporters considering the 
significant ratio of state owned enterprises in all Chinese companies. However, we should 
make it clear that in China, a state-owned firm is not necessarily a state-controlled firm. 
The former has self-management rights, but the latter has not and its operation is 
against durnped imports from countries not members of the European Community /*COM/2000.0363 
final - ACC 2000/0160. 
54 Recital 53, Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on protection 
-against durnped imports from countries not members of the European Community /* COM/2000/036-3 
final - ACC 2000/0160. 
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substantially interfered by the government. The existence of state-owned enterprises in 
China is mainly due to China's special historical and political reasons. However, the 
reform and reconstruction of such enterprise is a key area in China's economic reform 
from last decade till now. It was carried out: 
through privatisation, closures and mergers, shedding of excess labour, improvements 
in the financial situation of state-owned enterprises and the financial sector through 
debt write off, the setting up off Asset management companies and the banking sector 
being instructed to make lending decisions on the basis of market forces and not policy 
considerations. 55 
All of these actually emphasize that local government and institutions cannot interfere in 
the management of the firms; management rights have been transferred to the enterprise 
itself. In addition, the firms are not entitled to any privileges granted by the Chinese 
government. As a result of the reform, like wholly foreign owned firms and joint ventures, 
today, most state-owned enterprises manage their business, take responsibilities as an 
individual legal person and compete with others fairly in market-economy oriented 
environment. From this point of view, Chinese state-owned firms which have sound 
management and performance should also be given the opportunity to apply for 
individual treatment. 
On the other hand, another reason that results in problems of the application of the regime 
is that it is applied over strictly by the Commission. Anti-dumping investigations in Small 
Screen Televisions (SCTVS)56 and BicycleS57 are generally regarded as the foundation of 
55 Recital 15 of Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EQ No 384/96 on protection 
against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community 
/*COM/2000.0363 
final - ACC 2000/0160. 
56 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2093/91. 
57 Counc. 11 Regulation (EEC) No 2474/93 of 8 September 1993 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty op irn orts into the Community of bicycles orynating 
in the People's Republic of China and 
collecting 
Tefinitively 
the provisional anti- dumping duty OJ 1993 L228/1. 
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the EU policy on individual treatment for NME exporters. In the case of SCTVs, the 
Commission set up relevant rules to grant eligible Chinese exporters individual treatment. 
As a result, two China-Japanese joint ventures were granted individual treatment on the 
ground that: 
In so far as the other two Chinese exporters are concerned (i. e. the two 
China-Japanese joint-ventures) the Commission was able to establish to its 
satisfaction that these companies, even if they did not operate fully on a market 
economy basis, enjoyed a high degree of independence in their operations, basically 
because they were able to import components and export finished products without 
control from the Chamber or from any other body. Furthermore, the fact that these 
companies were able to transfer their profits subject to certain administrative 
requirements, out of the People's Republic of China, ensured that these 
profit-oriented companies enjoyed a sufficient degree of independence which 
justifies their individual treatment. 58 
This approach was later strengthened in the Video Tapd9 and Certain Polyester YarriS60 
cases. However, individual treatment was refined and tightened up in the EU's 
58 
lbid, Recital 20, pp. 5-6. 
59 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1034/91 of 23 April 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of video tapes in cassettes originating in the P. E. of China, O. J. L106,26 April 1991, 
p. 15. 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3091/91 of 21 October 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imports of video tapes in cassettes originating in the P. E. of China and definitively collecting 
the provisional duty, O. J. 1,293,24 October 1991, p. 4. 
60 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yams (man-made staple fibers) originating in 
Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the People' s Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yams originating in the Republic of Korea OJ 
1991 L318/48. 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti- dumping duty on 
imports of certain polyester yams (man-made staple fibers) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, 
the People's Republic of China and Turkey and collecting definitively the provisional duty OJ 1992 
L88/1. 
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anti-dumping investigation of Bicycles from the People's Republic of China. 61 
Application for individual treatment from Chinese companies has been systematically 
refused since then. In the bicycle case, the Commission refused to grant individual 
treatment to Chinese companies including foreign joint ventures. It gave the following 
reasons: 
First, it reiterated its fear of circumvention of the duties, i. e. if individual treatment was 
granted, exports could be channelled by the state authorities through whichever exporter 
has the lowest anti-dumping duty. However, as we have discussed before, such 
circumvention can be avoided and detected by examining the export volumes of a 
Chinese company before and after the anti-dumping investigation is terminated. 
Second, the Commission stressed that individual treatment is not required by the basic 
dumping Regulation. This argument is not reasonable enough because the basic dumping 
Regulation also does not have any provision to prohibit the EU to determine individual 
export prices, individual dumping and injury margins for suppliers in NMEs. So, whether 
to grant individual treatment to a Chinese exporter should be determined from a more fair 
and reasonable point of view. 
Third, the Commission concluded that none of the companies involved had been able to 
demonstrate that it was enjoying and will go on enjoying the necessary degree of 
commercial autonomy. Since it holds that the power of the state or a representative of the 
state to block certain key decisions of the company prevents it from acting in a truly 
autonomous manner, 62 so it cannot be granted individual treatment. However, as early as 
61 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474/93 of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imports into the Community of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of 
China and 
collecting definitively the provisional anti- dumping duty OJ 1993 L228/1. 
62 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550/93 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of 
China. OJ 1993 L58/12. paragraph 
34. 
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the 1980's, Chinese foreign joint venture law stipulated that the company has the right to 
manage its own business without any outer interference from the state. The rule provides 
that according to the contract establishing the joint venture, the board of directors will 
make decisions on crucial issues such as development strategy, income and expenditure 
budget, profit distribution and personnel recruitment. Under such provisions, the EU 
should not conclude that the State exercises a dominant influence on foreign joint 
ventures like those in the bicycle case. 
Based on the above points, the strict substantive and procedural criteria to grant 
individual treatment to exporters from NNIEs and the too broad discretion enjoyed by the 
EU institution make it very difficult for Chinese companies to satisfy the requirements. 
Consequently, very few of them can be granted individual treatment. Therefore, the 
treatment is the exception to one country one duty rule rather than a dominant rule in 
practice. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examines four separate forms of treatment which are applied against 
Chinese exporters in the EU's anti-dumping investigation at present: 
1. Traditional non-market economy treatment (analogue country method); 
II. Conditional MET. 
111. One country one duty rule. 
I V. Individual treatment; 
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The first two treatments are applied to determine the normal value of imports from NMEs 
in the EU's anti-dumping investigation. While the one country one duty rule and 
individual treatment are methods to impose anti-dumping measures. 
Both conditional economy treatment and individual treatment have been introduced to 
accommodate the remarkable advances brought about by the economic reform in China. 
They are presumed to bring more justification in the EU's anti-dumping practice. 
However, relevant statistics for recent years shows the impact of the new approaches is 
rather discouraging: 
Among over 45 applications for MET, only five Chinese companies and one Russian 
enterprise have managed to successfully pass through the Commission's assessment for 
the status. This means that the success rate is about 12 percent. With regard to individual 
dumping margins awarded to applicant enterprises that have successfully established 
their eligibility for MET, there is no significant decline in individual dumping margins 
than would otherwise have been the case. However, over the same period since the new 
approaches were introduced, the number of new anti-dumping investigations against 
Chinese exporters has increased sharply, from only one anti-dumping case in 1998 to 18 
new cases in 1999-2000. The facts show that the changes of the EU's antiýdumping 
policy towards China actually have had a negative impact rather than any tangible reward 
to its favourable outcome of economic reform. It also makes it clear that the application 
of these new approaches is problematic, at least from the statistical point of view. 
The main reasons for the problems of the new approaches mainly include two points. 
First, the criteria for both conditional MET and individual treatment are not reasonable 
enough for Chinese exporters to meet in anti-dumping investigations. The change of the 
rules was structured to allow the Commission to interpret the law as it saw fit on a 
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case-by-case basis. 63 In this way, the amended policy ensures that the Commission would 
have ample discretion to determine the existence of dumping in anti-dumping 
proceedings against imports from NMEs. Second, the policy is implemented over strictly 
by the European Commission so that it actually excludes the large majority of applicants 
from being successful. 'Commission officials admit that the formal rule change was more 
in name than in substance, and they had no intention of administering the more beneficial 
rules to Chinese and Russian firms. 64 
Therefore, it is no surprise that as a result in practice, the conditional MET and individual 
treatment seem to be exceptions to the traditional rules towards imports from China in the 
EU's anti-dumping investigations rather than the main principle to accommodate 
favourable changes obtained in China's economic reform. 
In summary, this chapter analyzes and comments on the current EU's 
anti-dumping rules towards China, and therefore constitutes a significant part of 
the whole thesis. In the next chapter, I will analyze the actual impacts of China's 
economic reform for the past twenty years, so that we can make corresponding 
suggestions to remedy the defects of the current EU's anti- dumping policy towards 
China. 
63 Cynthia M. Horne, 'Belief Stasis as an Impediment to Policy Implementation: Non-Market 
Economies and Western Trade Laws' (University of Washington, prepared 
for: American Political 
Science Association Conference San Francisco, CA, August 30 - September 2,2001). p 24. 
64 Ibid. 
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Chapter Four 
An Analysis of China's Economic Reform 
Introduction 
This chapter is an analysis of China's economic reform. As discussed in the last chapter, 
there are many unreasonable factors in the current EU's anti-dumping policy with regard 
to the People's Republic of China, ' and the very reason which brings out these problems 
and makes the rules unfair enough to be applied is the progress achieved in China's 
economic reform and the changes in its economic status. China has become a transitional 
economy and is quite close to an ME in many fields, but the EU still applies traditional 
NME treatment to Chinese exports in most cases, the proportion of Chinese exports 
subject to the EU's anti-dumping measures are extremely high. Based on this point, I will 
demonstrate the fundamental progress achieved in China's economy by analysing the 
development in four important sections, which include reform in foreign trade, enterprise, 
pricing and financial fields. 
Since foreign trade, enterprise, pricing and financial systems are the key areas in China's 
economic reforms, I will discuss their development respectively. For each of them, first, I 
give a brief introduction to their pre-reform conditions. Second, I enumerate progress 
made after the reform. Third, I abstract and explain relevant Chinese national legislation. 
This is not only because these laws embody the favourable outcomes of the reforms and 
support them in turn, but also because they relate to the requirements of EU's conditional 
MET. There, the basic consistency between the Chinese legislation and the criteria to get 
I The EU's anti-dumping policy against imports China are mainly traditional non-market economy 
treatment (analogue country method), one country one duty rule and occasionally use of market 
economy treatment and individual treatment. They are examined 
in more detail in chapter three. 
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MET is emphasized in order to propose some practical suggestions to the EU in the end. 
Four, I analyze commitments made on China's accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), which ensures that further reform will be carried out towards a market economy 
direction in future. 
After the above issues have been examined, the illegal and unreasonable aspects of the 
EU's anti-dumping practice towards China are analyzed. Based on the above study, 
suggestions for the EU are proposed at the end of this chapter. 
The analysis in this chapter is based on a variety of sources. It deals with the legislative 
changes that have taken place since China embarked on its period of economic 
transformation in the 1980s. These legislative changes are discussed in the context of the 
economic analyzes that have been conducted by the World Bark, the WTO and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in relation to each stage of economic reform 
wherever such reports are available. 
Of crucial importance in this respect is the Report of the Working Party on China's 
Accession to the WTO .2 This report provides the analysis - economic and legal - which 
corroborates the central argument of this thesis that the EU, by failing to take into account 
the very real changes that have occurred in China's economy, is acting unreasonably in its 
application of its anti-dumping regime. In many respects, the Report of the Working Party 
can be said to be a definitive statement of the true position of China's economy at the time 
of accession to the WTO in late 200 1. Its conclusions formed the basis of China's 
accession and, as such, clearly should be seriously considered by EU policy makers in 
determining its trade arrangements with China. 
2, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China', I October 2001. WTO document code: 
WT/ACC/CHN/49. Available by searching through <http: //docsonline. wto. org/gen_search. asp> (I 
December 2002). 
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1. China's foreign trade regime. 
China's foreign trade regime has undergone fundamental changes through continuous 
reform since 1979, when trade development was dominated through monopolies 
controlled by the Chinese central government. As the outcome of the reform, the foreign 
trade system has seen great progress in both the import and export sectors, so that it was 
able to meet the commitments when China entered the WTO in November 200 1. 
A. A brief introduction to the pre-reform foreign trade regime in China. 
China's foreign trade system before economic reform was completely controlled by the 
Chinese government. It was dominated by less than 17 foreign trade corporations with 
monopoly trading rights. 3 Ignoring the important role played by the market, planners 
determined both import and export volumes by projected demand and supply for 
particular goods. At that time, the old regime had three characteristics. On the one hand, 
conventional policy instruments including tariffs, quotas and licences were seldom 
applied. Instead, there were a series of complicated procedures and formalities to manage 
the foreign trade system. On the other hand, the government regulated foreign trade 
activities mainly with administrative measures which lacked transparency and therefore 
were unpredictable. Furthermore, there was no institution to monitor the planners' work. 
Under such circumstances, the foreign trade regime was inefficient, thus China lost its 
advantages in international trade. 
B. Process and progress of the reform of China's foreign trade regime. 
In order to bring new energy to the old regime, China took four significant strategies in 
3 Elena lanchovichina & Will Martin, 'Trade Liberalization in China's Accession to World Trade 
Organization' at p 3. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No: WPS 2623,2001/06/30. 
<http: //www-wds. worldbank. org/serviet/NkDS-IBank_Serviet? pcont--details&eid=000094946_0107 
1704024384> (I December 2002). 
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the reform, including: enlarging foreign trade rights, reforming trade policy, reforming 
the exchange system and reforming prices to let market prices guide resource allocation. 
1. Enlarged foreign trade rights. 
Since 1979, China has granted a large number of enterprises foreign trade rights rather 
than restrict such rights to the limited monopoly of foreign trade corporations as was done 
in the past. As a result, external trade is now conducted through more than 200,000 
importers and exporters in China. 
From I January 1999, if private companies can prove that they can meet certain basic 
requirements provided by law, they will obtain foreign trading rights for their own 
products. At a later stage, big manufacturing firms can also get direct foreign trade rights 
for their products automatically without ratification from the state once they meet the 
legal requirements. That is to say, today, not only state trading enterprises, but also private 
companies and joint ventures are entitled to participate in foreign trade transactions. In 
addition, they enjoy the same level of rights and obligations before the law. 
Besides, all these enterprises have been granted more rights to decision-making and 
self-management than ever before. 5 Since 1984, they have been legally independent 
economic entities. 6 Especially state owned enterprises which were completely under 
government control before, operate mainly along commercial lines now. 7 Based on this 
4 Deepak Bhattasali & Masahiro Kawai, 'Implications of China's Accession to the World Trade 
Organization', <http: //www. worldbank. org. cn/English/content/wto-implications. pdf> (I December 
2002). 
5 Except for a few commodities which the number of firms entitled to engage in trade is tightly 
restricted by state, such as crude oil, cotton, rubber, timber, steel etc. 
E. lanchoviChina & W. Martin, fn 3 above at p 5. 
6 Deepak Bhattasali & Masahiro Kawai, fn 4 above at p 4. 
7 Rozelle, S., Park, A., Huang, Jikun and Hehui, Jin. 'Bureacrat to Entrepreneur: the Changing Role of 
the State in China's Transitional Commodity Economy' (Stanford University: Mimeo, 1996). 
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point, an individual enterprise can take its advantages in foreign trade business according 
to its development level and competition capabi lity. 8 
All of these represent a relatively open foreign trade regime compared with before. Since 
the number of the enterprises and the trade rights that they enjoyed vvere largel. N expanded, 
import and export volumes greatly increased. Consequently, China's trade (imports and 
exports) as a share of GDP rose from 13 percent in 1980 to 44 percent in 19999 
2. Reform of trade policy. 
At the beginning of the reform, China's foreign trade system developed the conventional 
policy instruments including tariff and non-tariff barriers on imports. However, since 
1990, in order to be consistent with the global trade principle, (i. e. eliminate tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to restore fair competition in international trade) and integrate with the 
world trade system, China made great efforts to reduce tariffs and remove non-tariff 
barriers. The average weighted tariff rate for the economy was estimated to be 16.4 
percent in 200010 from 40.6 percent in 1992 (See Table 4.1). Several significant tariff 
reforms from October 1997 to 2001 further reduced tariffs on a wide range of 
commodities. As to non-tariff barriers, these are estimated to have fallen to a 
tariff-equivalent level of 9.3 percent in the mid-1990s, " and the number of products 
Subject to quotas and licences fell from 1247 tariff lines in 1992 to 261 in 
1999.12 
I lang Lin, 'China's Foreign Trade System towards Its Accession to the WTO' (Chinese) 
<http: l"www. C hi nare form. org. c n/cgi- bin/B BS-Read. asp? Topi c_ I D=620> (I 
Dccember 2002). 
D Bhattasali, fii 4 above at p 2. 
10 Para 89, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
World Bank 1997b. China Engaged: Integration with the World Economy. Washington D. C.. World 
Bank. 
fii 3 above at p 6. 12 E lanchovlChina, -1 
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Table 4.1. Average tariff rates in China from 1992 to 1998. (Percenty 3 
Year Sample Weighted 
1992 42.9 40.6 
1993 39.9 38.4 
1994 36.3 35.5 
1996 
1997 
1998 
23.6 
17.6 
17.5 
22.6 
18.2 
18.7 
ýýource: world t3anK 1999. World Development Indicator. 
All of these reforms of the old trade regime have greatly stimulated the development of 
China's foreign trade. As a result, China's foreign trade volume (exports and imports) as a 
share of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) rose from 13 percent in 1980 to 44 percent in 
1999.14 Also, China has become the second largest country with on-shore foreign 
currency deposits in the world after the United Kingdom. ' 5 Thus, it wins more andmore 
shares in international trade transactions. 
C. Relevant laws which support the reform; 
China provides a series of laws regulating its foreign trade system, in order to ensure that 
it operates under legal and market economy principles. On the one hand, it encourages 
normal trade activities, supporting and defending the outcome of the reform. From this 
13 World Bank 1999. World Development Indicators. World Bank, Washington DC. Available from the 
World Bank website: <http: //www. worldbank. org> (I December 2002). 
14 D Bhattasali, fn 4 above at p 2. 
15 , With on-shore foreign currency deposits of US$128 billion, the second largest in the world after 
the United Kingdom, China's economy is more open than generally believed. ' 
D Bhattasali, fin 4 above at 
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point, relevant laws include the Foreign Trade Law 16 and Current Policy & Conditions 
for the Qualification of Foreign Trade Management. 17 On the other hand, to maintain a 
fair foreign trade order, it punishes any behaviour which is destructive to the system. For 
example, with regard to the issue of dumping, China enacted its Interim Regulation for 
the Punishment of Enterprises which Export Products with Low Price sl 8 on 20 March 
1996. From this point of view, laws of different purpose perform together to keep a better 
foreign trade order in China. These different regulatory approaches should be analyzed to 
help us understand to what extent they ensure the system operates towards the market 
economy direction. 
1. Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China. 
This law was enacted on I July 1994. It provides: a. the basic principles and orders that 
foreign trade operators should observe, b. a list of a small range of goods which it is 
prohibited to import, c. export and legal responsibilities for operators. 
First of all, Article 4 provides: The State adopts a unified foreign trade regime and 
exercises a fair and free trade order. The State shall encourage every effort in trade 
development, help to bring the initiative of the localities into play, and safeguard the 
autonomy of trade operators in trade operation. 
Article II stipulates that foreign trade operators shall operate independently according to 
law and be responsible for their own profits or losses. 
16 Chinese Foreign Trade Law was promulgated by the State President on 12 May 1994. It was enacted 
to govern foreign trade dealer, goods imports and exports, technology imports and exports, 
international service trade, foreign trade order, and promotion of foreign trade. The Law went 
into 
effect on July 1,1994. 
17 This Regulation was issued by the Foreign Trade Department, MOFTEC. It has binding effects on 
all types of enterprises conducting foreign trade 
in China. Available from 
<http: //www. i-noftec. gov. cn/article/200207/20020700032855_1. xml> 
(I December 2002). 
18 it was enacted on 20 March 1996 by MOFTEC. 
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In this way, the law confirms its objective to develop a sound foreign trade regime 
towards market economy orientation. In the meantime, it ensures the rights of operators 
in trade, so that they are able to make decisions for themselves according to market 
supply and demand. 
2. Current Policy & Conditions for the Qualification of Foreign Trade Companies 
in the People's Republic of China. 
This was promulgated by the Foreign Trade Department of the Ministry ofForeign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation, PRC (MOFTEC) in June 2001. It specifies basic conditions 
and application procedures for enterprises which are potentially entitled to trade in China. 
The preface of the rule reiterates three points. First of all, the law was published to 
increase and improve transparency of China's foreign trade regime. In addition, the limit 
for the company's economic status permitted to do foreign trade business in China has 
been completely eliminated, i. e. non-public ownership (non-state-control) enterprises 
have the same rights with state trading companies at this point. In addition, the range of 
goods to be transacted under the regime is getting broader and broader. 
3. Interim Regulation for the Punishment of Enterprises which Export Products 
with Low Prices. 19 
It was enacted on 20 March 1996 by MOFTEC. It indicates that the Ministry is the body 
to implement this Regulation, 20 and identifies the concept of export at low price, 21 i. e. 
19 This regulation is applicable to all foreign trade enterprises in China. Available (in Chinese) 
from: 
<http: //www. people. com. cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/1/1-2-39. html> (I December 2002). 
20 Art. 3, Interim Regulation for the Punishment of Enterprises which Export Products with Low 
Prices. 
21 Art. 5, Interim Regulation for the Punishment of Enterprises which Export Products with Low 
Prices. 
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when the export price is lower than the price that should be paid. 22 In order to prevent 
Chinese exporters competing with each other unfairly by decreasing the prices of their 
exports, the Ministry encourages individuals and units to report such practices to the 
authority. Within 30 days of the report being received, the Ministry will decide whether to 
launch an investigation or not. 23 As to the enterprises which export at low price, they will 
24 receive an economic or administrative punishment. In this way, unfair competition in 
the foreign trade system is curbed by the government to some extent. 
From the above analysis, it can be seen that China has realized the significance of market 
economy principles in international trade. So, today, it is making efforts to build a free 
and fair environment for its foreign trade development within a legal framework. 
D. Commitments made on China's accession to the WTO and prospects for 
the future. 
1. Commitments made on China's accession to the WTO. 
According to the principles of international trade given in the GAT-r, the Chinese 
government made the following commitments in the foreign trade field on its accession to 
the WTO. 
a. Commitment on enterprise's qualification of foreign trade. 
Within a three years' transition period, China will liberalize the scope and availability of 
22 , Price that should be paid' comprises: production cost, transportation cost, insurance cost, 
management cost and reasonable profit of an export. 
23 Art. 8, Interim Regulation for the Punishment of Enterprises which Export Products with Low 
Prices. 
24 Art. 6& 12, Interim Regulation for the Punishment of Enterprises which Export Products with Low 
Prices (20 March 1996). 
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. 
25 foreign trading rights. It undertook that. 
With regard to wholly Chinese-invested enterprises. it would reduce the minimum 
registered capital requirement to obtain trading rights to RMB26 5,000,000 (around US 
Dollar $604,000) for year one, RMB 3,000,000 (around US Dollar $362,400) for year 
two, RMB 1,000,000 (around US Dollar $120,800) for year three and would eliminate tile 
examination and approval system at the end of the phase-in period for trading rights. As 
to foreign-invested enterprises, it would liberalize the scope and availability of tradifig 
rights gradually. 
Beginning one year after accession, joint-venture enterprises with minority share 
foreign- investment would be granted full rights to trade and beginning two years after 
accession ma ority share foreign-investedjoint-ventures would be granted full rights to 
27 trade . 
Within three years after accession, all enterprises in China would be granted the right to 
trade automatically. As a result, all enterprises in China, foreign enterprises and 
individuals would be allowed to export and import throughout the customs territory of 
China. 28 
b. Commitment on designated trading29 
The Chinese government undertook to phase out the limitation on the grant of trading 
rights for goods specified in Annex 2B of its Draft Protocol within three ý'ears after 
25 Para. 83 & 84, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
26 RMB is 'Reni-ninbi' for short. Chinese curreilcý. 
27 Para. 83 (c), Report of the Working Part), on the Accession of China. 
28 Fxcept for the share of products listed in Annex 2A to the Draft Protocol reserwd 
for importation 
and exportation bý state trading enterprises. 
29 Pam. 86, Report of the Working PartN on the Accession of China. 
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accession. t would liberalize the right to trade in such goods by increasing the number of 
imports progressively during the transition period. All Chinese and foreign enterprises 
and individuals would be permitted to import and export such goods throughout the 
customs territory of China in the end. 
c. Commitment on tariff reduction. 
China has made substantial tariff reductions in many sections within the past few years, a 
fact which is acknowledged by other WTO members . 
30 After it entered into the WTO, 
China has made further commitments on this issue. For example, China signed the 
Information Technology Agreement on its accession to the WTO, so it would eliminate 
tariffs and charges on all information technology products as set out in the schedule. 
31 
Besides, China has agreed to reduce the average tariffs for all imports. Tariffs on 
agricultural products will be reduced from 20 percent in 1998 to 17 percent by 2004, and 
the average tariffs on all manufactures will fall from 18.5 percent in 1998 to 9.4 percent 
by 2005. (See Table 4.2)32 
30 Para. 87, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
China. 
31 Para. 92, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
China. 
32 Deepak Bhattasali & Masahiro Kawai, fn 4 above at p 
4. 
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33 Table 4.2: Summary of Important Features of the China-LJS Agreement . 
Sector Agreements 
Agriculture Average tariffs reduced from 20 percent to 17 percent by January 
2004. 
A tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system established for bulk 
commodities, with quota quantities increasing over time, and 
subject to tariffs between 1-3 percent. Export subsidies on cotton 
and rice eliminated. 
Foreign exporters given the right to sell and distribute their 
products directly to consumers. 
Manufacturing Average tariffs reduced from 18.5 percent in 1998 to 9.4 percent 
by 2005, phased in linearly, with large cuts for automobiles, high 
tech products, wood, and paper. 
Quotas and non-tariff restrictions eliminated within 5 years (and 
most in 2002-2003). Foreign firms given full trading and 
distribution rights for imported goods. 
Textiles and Import quotas on China's textiles and clothing exports 
Clothing eliminated by end-2005, subject to anti-surge provisions through 
1 2008. 
Source: International Monetary Fund. 
d. Commitments on elimination of nonAariff trade barriers (quotas and licences). 
China established a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system on its accession to the WTO. China 
undertakes that the system will be transparent, predictable, uniform, fair and 
non-discriminatory with clearly specified timeframes, administrative procedures and 
requirements, which reflects consumer preferences and end-user demand. 
China will 
apply TRQs according to WTO principles and the provisions set out 
in China's Schedule 
33 WTO most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment enables the commitments made 
in China-US 
Agreement available to all other members. 
'Surnmary of U. S. - China Bilateral WTO 
Agreement I, 
<http: Hwww. usChina. org/public/991115a. html> 
(I December 1,2002). 
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of Concessions and Commitments on Goods. 34 
As to the TRQ provisions applied to state-trading enterprises. China ensures that it WOUld 
implement consistent allocation and reallocation policies. Besides, all these decisions 
will be made by a single, central authority according to consumer preferences and 
end-user demand of the commercial market. 35 
In addition, China has submitted a list of goods with non-tariff measures to phase out 
contained in Annex 3 of the Draft Protocol. 36 China will eliminate the measures 
according to the schedule provided in the Annex. China confirmed that the application 
and administration of those measures , i. e. quotas and import licences, would be 
consistent with the WTO Agreement. The quotas will be allocated and the licence %%ill be 
issued through simple and transparent procedures. As long as the products are within the 
relevant quota category, the quota holder has absolute rights to dispose of thern, includinp 
to decide their specifications, pricing and packaging. 37 All of these policies are targeted to 
meet potential need in the market and minimize the adverse effect of non-tariff measures 
on trade. 
Based on these principles, all quotas and non-tariff trade barriers %\ill be eliminated 
\vithin 5 years after China's accession to the WT - 
38 
2. Prospects for China's foreign trade in future. 
China's entry into the WTO had significant impact on its economic status in the ýwrld 
Para. 116, Report of the Working Parly on the Accession of China. 
. 15 Para. 119, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
36 , The Draft Protocol of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
China', Repon ofthe 
Working llartý on the Accession of China at p 731- 
37 Para. 13 1, Report of the Working Part), on the Accession of Cluna. 
38 Deepak 13hattasali & Masahiro KaNN a,. fin 4 above at p 5. 
141 
economy. With the implementation of the accession offer, its share of world export 
markets are estimated to rise from 3.7 percent in 1995 to 6.8 percent in 2005, and from 
3.4 percent in 1995 to 6.6 percent in 2005 of world import markets. With regard to its 
impact on developed regions, Western Europe can benefit most due to China! s accession 
to the WTO. Its exports to China will increase from $28,571 Million in 1995 to $50,182 
Million in 2005, while those from North America will grow from $19,019 Million to 
$28,638 Million during the same period of time. 39 China is likely to be the second largest 
trading partner only after the US twenty years later, rather than the 16 h largest partner of 
40 today . 
Considering these facts and analysis, it is safe to say that after years of reform, China's 
foreign trade system operates mainly under market economic conditions today. 
Following China's accession to the WTO, it will make further progress at this point 
through continuous reform. Therefore, both the outcome and prospects of the reform 
should be taken into account when determining China's economic status in international 
trade issues such as anti-dumping. 
IL Chinese enterprise reform. 
Chinese enterprises can be divided into four categories according to their ownership: 
state-owned enterprises, collective-owned enterprises, individual-owned enterprises, and 
'other' ownership forrns. Among them, collective-owned enterprises include urban 
collectives, township enterprises, village enterprises, and cooperatives. Individual-owned 
firms, which account for about 80 percent of the more than 7 million enterprises in China, 
are privately owned firms that employ no more than seven workers. 'Other' ownership 
39 Deepak Bhattasali & Masahiro Kawai, fn 4 above at p 18. 
40 Yukon Huang, 'Realizing China's Potential', 
<http: //www. worldbank. org. cn/english/content/529z6l4659 I. shtml> (I December 
2002). 
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firms include domestic joint ventures, privately owned enterprises. fore i gri. -funded joint 
ventures, overseas-funded joint ventures. foreign-funded \ýhollý owned firms. 
overseas-funded wholly owned firms, foreign-funded cooperatives. oýcrseas-funded 
cooperatives, and share-holding enterprises .4 
'Fundamental changes took place m 
Chinese enterprises due to China's economic reform, especially the self-management 
rights enjoyed by enterprises of different ownerships. These changes are examined below. 
A. Brief introduction to Chinese enterprise before reform. 
Before China's economic reform, the Chinese government fully controlled China's 
economy by dominating the country's enterprises. The large majority of invcstmcnt funds 
and resources were allocated by the state from state resources. '2 There was hardly am 
other ownership except state-owned and collective-owned cnterprises. F'or cmunple, in 
1980. ) China had only 
400 'other' ownership firms, but 83,400 state-o\\ned and 29'), 100 
collective-owned enterprises, which accounts for 99.89 percent of the total at that 
tim C. 
43 
B. Process and Progress of the Chinese enterprise reform. 
Following China's economic reform in 1978, several kcy strate(gies were taken by the 
government, and tremendous changes took place in Chinese enterprises. 
First, non-state-ownership was introduced and increasingly expanded. 
The merall 
number of enterprises in China rose from 377,000 in 1980 to nearly 
8 million in 1999. 
(Table 4.3) Arnong them, State-owned enterprises decreased from 83,400 in 1980 to 
41 G, -iry II. Jefferson & Thomas G. Rawski, 'Ownership 
Change in Chinese lndustr--, ' in Garv If. 
Jef't'c'-son and Inderjit Singh (eds. ), Enterprise reorm 
in China, 0ývncrshP, Transition, aml 
Av-1brmance. (Oxford Universit-, Press: 1999) at p 2-3). 
42 GarN II. Jefferson, Albert G. Z. Hu, and Indedit Singh. 'Industrial 
IMestment, Finance. and 
Enterprise Perforniancein Chinese lndustD, '. in Gary I-I. Jefferson and lnderjit, -, ingh 
(eds. ). Ewerl)rist., 
"clol-in in ('hina, Oivnership, Transition, und 
Performance. (Oxford Unk ersitý Press: 1999). 223. 
4.1 Garv I I. Jefferson K, Thomas G. Rawski, 'fiz 
41 abo\c at p 25- 
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61,300 in 1999. The number of collective-owned enterprises increased from 293,500 in 
1980 to 1,659,200 in 1999, with most of the growth coming from village or joint 
township-village enterprises. The most extraordinary growth existed in individual-owned 
enterprises, w ich rose sharply from 3,347,800 in 1985 to 6,126,800 in 1999. All of the 
changes, especially the rapid expansion of non-state-owned firms, reflect the relatively 
free market environment in China compared with before. 44 
Table 4.3. Number of enterprises (thousand), selected years (1980-99). 
Type of 
enterprise 
1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 1999 
State-owned 83.4 93.7 104.4 118.0 64.7 61.3 
Collective-owned 293.5 367.8 15668.5 15475.0 1,797.8 1,659.2 
Individual-owned -- 3,347.8 6!, 176.0 5,688.2 6,033.8 6,126.8 
Other 0.4 1.7 8.8 60.3 85.7 91.8 
[Total 
377.3 3,811.0 7,957.8 7,341.5 7,974.6 7,929.9 
Note: -- Not available. 
Source: China State Statistical Bureau 2000.45 
Second, at the beginning, the reform was carried out by decentralizing public ownership 
through devolution of the control of state industry to provincial and local governments. 
This decentralization of control was reinforced by the policy that the state increasingly 
leaves the disposition of all except the largest enterprises to provincial and local levels of 
government. It had a strong impact on the large number of state-owned enterprises at that 
time. Although public ownership still dominates Chinese industry, the state could no 
longer monopolize production and pricing, except in certain natural resource and defense 
sectors. As a result, these enterprises gained more flexibility in their individual 
44 Ibid. 
45 From China State Statistical Bureau official website: 
<http: //www. stats. gov. cn/sjjw/ndsj/zgnj/2000/MOlc. htm> (26 
March 2002). 
144 
development, and became more competitive than before. 46 
Another approach to Chinese enterprise reform is corporate restructuring. A rapidly 
growing number of Chinese state owned enterprises have been corporatized, generally as 
joint ventures or joint stock companies in which the state remains the majority 
shareholder. The incentive to the conversion is the low productivity of state-owned 
47 
enterprises, which declined at an annual rate of 3.42 percent between 1988 and 1992. 
An important reason for the frequently poor performance of these enterprises, and of 
difficulties experienced by foreign partners investing in or with them, has been their lack 
of a corporate structure. Due to this reason, by the end of 1997, more than 400 of China's 
larger state enterprises had been converted into joint stock companies and listed on public 
exchanges. Labour productivity in these enterprises was highly improved in this way. 
(See table 4.4). In 2000,2800 bankruptcy and merger proposals were approved, among 
which 1504 were carried out, with a total writing-off of RMB81 billion (around US 
Dollar $9.79 billion). By the end of 2000, more than 81 percent of the 63,490 smalýsized 
state-owned enterprises existed at end-1996 had been reformed (mainly through sales). 
48 
As a result of corporate restructuring, these enterprises enjoy a substantial expansion of 
property rights and decision-making rights, which bring out much higher productivity 
and stronger competitive capability compared with before. 
46 Gary H. Jefferson and Thomas G. Rawski, fn 41 above at p 29. 
47 Gary H. Jefferson, Inderjit Singh, XingJunling, and Zhang Shouqing. 'China's Industrial 
Performance: A Review of Recent Findings' in Gary H. Jefferson and Inderj it Singh 
(eds. ), Enterprise 
reform in China, Ownership, Transition, and Performance. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999), 
147. 
48 , World Bank Report on China's Economic Management, ' September 2001, 
<http: //www. worldbank. org. cn/english/Knowledge/update9-200 
I. pdf> (I December 2002). 
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Table 4.4 Labour productivity by ownership, selected years, 1985-96. (Chinese Yuan 
RMB per worker; I US Dollar is roughly equivalent to 8.28 WB in December 2002f 9 
Yi eear 
rprI Type of enterrpprrii'ýý 
1980 1988 1990 1993 1996 
State enterprise 15309 24477 
- 
29933 50522 66295 
Collective enterprise 5042 8721 
_ 
11444 22581 42234 
Other enterprises 32636 
1 
63_0 18 
1 
76297 
1 
120888 
Source: China State Statistical Bureau. 
In short, Chinese enterprise reform has been carried out towards market orientation since 
1978. It results in less and less interference from the state or local government in these 
enterprises' operations. It brings them (especially state owned enterprises) many more 
rights to manage themselves than ever before, so that today they can make crucial 
decisions according to their individual advantages and market demand. On the other hand, 
the state applies a unified set of rules to regulate companies with different ownerships and 
treats them without discrimination. Under such circumstances, all types of enterprises are 
able to compete fairly under market principles. 
C. Main laws regulating Chinese enterprises. 
China has enacted a number of laws to ensure that the Chinese enterprise reform is 
carried out towards market orientation. They include General Principles of the Civil 
Law of the People's Republic of China, 50 Company law, 
51 Enterprise Bankruptcy 
49 Source: China State Statistical Bureau 1986,1989,1991,1994,1997; China Labour Statistics 
Yearbook 1993 (pp. 193,349,413); China Industrial Economy Statistical Yearbook 1988at p. 27; 
China State Statistical Bureau enterprise data set. 
50 General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China was Promulgated by the State 
President on April 12,1986. 
51 The translation of the law is available from <http: //www. qis. net/Chinalaw/lawtranl. htm> (I 
December 2002). 
146 
Law, " Laws for enterprises of different ownerships. 
1. General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China 
This is a very important statute which identifies the basic legal status of Chinese 
enterprises. Coming effect on January 1,1987, it provides general rights and obligations 
of a legal person in China. 
According to the law, a legal person shall be an organization that has capacity for civil 
rights and capacity for civil conduct and independently enjoys civil rights and assumes 
civil obligations. 53 An enterprise as a legal person shall bear civil liability for the 
operational activities of its legal representatives and other personnel. 54 A state-owned 
enterprise (enterprise owned by the whole people), collective enterprise, China-foreign 
equity joint venture, China-foreign contractual joint venture or foreign-capital enterprise 
as a legal person shall bear civil liability with the property it owns, except as stipulated 
otherwise by law. 55 
2. Chinese Company Law. 
Chinese Company law was enacted on 29 December 1993 for the first time and revised on 
25 December 1999. Compared with the provisions in the General Principles of the Civil 
Law of PRC, it is more specific, governing a company's foundation, structure, rights and 
obligations, functioning, stock issue, dissolution and so on. However, for the purpose of 
this section. ) 
56 here we may just examine the provisions with regard to a company's 
52 It was promulgated by the State President on 2 December 1986 and took effect on I October 1988. 
53 Art. 36, General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China. 
54 Art. 43, General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China. 
55 Art. 48, General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China. 
56 This section aims to prove that Chinese enterprises of today enjoy 
broad self-management rights, so 
that they are able to operate and compete with each other under 
fair market conditions. 
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self-management rights, obligations and responsibilities that it bears for its decisions. 
a. Liabilities of a company. 
According to the Law, 'company' refers to a limited liability company or a company 
limited by shares established within the Chinese territory. 57 Both types of companies are 
enterprise legal persons. 
In the case of a limited liability company, a shareholder is liable to the company to the 
extent of the amount of the shareholder's capital contribution. A limited liability company 
is liable for the debts of the company with all its assets. In the case of a company limited 
by shares, its entire capital is divided into shares of equal value and shareholders shall be 
liable to the company to the extent of the shares held by them. A company limited by 
shares is liable for the debts of the company with all its assets. 58 
The above provisions stress that companies of different types are responsible for their 
debts with their assets. They are very important because they are the prerequisite to 
provide a company's self-management rights subsequently in this law. 
b. Basic rights and general principles of self-management. 
The shareholders of a company, as capital contributors, have the right to enjoy the 
benefits of the assets of the company, make major decisions, choose managers etc. in 
accordance with the amount of capital they have invested in the company. A company 
enjoys all legal person property rights constituted by the shareholders' investment, enjoys 
civil rights and assumes civil liabilities in accordance with the law. 
59 
57 Art. 2, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
58 Art. 3, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
59 Art. 4, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
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With respect to all its corporate property, a company conducts its business autonomously 
in accordance with the law and is responsible for its own profits and losses. Under the 
state's macro regulation and control adjustment, a company organizes its production and 
operations autonomously according to market demand with the objectives of raising 
economic efficiency and labour productivity and preserving and increasing the value of 
assets. 60 A company implements an internal management structure with a clear division 
of rights and responsibilities, scientific management and combined incentives and 
restrictions. 61 
The above rules ensure a company's self-management rights without state interference 
with regard to decision-making, profit and loss, and production. All of these are 
consistent with the first criterion of the EU's conditional MET. 62 
The law also provides that a state owned enterprise which is being reorganized as a 
company shall replace its system of operation, gradually and systematically take 
inventory of its assets and verify its capital, determine property rights, clear creditors' 
rights and indebtedness, value assets and set up a standardized internal management 
structure in accordance with the law and conditions and requirements of administrative 
regulations. 63 
This rule is basically the same as the third criterion of the EU's conditional MET, which 
60 Art. 5, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
61 Art. 6, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
62 6 Decisions of firms regarding prices, costs and inputs, including for instance raw materials, cost of 
technology and labour, output, sales and investment, are made in response to market signals reflecting 
supply and demand, and without significant State interference in this regard, and costs of major inputs 
substantially reflect market values', Art. 2(7)(c) of Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98, OJ 1998 L 
128/18. 
The five criteria of the conditional MET are analyzed in more detail in chapter three and section V of 
this chapter. 
63 Art. 7, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
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requires that 'the production costs and financial situation of firrns are not subject to 
significant distortions carried over from the former non-market economy system, in 
particular in relation to depreciation of assets, other writo-offs, barter trade and payment 
via compensation of debts'. 
c. Management rights of a limited liability company. 
China's Company Law strengthens a limited liability company's self-management rights 
by specifying the powers exercised by its shareholder's meeting, board of directors, 
manager and board of supervisors. 
Under the Law, a shareholder's meeting of a limited liability company will be made up of 
all shareholders . 
64 It is the company's authoritative organization, and exercises the 
powers to decide on the company's operational policies and investment plans; to elect and 
replace directors and decide on matters relating to the remuneration of directors; to elect 
and replace the supervisors who are representatives of the shareholders, and decide on 
matters relating to the remuneration of supervisors; to examine and approve reports of the 
board of directors; to examine and approve reports of the board of supervisors or any 
supervisor(s); to examine and approve the company's proposed annual financial budget 
and final accounts; to examine and approve the company's plans for profit distribution 
and recovery of losses; to decide on increases in or reductions of the company's registered 
capital; to decide on the issue of bonds by the company; to decide on transfers of capital 
contribution by shareholders to a person other than a shareholder; to decide on issues 
such as merger, division, change in corporate form or dissolution and liquidation of the 
company; and to amend the company's articles of association. 
65 
The board of directors is set up with 3-13 members of the company, and has one chairman 
64 Art. 337, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
65 Art. 38, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
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and may have one or two vice-chairmen who are elected according to the articles of 
association. The chairman of the board of directors is the legal representative of the 
66 
company . The board of directors is responsible to the shareholders' meetings and 
exercises the powers to be responsible for convening shareholders' meetings and is 
accountable to the shareholders' meeting; to implement the resolutions of the 
shareholders' meeting; to decide on the operational plans and investment plan of the 
company; to formulate the company's proposed annual financial budget and final 
accounts; to formulate plans for profit distribution and recovery of losses; to formulate 
plans for increases in or reductions of the company's registered capital; to prepare plans 
for merger, division, change in corporate form and dissolution of the company; to decide 
on the set up of the company's internal management structure; to appoint or dismiss the 
company's manager (general manager) (the 'manager') and pursuant to the manager's 
nominations to appoint or dismiss the deputy manager and the financial officers of the 
company and decide upon their remuneration; and to formulate the company's basic 
management system. 67 
A limited liability company has a manager who is appointed or dismissed by the board of 
directors. The manager is responsible to the board of directors and exercises the powers to 
be in charge of the company's production, operations and management and organize the 
implementation of the resolutions of the board of directors; to organize the 
implementation of the company's annual business plan and investment plan; to propose 
plans for the putting in place of the company's internal management structure; to propose 
the company's basic management system; to formulate specific rules and regulations for 
the company; to propose the appointment or dismissal of the company's deputy 
manager(s) and financial officers; to appoint or dismiss management officers other than 
66 Art. 45, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
67 Art. 46, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
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those required to be appointed or dismissed by the board of directors; and other powers 
conferred by the company's articles of association and the board of directors. The 
manager is present at meetings of the board of directors. 68 
The board of supervisors is made up of representatives of shareholders and a reasonable 
proportion of representatives from the company's staff and workers according to the 
Company's Articles of Association. The directors, manager and financial officers of the 
company shall not act concurrently as supervisors . 
69 The board of supervisors as 
supervisor (s) exercises the powers to inspect the company's financial situation; to 
exercise supervision over the acts of the directors and manager carried out while 
performing their corporate functions which violate laws, regulations or the company's 
articles of association; to demand remedies from a director or manager when the acts of 
such director or manager are harmful to the company's interests; to propose the convening 
of an interim shareholders' meeting; and other powers specified in the company's articles 
of association. The supervisors are present at meetings of the board of directors 70 
Other provisions about a company's decision-making right include: when considering 
and deciding on major issues relating to the company's production and operations and 
formulating important rules and regulations, the company shall solicit and consider the 
opinions and proposals of the company's trade union and staff and workers. 71 In addition, 
state civil servants shall not act concurrently as a company's director, supervisor or 
manager. 
72 
68 Art. 50, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
69 Art. 52, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
70 
Art. 54, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
71 
Art. 56, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
72 
Art. 58, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
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d. Management rights of a company limited by shares. 
Based on the provisions of Chinese Company Law, a company limited by shares enjoys 
similar broad management rights as a limited liability company. Like the latter, a 
shareholder's general meeting, 73 board of director s74 and board of supervisor s75 will be 
made up, and a board chairman and a manage r76 will be appointed according to the 
Company's Articles of Association. Besides, in case of consulting and making decisions 
on crucial issues relating to the company's production and operation, also when 
formulating important rules and regulations, the company is required to solicit and 
consider the opinions or proposals of the company's trade union and the staff and 
workers. 
77 
All of the above detailed provisions of the Company Law ensure a company's 
self-management rights with regard to its operation and development. Therefore, it is safe 
to say that under these rules, there is no significant state interference towards most of the 
companies today. 
e. Financial Affairs and Accounting. 
Chinese Company Law requires every company to have its financial and accounting 
systems according to the laws, administrative regulations and the regulations of the 
78 
responsible finance department of the State Council . 
At the end of each fiscal year, the company shall prepare a financial statement which shall 
73 Art. 102 & 103, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
74 Art. 112, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
75 Art. 124,126, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
76 Art. 119, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
77 Art. 122, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
78 Art. 174, Company Law of the People's Republic of China 
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be examined and verified as provided by law. The company's financial statements shall 
include the following accounting statements and schedules: balance sheet, profit and loss 
statement, statement of financial changes, explanation of financial condition, and profit 
distribution statement. 79 
Together with other laws regulating enterprises' accounting and financial system which 
will be illustrated later, these provisions are in line with the second criterion of the EU's 
conditional MET, which requires that 'firms have one clear set of basic accounting 
records which are independently audited in line with international accounting standards 
and are applied for all purposes'. 
f. Insolvency, dissolution and liquidation of a company. 
In the case of a company legally declared bankrupt because it is unable to repay debts due, 
the People's Court shall, in accordance with the provisions of relevant laws, organize the 
shareholders, relevant organizations and relevant professional personnel to establish a 
liquidation group to carry out bankruptcy liquidation procedures with respect to the 
company. 
80 
A company may dissolve in any of the following situations: (1) Pursuant to the provisions 
of the company's articles of association, the term of the company has expired or one of the 
other events which are grounds for dissolution has occurred; (2) A resolution for 
dissolution is passed by a shareholders' meeting; (3) Dissolution is necessary due to a 
merger or division of the company. 81 
After putting the company's property in order and preparing a balance sheet and an 
79 Art. 175, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
80 Art. 189, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
81 Art. 190, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
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inventory of property in connection with liquidation of the company resulting from 
dissolution, if the liquidation group discovers that the company's assets are insufficient to 
repay the company's debts, the liquidation group shall immediately apply to the People's 
Court for a bankruptcy declaration. 82 
The rules of insolvency, dissolution and liquidation of a company are consistent with the 
fourth criterion of the EU's conditional MET, which requires that the firms concerned be 
'subject to bankruptcy and property laws which guarantee legal certainty and stability for 
the operation of firms'. 
3. Laws for enterprises of different forms of ownerships. 
They mainly include: State-Owned Enterprise Law; 83 Law on Urban Collective-owned 
Enterprise; 84 Law on TownshipNillage-owned Enterprise; 85 Individual-owned 
Enterprise Law; 86 Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture; 87 Foreign-Capital 
Enterprise Law; 88 Law on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Venture. 89 
82 Art. 196, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
83 It went into effect on I August 1988, providing s state-owned enterprise's establishment, rights and 
obligations, management, legal responsibilities. 
84 It took effect on I January 1992. 
85 It went to effect on I January 1997. 
86 It governs the establishment, basic rights and obligations, dissolution, liquidation and legal 
responsibilities of Individual-Owned Enterprises. It took effect on I January 2000. 
87 It governs the establishment, organization form, financial and accounting affairs of Chinese-Foreign 
Equity Joint Ventures. The Law went into effect on July 1,1979 with amendments on April 4,1990 
and March 15,2001. 
88 It is enacted to encourage the establishment of foreign-capital enterprises in China by foreign 
investors and protect the lawful rights and interests of foreign-capital enterprises. The Law went 
into 
effect on April 12,1986, and was amended on October 31,2000. 
89 It is enacted to expand China-foreign economic co-operation and technical exchange and to 
promote foreign enterprises and other economic organizations or 
individuals to establish 
China-foreign contractual joint ventures. The Law went into effect on April 13,1988, and was 
amended on October 31,2000. 
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Though they are laws governing enterprises with different forms of ownerships, all of 
them insist on the same basic principle that all enterprises should observe laws and be 
responsible for their own profits and losses. The legislation ensures that different types of 
Chinese enterprises today enjoy broad freedom and operate under legal and market 
conditions. 
4. Laws regulaUng enterprises' accounting and financial system. 
They are mainly Accounting Law, Enterprise Accounting Standards and General 
Principles on Financial Affairs of Enterprises. 
a. Accounting Law. 90 
Accounting Law of China regulates accounting behaviours, ensures accounting 
information to be truthful and complete, strengthens economic management and financial 
management, and improves economic benefits. The law covers general provisions, 
accounting calculation, special provisions on accounting calculation of companies and 
enterprises, accounting supervision, accounting organs and accounting personnel, legal 
liability and supplemental provisions. The law entered into force on July 1,2000. 
b. Enterprise Accounting Standards. 91 
They govern the common principles, assets, liabilities, equities of the owner, revenue, 
expenses, profits, and accounting statements of enterprises. The standards went into 
effect on July 1,1993. 
90 Chinese Accounting Law was firstly promulgated by the State President on January 21,1985. It was 
arnended in 1993 and most recently on October 31,1999. 
91 It was enacted by the Ministry of Finance, People's Republic of 
China on 30 November 30,1992, 
and went into effect on July 1,1993. 
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c. General Principles on Financial Affairs of Enterprises. 92 
It regulates financing, working capital, fixed, intangible and deferred assets, investment, 
costs and expenses, business income, profits and their distribution, foreign currency 
operations, enterprise liquidation, and financial statements and evaluation. The principles 
went into effect on July 1,1993. 
The three laws operate together governing the accounting and financial system of 
Chinese enterprises. According to the detailed provisions of the laws, basic accounting 
principles observed by Chinese enterprises are the same as international accounting 
93 
standards in nature. This is consistent with the second criteria for MET in the current 
EU's anti-dumping policy applicable to China. 94 
5. Chinese Enterprise Bankruptcy Law. 
It was enacted on 2 December 1986 and took effect on I October 1988. It regulates 
bankruptcy of state-owned enterprises. When such an enterprise is unable to repay debts 
due because of the failure of management, it will be legally declared to be bankrupt 
pursuant to this law. It provides detailed procedures on bankruptcy liquidation and 
allocation of residual assets of the enterprise concerned. 
According to the law, state-owned enterprises will be declared bankrupt as a result of 
92 It was promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, People's Republic of China on 
November 30,1992, 
and went into effect on July 1,1993. 
93 Lei Wang, 'The Twenty Years of EU's Anti-Dumping Practice with regard to the People's Republic 
of China' in Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Metals, 
Minerals & Chemicals Importers & 
Exporters (ed. ), How to Respond to Foreign Countries' Anti-Dumping Practice? ' (Beijing, China: 
Foreign Economy and Trade Publisher, 2001). 
94 'firms have one clear set of basic accounting records which are independently audited 
in line with 
international accounting standards and are applied 
for all purposes, ' Art 2(7)(c), Council Regulation 
(EC) No 905/98 of 27 April 1998 amending Regulation (EC) No 
384/96 on protection against dumped 
imports from countries not inembers of the European Community. 
OJ 1998 L 128/18. 
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failure in market competition, unless they are essential to the national economy and 
unless the livelihood of people is threatened, then they may be supported by government. 
That is to say, considering the conditions governing bankruptcy, state-owned enterprises 
do not have privileges compared with those of other ownerships. All of them compete 
with each other fairly under market economy conditions according to laws and 
regulations. 
From the above analysis of laws, we can see the favourable outcomes of the reform of 
Chinese enterprises and companies. First, the reform realizes the separation of 
government's administrative rights and company/enterprise's decision-making rights. 95 
Second,, enterprises enjoy many more self-management rights compared with before. 
Third, enterprises with different forms of ownership enjoy the same level of rights and 
obligations and compete fairly under market principles. 
D. Commitments about Chinese enterprise made on China's accession to 
the WTO. 
As we have discussed above, China has made remarkable progress on its enterprise 
reform. The reform will go even deeper now that CHna has entered into the WTO. This 
can be ensured by the commitments made on its accession to the WTO. According to the 
'Report of the WTO working party on the accession of China', 
96 emphasis is put on issues 
of state ownership, where enterprise decision-making process is most 
likely to be 
interfered with by the state. The commitments ensure the maximum decision-making 
rights of state-owned enterprises and the minimum possible 
interference from Chinese 
central government. 
95 Art. 58. State civil servants shall not act concurrently as a company's 
director, supervisor or manager. 
Chinese Company Law. 
96 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
China, WT/ACC/CHN/49, I October 2001. 
Available from: http: //www. wto. org 
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1. China states that Chinese state-owned enterprises operate under rules of market 
economy without direct government interference in the human, finance and operational 
activities such as production, supply, and marketing. Production resources are allocated 
by the market, and the price of products from the enterprises are determined by the 
enterprises themselves based on market demand. The state-owned banks had been 
commercialized, and their transactions with state-owned enterprises are carried out 
exclusively under market conditions. 97 
2. China ensures that all state-owned and state-invested enterprises' decisions will be 
made based solely on commercial considerations without government influence. 
Enterprises of other WTO members have equivalent opportunities to compete for sales 
and purchases from these state enterprises on non-discriminatory terms and conditions. 98 
Based on the above point, it is easy to deduce that as the result of continuous reform, with 
the commitments that China has made as a member of the WTO, Chinese enterprises of 
different ownerships will operate more freely and compete more fairly under market 
economy principles in the future. 
Ill. Price reform. 
According to economic theory, prices are essential to establish the correct signals for 
resource allocation. Especially when combined with reforms that give enterprises 
autonomy and the incentive to respond to price signals, they ensure that allocative 
efficiency will be improved. From this point of view, the most critical and 
basic 
requirement in any reforming planned economy 
(RPE) is the establishment of 
market-based relative prices for commodities and 
factors of production. Due to this 
97 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
China, para 43. 
98 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
China, para 46. 
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reason, China has regarded price reform as a key area in its economic reform since 1979. 
A. A brief introduction to the pricing system in China before reform. 
Prior to the reform, China's economy was dominated by mandatory planning, so prices 
were set by the central government. According to a World Bank report, in 1978,97 
percent of retail prices, 94.4 percent of farm prices and 99.7 percent of raw material 
prices were state controlled in China. 99 Even in the early 1980s, I 10 agricultural 
commodities were subject to state price. 100 In that case, they reflect neither the value of 
commodities, nor supply and demand of the market. 
B. Outcome of price reform in China. 
China has carried out reform of its price system gradually since 1979. The price reform 
aims to reduce the scope of state controlled price and apply both floating prices and 
market prices to goods circulating in the market. The reform has lasted for more than 
twenty years so far, and it has received favourable outcomes. 
By the early 1990s, the reform had reached a fairly advanced stage. Nearly 70 percent of 
all consumer goods, in terms of sales value, had been deregulated and price controls had 
been relieved except on III intermediary goods. At the end of 1991, only 17 agricultural 
commodities remained subject to state price controls. ' 01 Reform by that time had enabled 
the most important economic factors such as resource allocation to be increasingly 
subject to market prices. It also accelerated the growth of productivity in industrial 
99 Page 7, Council Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96, COMJ97/0677 final - 
ACC, OJ 1998 C70/15. 
100, China: the Achievement and Challenge of Price Reform'. (World Bank Report No: 11772, March 
1993), vii. 
<http: //www-wds. worldbank. org/servIet/WDS-1Bank_ServIet? pcont--detaiIs&eid=000 17883098 10 
191119204> (I December 2002). 
101 lbid 
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sectors. 
After achieving primary macroeconomic stability, China began another round of price 
adjustments in the late 1980. These adjustments covered transport tariffs, and the prices 
of industrial raw materials, agricultural commodities and grain. By 1992, 'They have 
successfully exploited the opportunities provided by a relatively benign macro 
environment, in substantially reducing relative price distortions in critical sectors and 
brought Chinese prices close to international ones. ' 102 Crude oil and steel prices were 
liberalized in 1993. 
In the past few years, price reform in China has been further deepened. According to the 
World Bank, in 1996,90 percent of retail prices and 80 percent of prices for agriculture 
and raw materials were determined by the market. 103 In 2001, the number of products 
with regulated prices has dropped to 13, as against 144 in 1992.1 04 
By October 2001 when China successfully entered into the WTO, data 105 shows that in 
respect of social retailing products, the share of government prices was about 4 per cent, 
that of government guidance prices 1.2 per cent, and that of market-regulated prices 94.7 
per cent. For agricultural products, the share of government prices was 9.1 per cent, 
government guidance prices 7.1 per cent, and market-regulated 83.3 per cent. For 
production inputs, the share of government prices was 9.6 per cent, that of government 
guidance prices 4.4 per cent, and market-regulated prices 86 per cent. Above 
is the 
fundamental progress made in the price reform of China so far. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Proposal to the Council Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 
384/96, COM/97/0677 
final - ACC, OJ 1998 C70/15. 
104 , Country update, Economic Management of China', 
World Bank Report. September 27,2001. 
Page 2. <http: //www. worldbank. org. cn/english/Knowledge/update9-200 
I. pdf> (I December 2002). 
105 Para 55, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
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Based on these facts, we can say that the share of direct government-controlled prices has 
been largely reduced so far, and China's price system has become increasingly 
rationalized. Today, the majority of prices in China are determined by the market, and 
state-controlled prices have been eliminated in all areas except a few relating to the 
national economy and livelihood of people, such as gas, water and electricity for civil 
use. 106 
C. Chinese Price Law. 107 
China promulgated its Price Law on May 1,1998. It is enacted to regulate price 
behaviours, stabilize the general level of market price, and protect legitimate rights and 
interests of consumers and operators. It governs pricing by operators, pricing by 
government, price supervision, inspection and legal liabilities. The law protects business 
operator's basic pricing rights on the one hand. On the other hand, it prohibits undue 
pricing behaviours. These can be shown by examining specific provisions of the Price 
Law. 
General Principles. 108 
The State shall introduce and gradually improve the mechanism of regulation of prices 
mainly through market forces and under a kind of macroeconomic control. Under such a 
mechanism, pricing should be made to accord with the value law with most of the 
merchandise and services to adopt market -regulated prices'09 while only a few of them 
106 Proposal to the Council Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96, COM/97/0677 
final - ACC, OJ 1998 C70/15- 
107 It was promulgated by the State President on December 29,1997 and went into effect on May 1, 
1998. 
108 Ail. 3&4. Price Law of the People's Republic of China. 
109 Market-regulated prices refer to prices fixed independently by business operators through market 
competition. 
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are to be put under government-set' 10 or guided prices. ' 11 
Pricing rights of business operators. 
According to the law, prices of merchandise and services shall be subject to market 
regulation to be fixed by business operators independently. 1 12 Under fair, lawful, honest 
and trustworthy principles, business operators should fix their prices based on the cost of 
production or operation, market supply and demand. ' 13 
Prohibited pricing behaviour. ' 14 
On the one hand, the law protects business operator's basic pricing rights. On the other 
hand, it prohibits undue pricing behaviours, which include: 
1. Working collaboratively with others to control market prices to the detriment of 
the lawful rights and interests of other business operators or consumers; 
2. Engaging in dumping sales (except the cases of sales of fresh and live 
merchandise, seasonal merchandise and stockpiled merchandise at discount) at 
below cost prices in order to attain an upper hand over rivals or dominate the 
market and disrupt the normal production and operation order to the great 
detriment to the interests of the State or the lawful rights and interests of other 
business operators; 
110 Government-set prices are fixed by the government department in charge of prices or related 
departments within their term of reference according to the provisions of this law. 
1 '' Government-guided prices refer to prices as fixed by business operators according to benchmark 
prices and range of the prices as set by the government department in charge of price or other related 
departments within their terrn of reference. 
112 Art. 6. Price Law of the People's Republic of China. 
113 Art. 6&7. Price Law of the People's Republic of China. 
114 Art. 14. Price Law of the People's Republic of China. 
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3. Fabricating and spreading price rise information to push up prices to excessively 
high levels; 
4. Resorting to deceitful or misleading means in terms of prices to entice consumers 
or other business operators into trading in terms of prices; 
5. Discriminating in terms of prices as between the same kinds of merchandise or 
services offered by certain business operators under the same trading conditions; 
6. Disguisedly raising or lowering prices at irrational ranges by artificially raising 
or lowering grades of merchandise or services; 
7. Seeking exorbitant profits in violation of laws and regulations; and 
8. Affecting other illicit price behaviours that are forbidden by law or administrative 
decrees. 
- Government pricing behaviour. 
The law limits government pricing behaviours to a few areas based on the price 
catalogues, which are issued by the central and local governments following strict 
administrative procedures. 115 The government shall issue govemment-set or guided 
prices for the following merchandise and services: 116 
1. The few merchandise that are of great importance to development of the national 
economy and the people's livelihood; 
2. The few merchandise that are in shortage of resources; 
3. Merchandise of monopoly in nature; 
115 Art. 19. Price Law of the People's Republic of China. 
116 Art. 18. Price Law of the People's Republic of China. 
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4. Important public utilities; 
5. Important services of public welfare in nature. 
In fixing government-set and guided prices, price departments and other related 
departments should carry out investigations into prices and costs and collect views from 
consumers, business operators and other quarters. ' 17 After the govemment-set and guided 
prices are determined, they shall be made public by the price departments! 18 The scope 
and level of the government-set and guided prices shall properly be adjusted in the light 
of the operation of the national economy and recommendations from consumers and 
business operators. ' 19 
- Monitoring and checking of prices 
In order to keep the price system in good order, the Price Departments of the People's 
Governments at and above the county level exercise monitoring and checking over 
pricing activities according to law and mete out administrative punishments on acts that 
violate the law. 120 Business operators or government departments concerned in that case 
will take legal responsibilities for their behaviours. 1 21 
In this way, the Price Law of the People's Republic of China substantially defends the 
favourable outcomes of the reform,, and ensures the ongoing reform is deepened towards 
the market economy direction. 
117 Art. 22. Price Law of the People's Republic of China. 
118 Art. 24. Price Law of the People's Republic of China. 
119 Art. 25. Price Law of the People's Republic of China. 
120 Art. 33. Price Law of the People's Republic of China. 
121 Chapter 6. Price Law of the People's Republic of China. 
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D. Commitments and prospects after China's accession to the WTO 
Price reform will be carried out in more areas and at a deeper level towards the market 
economy direction after China's entry into the WTO. This can be confirmed in the 
'Report of the WTO working party on the accession of China'. 122 According to the 
document, China has made the following commitments that aim to limit government 
power to interfere in pricing decisions. 
1. Range of products subject to govemment pricing. 123 
China currently adopts a mechanism of market-based pricing under macro-economic 
adjustment, and national treatment is observed in the areas of government pricing for all 
imported goods. Only a few products and services are subject to government pricing. 124 
They are those having a direct bearing on the national economy and the basic needs of the 
people's livelihood, including those products that were scarce in China. 125 As the result of 
the continued reform of China's price system, the share of government prices is 
decreasing, and that of market-regulated prices will go on increasing. 
2. Factors taken into account in case of govemment pricing. 
All the enterprises and individuals enjoyed the same treatment in terms of participating in 
the process of setting government prices and government guidance prices. 126 While 
formulating government prices and government guidance prices, crucial pricing factors 
should be taken into account. They include normal production costs, supply and demand 
122 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
123 Annex 4 of the Draft Protocol contained a comprehensive listing of all products and services 
presently subject to government guidance pricing and government pricing. 
124 i. e. government-set or guided prices explained in China's Price Law. They have the same meaning 
as the terrns 'government prices and government guidance prices'. 
125 Para 52, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
126 Para 53, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
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situation, relevant government policies and prices of related products. 127 
3. Transparency of the pricing policies. 
China will publish the list of goods and services subject to state pricing and changes, 
together with price-setting mechanisms and policies in an official journal. 128 It is 'Pricing 
Monthly of the People's Republic of China', a monthly magazine listing all products and 
services priced by the State. 
4. Other Commitments. 
China assures that it will continue to deepen its price reform, adjusting the catalogue 
subject to state pricing and further liberalizing its pricing policies. "' It confirms that 
price controls will not be used for purposes of affording protection to domestic industries 
or services providers, 130 and they will not limit or impair China's market-access 
commitments in goods and services. In addition, after China's entry into the WTO, it will 
take account of the interests of exporting WTO Members as provided for in paragraph 9 
131 
of Article III of the GATT 1994. 
IV. Reform of the financial system. 
Both economic theory and practical experience suggest that financial liberalization can 
stimulate economic development. So since 1978 when China commenced its economic 
reform, great efforts have been made in the financial sector. After more than twenty years' 
127 Para 55, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
128 Para 60,6 1, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
129 Para 6 1, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
130 Para 63, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
131 Para 64, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
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reconstruction, fundamental changes took place - various types of government control in 
this area have been abolished gradually. As a result, today China's financial market has 
been greatly liberalized compared with before. For the purpose of this chapter, I will 
focus on foreign exchange issue in China's financial reforyn. 
A. Brief introduction to China's pre-reform financial system. 
Like most developing countries, extensive government intervention was the norm in their 
financial markets before reform. In that case, 'ceilings were imposed on bank interest 
rates; credit was allocated by administrative decision rather than market criteria; and 
inflows of foreign capital were strictly controlled. 5132 
As a substantial part of financial operation, foreign exchange always has close 
relationships with a country's international trade volume. So, before we examine China's 
pre-reform financial system, it is important to examine the foreign trade regime in 
operation at that time. As stated earlier in this chapter, before China's open economy 
policy, all foreign trade transactions in the country were conducted strictly in accordance 
with government plans. In determining these import and export plans, the authority 
sought to achieve a balance in foreign exchange requirements. As the result of such heavy 
reliance on mandatory plans, the foreign exchange rate had very little influence on the 
level and the pattern of foreign trade. In other words, it was essentially an accounting 
device used in the formulation of foreign trade plans. Consequently, before financial 
reform, the exchange rate played no direct role as a price signal in either foreign trade or 
in the allocation of resources in China. ' 33 
132 Huw Pill & Mahmood Pradhan, 'Financial Indicators and Financial Change in Africa and Asia, ' 
IMF Working Paper No. 95/123 (Washington: IMF, November 1995) 
--littp: //www. worldbank. org/fandd/english/0697/articles/01 
10697. htm#author> (I December 2002). 
133 YC Richard Wong and ML Sonia Wong (University of Hong Kong), 'Removing Regulatory 
Barriers in China: Changing the Foreign Exchange Regime. ' Paper Prepared for the Conference of 
China as a Global Economic Power: Market Reforms in the New 
Millennium, Shanghai, June 15-18, 
1997. <http: //www. cato. org/events/China/papers/wong. html> (I December 2002). 
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B. Process and outcomes of China's financial reform. 
Reform in the financial sector should follow the track of the industrial sector in China. 
Since 1978, China has allowed the non-state sector to compete with state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). It decentralized foreign trade authority to localities and enterprises, 
and the role of the exchange rate began to change in the meantime. 
When foreign trade corporations were given increasing freedom to conduct foreign trade, 
the exchange rate began to act as a signal to motivate importing and exporting decisions. 
Because the domestic currency was overvalued at that time, foreign trade corporations 
had little incentive to expand exports. To recover the incentive effects of the exchange 
rate on exports, China began to modify its foreign exchange policy shortly after its 
foreign trade decentralization. 
The modifications were made in several steps. First, the official exchange rates were 
steadily devalued so as to compensate for the rising costs of exports. Second, the foreign 
exchange retention scheme was launched, which allows exporting enterprises and local 
governments to retain a certain portion of their foreign exchange earnings to finance their 
own imports. Third, foreign exchange swap markets were established in 1988, where 
exporters could convert their retained foreign exchange earnings at more favourable 
exchange rates. As the results of the retention scheme and the swap markets, they not only 
provided incentives to exporters, but also helped to increase the convertibility of China's 
domestic currency. 
On January 1,1994, official RMB exchange rates were unified with the market rates. The 
banking exchange system was adopted and a nationwide unified inter-bank 
forex market 
was established, with conditional convertibility of the RMB on current accounts. 
134 The 
134 Para 28, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
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1994 reform was a significant step towards current account convertibility. Afterwards, 
exports, tourism, and foreign direct investment grew briskly, at rates of 31.9 percent, 56.4 
percent, and 22.7 percent, respectively. Foreign exchange reserves increased by 114.5 
135 percent in 1994 and 42.6 percent in 1995 . In 1996, China introduced full convertibility 
for current restrictions on current account transactions, forgoing the right ever to 
reimpose any currency restrictions on current account activities without the approval of 
the International Monetary Fund. 136 Before China's accession to the WTO, 'it was 
confirmed by the IMF in its Staff Report on Article IV Consultations with China in 2000 
that China had no existing forex restrictions for current account transactions. 137 
C. Relevant laws in force. 
China has enacted a number of laws to regulate foreign exchange operations in its 
process of reform. The most important laws specifically for forex are the 'Regulations 
on Foreign Exchange Control of the People's Republic of China', 138 'Regulations on 
the Control of Banking Operations of Foreign Exchange', 139 'Regulations on the 
Control of Settlement,, Sale and Payment of Exchange'. 140 In addition, legislation 
governing the allocation of forex earned by joint ventures is provided in the 
China-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law 141 and China-Foreign Contractual Joint 
135 YC Richard Wong and ML Sonia, fn 133 above. 
136 Proposal to the Council Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96, COM/97/0677 
final - ACC, OJ 1998 C70/15. 
137 Para 28, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
138 The law was first promulgated by the State Council on December 18,1980, and was 
re-prornulgated by Decree No 211 of the State Council on January 14,1997. 
139 It was issued by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on 
September 27,1997. It entered 
into force on January 1,1998. 
140 The Regulations went into effect on July 1,1996. The Provisional Regulations on the 
Control of 
Foreign Exchange Settlement, Sale and Payment promulgated on March 26,1994 were annulled on 
the same date. 
141 The Law was promulgated by the State President. It went 
into effect on July 1,1979 with 
amendments on April 4,1990 and March 15,2001. 
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Venture Law 142 of the People's Republic of China. We can find out how these laws keep 
foreign exchange operations in order under market economy conditions by examining 
them respectively. 
1. Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control of the PRC 
It governs foreign exchange on current account and on capital account, RMB exchange 
rate and foreign exchange market. According to the regulation, a unitary and 
well-managed floating exchange rate system based on market supply and demand is 
implemented for the exchange rates of RMB. The People's Bank of China shall publish 
the exchange rates of RMB against major foreign currencies according to the prices fixed 
at inter- bank foreign exchange swap centers. 143 Transactions at foreign exchange swap 
centers shall be governed by the principle of being open, fair, impartial, and honest. 144 
2. Regulations on the Control of Banking Operations of Foreign Exchange. 
The law was adopted in accordance with the Law on Commercial Banks and the 
Regulation on the Control of Foreign Exchange. It was formulated to enhance the control 
of banking operations of foreign exchange, to ensure the healthy development of foreign 
exchange business and to maintain the stability of the financial order. 
3. Regulations on the Control of Settlement, Sale and Payment of Exchange. 
The Regulations are enacted to standardize the acts in foreign exchange settlement, sale 
and payment, and realize the convertibility of RMB under current account. They govern 
these transactions under capital account; supervision and control of foreign exchange 
142 The Law was promulgated by the State president on April 13,1988. It was later amended on 
October 31,2000. 
143 Art. 33, Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control of the PRC. 
144 Art. 34, Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control of the PRC. 
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settlement, sale and payment. 
4. Provisions goveming the allocation of forex eamed byjoint ventures. 
China-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law 145 and China-Foreign Contractual Joint 
Venture Law of the People's Republic of China 146 contain some provisions relevant to 
foreign exchange. 
The net profit which a foreign joint venture receives as its share after performing its 
obligations under the laws, and the agreements or the contract, the funds it receives 
upon the expiration of the venture' term of operation or its early termination, and its 
other funds may be remitted abroad in accordance with foreign exchange control 
regulations and in the currency or currencies specified in the contract concerning the 
equity joint venture. 147 
The wages, salaries or other legitimate income earned by a foreign worker or staff 
member of an equity joint venture, after payment of the individual income tax under 
the tax laws of the People's Republic of China, may be remitted abroad in accordance 
with foreign exchange control regulations. 148 
From the above analysis of the laws, it can be seen that China's foreign exchange 
regulation has been liberalized. Compared with before, there are less government 
restrictions on the use and allocation of forex. Today, all legal forex transactions are 
encouraged to be carried out under market economy conditions. 
145 The Law was promulgated by the State President. It went into effect on July 1,1979 with 
amendments on April 4,1990 and March 15,2001. 
146 The Law was promulgated by the State president on April 13,1988. It was 
later amended on 
October 31,2000. 
1.17 Art. 11, China-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law of the People's Republic of China. 
148 Art. 12, China-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law of the People's Republic of China. 
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D. Commitments and prospects for foreign exchange after China's 
accession to the WTO. 
Since foreign exchange plays a very important role in a country's economic development 
and its international trade, China has made commitments in this field on its accession to 
the WTO. They can be summarized into the following points. 
1. Purpose of the reform. 
It indicates that the purpose of China's forex reform is to reduce administrative 
intervention and increase the role of market forces. It assures that further reform will be 
carried out towards the market economy direction. 149 
2. Enterprises'rights to purchase and debit forex. 
With regard to forex payments under current accounts, domestic entities (including 
foreign investment enterprises) could purchase forex at market exchange rates from 
designated banks or debit their forex accounts directly upon presentation of valid 
documents. 150 
3. Exchange rate regime. 
Since the unification of exchange rates on I January 1994, China has adopted a single and 
managed floating exchange rate regime based on supply and 
demand . 
15 1 Designated 
forex banks are the major participants in forex transactions, and they 
deal on the 
inter-bank market according to the turnover position 
limit on banking exchange 
stipulated by State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE) and covered the position 
149 Para 28, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
150 Para 30, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
151 Para 3 1, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
China. 
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on the market. ' 
52 
4. Rights that foreign investment enterprises enjoy with regard to foreign 
exchange transaction. 
In order to encourage foreign direct investment, China has granted national treatment to 
foreign investment enterprises (FlEs) in exchange administration. Since I MY 1996, 
forex dealing of the FlEs has been carried out through the banking exchange system. 
FlEs are allowed to open and hold forex settlement accounts to retain receipts under 
current accounts, up to a maximum amount stipulated by the SAFE. No restrictions are 
maintained on the payment and transfer of current transactions by FlEs, and FlEs could 
purchase forex from designated forex banks or debit their forex accounts for any 
payment under current transactions, upon the presentation of valid documents to the 
designated forex banks or SAFE for the bona fide test. FlEs could also open forex 
accounts to hold foreign- invested capital, and they could sell from these accounts upon 
the approval of SAFE. FlEs could also borrow forex directly from domestic and 
overseas banks, but were required to register with SAFE afterwards, and obtain 
approval by SAFE for debt repayment and services. FlEs could make payments from 
their forex accounts or in forex purchased from designated forex banks after 
liquidation, upon approval by SAFE according to law. 153 
5. Commitments made with regard to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
China has accepted Article VIII of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, which provides that 
ýno member shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of 
payments and transfers for current international transactions'. According to these 
152 Para 32, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
153 Para 33, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
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obligations, China would not resort to any laws or other measures to restrict the 
availability to any individual or enterprise of forex for current international transactions 
within its customs territory to an amount related to the forex inflows attributable to that 
individual or enterprise, unless otherwise provided for in the IMF's Articles of 
Agreement. 154 
From the above commitments made on China's accession to the WTO, we can see the 
significant progress made in the foreign exchange section of China's finamial reform so 
far. With regard to the future development, the commitments and relevant laws in force 
will operate together to ensure that further reform can be carried out towards a more 
liberalized market economy direction. 
V. Findings of the economic analysis. 
From this analysis of China's economic reform, we can derive two important findings 
which shake the basis of the current EU's anti-dumping policy against imports from the 
People's Republic of China. 
A. The illegal aspect of the EU's anti-dumping practice against China. 
China is no longer an NME or state-control country after more than twenty years of 
economic reform. Plus the fact that China has entered into the WTO, the EU's 
anti-dumping practice against China can be regarded as illegal. 
Based on the dramatic progress obtained from China's economic reform and the solid 
legislation which defends the outcomes, it is safe to say that fundamental changes have 
taken place in China's economic status, i. e. it is not an NME or state-trading country any 
more. This fact is widely accepted and has been further confirmed 
by China's accession 
154 Para 35, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
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to the WTO. Since the WTO was established on fair competition and free market 
principles, considering China's huge size and influence on the world economy, it would 
not be accepted as a member of the organization if it were an NME. Based on this point, 
China is a transitional ME, and is quite close to market economies in many areas of its 
economy which are highly developed. 
According to the GATT, during an anti-dumping investigation, if there is a sufficient 
volume of sales of the like product in the domestic market of the exporting country, 155 the 
normal value of the import concerned is normally based on its domestic price except 
when the import comes 'from a country which has a complete or substantially complete 
monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State. ' 156 
Referring to recent statistics, the EU adopts the traditional NME treatment 157 when 
determining the normal value of imports from China in most cases. As a member of the 
WTO, the legal basis of the EU's practice is the GATT provision analyzed above. 
However, due to the change of China's economic status, the provision is no longer 
applicable in that case. Furthermore, the EU's practice can be regarded as illegal and 
could be challenged by China under the GATT because China is now a member of the 
WTO. 
155 Art. 2 (2), WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
156 Para. I of Art. VI in Annex I to the GATT 1994 states: 
'It is recognized that, in the case of imports 
frorn a country which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of 
its trade and where all 
dornestic prices are fixed by the state, special 
difficulties may exist in determining prices 
comparability for the purposes of Paragraph 1, and 
in such case importing contracting parities may 
find it necessary to take into account the possibility that a strict comparison 
with domestic prices in 
such a country may not always be appropriate. 
' 
157 - i. e . analogue country method. 
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B. Unfair aspects underlying the EUIs antimdumping practice towards 
China. 
According to the analysis of China's economic reform of foreign trade, enterprise, pricing 
and forex systems, the criteria for Chinese exporters to apply for EU's MET when 
deciding their exports' normal values are very unfair. 
In Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98 of 27 April 1998 amending Regulation (EC) No 
384/96 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the 
European Community, the following criteria are provided for Chinese exporters to apply 
for MET: 
Decisions of firms regarding prices, costs and inputs, including for instance raw 
materials,, cost of technology and labour, output, sales and investment, are made in 
response to market signals reflecting supply and demand, and without significant state 
interference in this regard, and costs of major inputs substantially reflect market 
values; 
Firms have one clear set of basic accounting records which are independently audited 
in line with international accounting standards and are applied for all purposes, 
The production costs and financial situation of firms are not subject to significant 
distortions carried over from the former NME system, in particular 
in relation to 
depreciation of assets, other write-offs, barter trade and payment via compensation of 
debts. 
The firms concerned are subject to bankruptcy and property 
laws which guarantee 
legal certainty and stability for the operation of 
firms, and 
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Exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate. 158 
As we discussed before, the new method to determine the normal value of imports in 
anti-dumping proceedings is proposed to match the fundamental change of China's 
economic status. Unfortunately, within two years after the new method was proposed, it 
was granted to three Chinese companies, only accounting for about 10 percent of the total 
applicants. 159The reason is that it is too strict and unfair to be applied in practice, because 
applicants have to bear very heavy burden of proof within extremely tight time limit. Now, ) 
I will examine the unreasonable factors in the criteria. 
1. Criterion one requires that firm's decisions are made by itself based on market 
principles. State does not interfere in the firm's operations such as pricing, production 
costs and inputs. 
From the analysis of legislation of Chinese enterprises and companies, it is clear that it is 
a firm's right to make decisions and organize its production autonomously according to 
market demand. 160 Even state-owned enterprises have this self-management right. In the 
Report of the WTO working party on the accession of China, it is recognized that 
State-owned enterprises of China basically operated in accordance with rules of market 
economy. The government would no longer directly administer the human, finance and 
material resources, and operational activities such as production, supply and marketing. 
The prices of commodities produced by state-owned enterprises were decided by the 
market and resources in operational areas were fundamentally allocated by the 
158 OJ 1998 L 128/18. 
159 Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on protection against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community /*COM/2000/0363 final - 
ACC 2000/0160. 
160 Art. 5, Company Law of the People's Republic of China. 
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market. ' 
61 
With regard to production costs including labour cost and input cost etc, the government 
does not interfere in their prices in general. Today, the majority of prices in China are 
determined by the market, and state-controlled prices have been eliminated in all areas 
except a few relating to the national economy and the livelihood of the people, such as gas, 
water and electricity for civil use. 162 
Most Chinese firms actually meet this criterion. However, considering the heavy burden 
of proof that applicants bear, only a few are able to prove it within the very tight time 
limit 
2. The second criterion emphasizes that applicants should have a set of accounting 
records, which is in accordance with international accounting standards. 
In fact, this is exactly the same requirement that China puts on its enterprises and 
companies. It can be seen from the relevant accounting laws that detailed rules and basic 
accounting principles observed by Chinese enterprises comply with international 
accounting standards in nature. 
3. Criterion three is that the firm is liable for its own debts, and its production costs and 
financial situation not be subject to significant distortions carried over from the 
tormer NME system. In fact, Article 7 of Chinese Company Law puts the similar 
requirement on companies which are being reorganized from state-owned 
161 Para 43, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
162 Proposal to the Council Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96, COM/97/0677 
final - ACC, OJ 1998 C70/15. 
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enterprises. 
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4. Criterion four is that Companies should be subject to bankruptcy and property law. 
Both the Company Law and the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of 
China have detailed provisions on this point. Chinese Company Law states clearly that 
various types of companies are all responsible for their own debts, and they will be 
legally declared bankrupt when they are unable to repay debts due. Likewise, the Chinese 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law provides that state-owned enterprises will be declared 
bankrupt as a result of failure in the market, except those essential to the national 
economy and the livelihood of people, these may be supported by the government. In this 
situation, China has a similar policy to most developed countries. 
5. The last criterion is about exchange rate conversions, which should be carried out at 
market rate. 
As to this criterion, China's current foreign exchange regime is consistent with the EU's 
requirements. It is confirmed in the 'Report of the WTO working party on the accession 
of China' that 'since the unification of exchange rates on I January 1994, China had 
adopted a single and managed floating exchange rate regime based on supply and demand. 
PBC published the reference rates of RMB against the US dollar, the HK dollar and 
Japanese yen based on the weighted average prices of forex transactions at the interbank 
forex market during the previous day's trading ... Designated 
forex banks could deal with 
their clients at an agreed rate... The exchange rates for other foreign currencies were 
163 It provides that a state owned enterprise which is being reorganized as a company shall replace 
its 
system of operation, gradually and systematically take inventory of its assets and verify 
its capital, 
determine property rights, clear creditors' rights and indebtedness, value assets and set up a 
standardized internal management structure in accordance with the 
law and conditions and 
requirements of administrative regulations. 
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based on the rates of RMB against the US dollar and cross-exchange rates of other foreign 
currency on the international market. The permitted margin between the buying and 
selling rate could not exceed 0.5 per cent. 9164 
A Proposals based on the economic analysis of China. 
We can therefore conclude that most Chinese firms actually operate under free market 
principles and therefore should be granted the conditional MET by the EU. This argument 
is based not only on the existence of an extensive legal regime in China, but also because 
the economic analysis supports it. Assessments made by authorized international 
organisations such as the WTO and the World Bank demonstrate that China's economic 
reforms have not been just a paper exercise. Nevertheless, the European Commission has 
refused to grant conditional MET to most Chinese exporters on a case-by-case basis by 
insisting that they do not operate under ME conditions. 
This thesis will not explore whether the EU's argument is true or not. However, it is 
noticeable that the 'Commission officials admit that the formal rule change was more in 
name than in substance, and that they had no intention of administering the more 
beneficial rules to Chinese and Russian firms. ' 165 This probably is the most explicit 
answer to the puzzle that within three years after the EU anti-dumping legislation was 
amended, only around 12 percent of applications for conditional MET were successful. 166 
Based on the economic and legal analysis made in this chapter, one way to make the EU's 
164 Para 3 1, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China. 
165 Cynthia M. Horne, 'Belief Stasis as an Impediment to Policy Implementation: Non-Market 
Economies and Western Trade Laws' (University of Washington, prepared for: American Political 
Science Association Conference San Francisco, CA, August 30 - September 2,200 1). p 24. 
166 R. M. MacLean. 'International Trade Evaluating the Impact of the E. C's Conditional Market 
Economy Principle in Chinese and Russian Anti-Dumping Cases', 65. 
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new method to be fair to implement is to reduce the exporter's burden of proof when they 
apply for the conditional MET. Since all of the five criteria are basically consistent with 
Chinese laws, practice required for the MET is governed and has been ensured by the 
national legislation to a large extent. Therefore, the Commission should adopt a more 
flexible and less stringent approach. In other words, a Chinese exporter's application for 
the MET should not be rejected simply because it cannot meet one of the five criteria. 
As a possible result of this suggestion, a reasonable number of Chinese companies will 
successfully get conditional MET, and their domestic sales prices will be adopted to 
determine the normal values of their exports. Therefore, the purpose of the EU's new 
approach can be fulfilled, and the outcomes of its anti-dumping investigations will be fair 
enough to Chinese exporters as well. 
Conclusion 
This chapter enumerates the achievements made through China's economic reform in 
foreign trade, enterprise, pricing and financial sections, and analyzes the country's 
economic prospect in future based on existing legislation and commitments made on 
China's accession to the World Trade Organisation. 
Though it only provides a theoretical analysis from the economic point of view for the 
purpose of the thesis, it brings out more significant issues to us. It can 
be seen that China 
has made dramatic progress in its economic reform so far, and this 
is well acknowledged 
by the WTO. However, considering the EU's anti-dumping policy against imports 
from 
China and its outcomes, there arise several questions: 
Since China no longer can be regarded as an NNE, what is the 
legal basis for the EU's 
anti-dumping policy, especially its use of traditional 
NME treatment, which is applied 
to Chinese exports in most cases? 
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2. Is the EU's current practise still legal since China has already become a member of 
WTO? 
3. Based on the analysis in the chapter from the economic point of vievv, state related 
enterprises or transactions do not necessarily mean governmental interference in 
China. Then shall the EU also consider the application for MET for Chinese state 
related enterprises? 
4. To what extent should the EU's policy be revised to be fair enough to meet the actual 
situations? 
With regard to the above issues, all of them will be discussed in the last chapter, which 
will propose possible resolutions to the EU for its anti-dumping policy applicable to 
China. 
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Chapter Five 
Alternative Approaches to Anti-Dumping 
Legislation Applicable to the People's Republic of 
China 
Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the anti-dumping legislation of the United States (U. S. ), Australia, 
New Zealand and Japan. It focuses on the differences between the EU and these 
countries' anti-dumping legislation towards China, especially the different 
methodologies adopted to determine the normal values of Chinese exports in 
anti-dumping investigations. 
For the purpose of the thesis, these four developed countries are selected for analysis 
because of two reasons. First, most of them (except Japan) are the main and traditional 
users of anti-dumping measures among the developed countries of the world. (See Table 
5.2-5.4 on pages 230-232) Second, all of them have adjusted their antimdumping 
legislation applicable to China as a transitional economy, and their approaches 
accommodate the changes of China's economic status better than the EU in practice. In 
other words, their legislation is more flexible and specific, under which antimdumping 
authorities can assess the normal value of the imports from China impartially without 
wide discretion. This can be seen from case studies later in this chapter. 
The EU9 U. S. ) Australia,, 
New Zealand and Japan are all Members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). So, their anti-dumping legislation is established under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) legal framework, i. e. Article VI of the GATT 
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and the Uruguay Round Anti-Dumping Code. ' Under the GATT, each Member codifies its 
anti-dumping legislation to interpret and implement the guidelines. 2 All of these countries 
delegate anti-dumping investigations to special authorized bodiesq though the extent to 
which these units are isolated from political pressure and independent of Executive 
authority varies. 3 Under such circumstances, they have the freedom to develop a set of 
anti-dumping rules specific to non-market economies (NMEs), but they normally apply 
different methods rather than use domestic sales price to deten-nine the product's normal 
value. 
According to China's economic reform and its well-acknowledged progress obtained, 4 
most WTO Members have adjusted their anti-dumping policies to accommodate the 
changes. However, compared with the EU, the updated antýdumping rules towards China 
adopted by the other four countries are more reasonable and practical considering their 
implementation in practice. 
Here, 'reasonable' means that the rules enable the anti-dumping authority to assess the 
normal values of imports concerned impartially based on facts and subsequently impose 
anti-dumping measures on dumped goods proportionately according to their dumping 
margins. In practice, an accurate assessment of dumping facts needs three principles. First, 
the investigation authority should grant market economy treatment (METý to an exporter 
who has a sound management record and operates independently in a transitional economy. 
Second, due to the discrepancy in the level of economic development of different exporters, 
individual treatment should be applied automatically. That is to say, dumping margins of 
c. Agreement on Implementation of Art. VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs, and Trade 1994. 
2 GATT anti-dumping legislation is analyzed in chapter one. 
3 Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, 'Anti-Dumping' at p 7, <http: //www. nber. org/papers/w8398 - 
(I December 2002). 
4 This issue has been illustrated in chapter four. 
5 i. e. use the domestic sales prices to determine the normal values of the products. 
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the dumped imports and rates of anti-dumping duties for different exporters should be 
determined on an individual basis. Third, in a few cases where the analogue country 
method is applied due to complete state control in the industry of the export country 
concerned, a third country should be selected properly. In other words, the side effects of 
the analogue country method should be minimised. In that case, the selected third economy 
should have similarities with the export country in three aspects. 1) They have similar 
comparative advantages in the same industry concerned. 2) They have similar procedures 
and methods to produce the same products. 3) They have similar costs of key production 
factors, such as labour costs and raw material costs. Only if the above three principles are 
observed, can an accurate judgement be made in anti-dumping investigations towards 
imports from transitional economies. 
A sound legislation not only should be reasonable, but also should be practical enough to be 
applied in practice. With regard to anti-dumping rules towards transitional economies, the 
authority assesses the economic status of foreign exporters before granting them 
conditional MET. State control is the main reason to reject the application for MET. So, the 
way that the authority distinguishes state control from state-related behaviour can lead to 
quite different outcomes of assessment about an exporter's economic status. In that case, 
practical rules lead to the conclusion of state control only when state interference has 
substantial and significant effect on the enterprise's decision-making proceedings. In short, 
practical rules grant the authority less discretion and ask for more consideration of 
facts in 
anti-dumping investigations. 
Based on the above points, differences of anti-dumping legislation 
between the EU and the 
U. S., Australia, New Zealand and Japan will be examined in this chapter. They will help us 
understand the most appropriate approaches to determine normal values and anti-dumping 
duties for Chinese exports in anti-dumping investigations. 
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The above issue will be analyzed through four parts of this chapter. Part one briefly 
introduces the anti-dumping legislation of the four countries. Alternative methods to 
identify NME in the context of anti-dumping legislation will be examined in part two. 
Though the EU eliminated China from its list of NME in 1998,6 it still treats China as an 
NME in most of its anti-dumping proceedings. Focusing on this issue, part three will 
identify different NME treatments under the GATT anti-dumping legal framework. Due to 
the fundamental changes arising in China's economy because of its reforms since 1979, EU 
and the four countries amended their anti-dumping legislation to try to accommodate these 
changes. These new approaches adopted to determine the normal values of Chinese 
exports will be illustrated in part four. Finally, part five will analyze different 
methodologies to determine anti-dumping duty rates for imports from China. 
/. Brief introduction to the anti-dumping legislation of other 
developed countries. 
A. The U. S. 
The US anti-dumping law aims to protect American industries from supposedly unfair 
7 import competition. The first legislation passed by the Congress was the AntiDumping 
Act of 1916, which provides for damages through the Federal court against parties who 
dumped foreign goods in the U. S. In 1921, an AntýDumping Act was adopted, which 
8 
forms the basis of the current US legislation. Following the AntiDumping Agreement 
reached in the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations, the Trade Agreement Act of 1979 
6 Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98 of 27 April 1998 amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on 
protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European 
Community. OJ 
1998 L 128/18. 
7 Brink Lindsy, 'The U. S. Ant, -Dumping Law Rhetoric versus Reality' at pI 
<http: //www. freetrade. org/pubs/pas/tpa-007. pdf > (I December 2002). 
8 Holmes, Peter, Kempton, Jeremy; Stevenson, Cliff, 'The Globalisation of Anti-Dumping and the 
EU, ' at p 2. --ýlittp: //www2. cid. harvard. edu/cidtrade/Issues/holmes. pdf> 
(I December 2002). 
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repealed the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921 with Title I and added a new Title VII to the 
Tariff Act of 1930. Today, the U. S anti-dumping law in force is the Uruguay Round 
Agreement Act (URAA), which implemented changes required by the 1994 
Anti-Dumping Agreement. 9 
The U. S. anti-dumping institution is quite different from that of the EU. First, it has 
different administrative authorities that make key decisions. The U. S. authorizes one 
agency to handle dumping determination, and another to handle injury determination. 
The Department of Commerce (Commerce) and the International Trade Commission 
(ITC) have the joint responsibility of administering U. S. anti-dumping law. 10 According 
to Title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), after a company or a coalition of 
companies files a dumping petition, Commerce makes a preliminary decision as to 
whether the product is being sold at less than a normal value in the U. S., and calculates an 
ad valorem dumping margin equal to the percentage difference between the price it is 
being sold at in the U. S. and the normal value. ' 1 After that, the ITC makes a preliminary 
decision as to whether the relevant U. S. domestic industry has been materially injured or 
is threatened with injury due to the imports under investigation. 12 If both aWncies make 
an affirmative final decision of dumping, then Commerce will issue a permanent 
anti-dumping order, under which a duty equal to the estimated dumping margin is levied 
on imports of the product from the subject countries. 
Second,, compared with the EU, the U. S. adopts different approaches to identify NMEs 
and to calculate normal values for their exports. In order to accommodate the progress 
9 Anti-Dumping and Countervailing duty Handbook, U. S. International Trade Commission. 
Washington, DC 20436. November 1997, available from: 
<ftp: //ftp. usitc. gov/pub/reports/studies/PUB312I. PDF> (I December 
2002). 
10 Anti-Dumping and countervailing duty handbook, ibid. 
I The Commerce regulations are set at Section 353 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). 
12 The ITC regulations are contained in Section 207 of the 
CFR. 
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obtained from economic reforms of former NMEs such as China, it also provides a set of 
criteria to grant conditional MET to its exporters, which is also different from that of the 
EU. All of these will be analyzed later in this chapter. 
B. Australia 
The Customs Act 1901 and the Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Act 1975 are the 
principal legislative instruments of Australian Anti-Dumping Law. The current 
legislation was the implementation of the GATT, the Anti-Dumping Code (the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT) and the Agreement on 
Interpretation and Application of Article VI, XVI and XXIII (the Code on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duties). 13 It was achieved by way of wholesale amendment and addition 
to Part XV13 of the Customs Act, plus some minor changes to other legislation. They 
include the Customs Legislation Bill (World Trade Organisation Amendments) and the 
Customs Tariff Bill (Anti -Dumping)(WTO Amendments). They were passed by the 
Australian Parliament on 6 December 1994, and came into force on I January 1995.14 
The Australian Customs Service (Customs) is the key body administering antiýdumping 
and countervailing measures. After an anti-dumping application is lodged, Customs will 
investigate it and make preliminary detenninations on provisional measures. If dumping 
is concluded as the determination, Customs will submit the essential facts and 
recommendations on final measures to the Minister for Justice and Customs, who is 
empowered to impose anti-dumping duties. 
The anti-clumping institutions of Australia and the EU have many similarities. First, both 
13 John Carroll, 'Australian Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures, ' for the Lex Mundi Asian 
Pacific Conference on Saturday, May 20,2000,1. 
<http: //www. lexmundi. org/committees/confinaterial/carroll. pdf> (I December -1002). 
14 Daniel Moulis, Freehill Hollingdale & Page, Canaberra, 'Australia' in Keith Steele (ed. ), 
-Inli-Dumping under the K70. - .4 
Comparative Review. (London: Kluwer Law International and 
International Bar Association, 1996). 35. 
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of them have a single agency to make decisions on injury and dumping. Second. they 
allow only investigation authorities to have access to all pertinent information. Third, 
both of them use more price undertakings than the U. S. In addition, both of them require 
that the anti-dumping duty be lower than the dumping margin if lesser duties would be 
sufficient to remove the injury caused by the dumping. " 
Despite these similarities, Australian anti-dumping law is quite different from that of the 
EU. The differences can be summarized in three points: methods ID identify NMEs, rules 
to determine normal values of imports from NMEs, and most important of all, provisions 
for Economies in Transition (EIT). This will be further analyzed in the following 
sections. 
C. New Zealand 
New Zealand was one of the first countries to adopt anti-dumping legislation. As early as 
1905, the Agricultural Implement Manufacture, Importation and Sale Ac t16 was passed as 
the first anti-dumping legislation of New Zealand. According to its obligations as a WTO 
Member, under the GATT 1994 Anti-Dumping Code, the current New Zealand laws are 
the Dumping and Countervailing Duties Act 1988 (Dumping Act) and the Temporary 
Safeguard Authorities Act 1987.17 
Compared with the EU, the most significant difference of the New Zealand's current 
anti-dumping legislation is the removal of the special approach towards NMEs and EIT. 
15 Blonigen & Prusa, fn 3 above at p 8. 
16 , In 1905 domestic and British manufacturers of agricultural implements complained about the 
efforts of an American harvester trust to monopolise the New Zealand market by systematic 
price-cutting to New Zealand purchasers. ' Under that circumstance, the Act applied a special duty to 
the unfairly trade imports. 'Anti-Dumping Law and Practice in New Zealand. 
' 
<httP: //www. med. govt. nz/busIt/trade - 
rem/otherdoc/adlpinz. html> (I December 2002). 
17 Russell McVeagh McKenzie. Bartleet & Community, Auckland. 'Nexv Zealand'. in Keith Steele 
(ed. ), Anti-Dwnpi7W under the WTO. - A Comparative Revieýi'. (London: Kluwer Law International 
and International Bar Association, 1996), 185. 
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That is to say, its authority normally adopts the domestic sales prices of Chinese products 
to determine their normal values. Price and cost information from analogue countries 
only will be used as an exception rather than the rule. 18 This brings out a completely 
different outcome in its anti-dumping investigations about imports from China - no 
dumping has been found since January 1994.19 
D. Japan 
As a Member of the WTO, Japan's current anti-dumping legislation is compiled under the 
GATT anti-dumping framework, and it consists of the following laws: 
1. Article 8 of the basic Customs Tariff Act (ex Article 9), amended in 1994 in accordance 
with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
2. Cabinet Order Relating to Anti-Dumping Duty (the Cabinet Order), adopted in 1980 to 
implement the Law. It was completely amended in accordance with the amendments to 
the Customs Tariff Act. 
3. 'Guidelines for Procedures Relating to Countervailing and AntýDumping Duty' of 24 
December 1986 (the Guidelines), issued by the Ministry of Finance as well as the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the Ministry of Health and Welfare, 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the Ministry of Transport, to 
clarify anti-dumping procedures and strengthen the implementation of the above ruleS. 
20 
Like the EU, the Japanese anti-dumping legislation provides special methods to 
determine the normal values of imports from NMEs. According to Article 
1(2) of the 
18, Anti-Dumping Law and Practice in New Zealand', seefn 16 above. 
19, WTO Anti-Dumping Statistics', 
-littp: ///xN, \v-Nv. wto. org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_stattab2_e. 
htm> (I December 2002). 
20 Shintaro Hagiwara, 'Japan' in Keith Steele (ed. ). . 4nti-Dumping under the 
WTO. - .4 COmparati vC, 
Reviciv. (London: Kluwer Law International and International Bar Association, 1996) at p 
12 1. 
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Cabinet Order, the Japanese authority may determine normal values of imports frorn 
NMEs based on price information of the like products in a third market economy (ME). 
The economic development stage of the selected country should be the closest 
comparable to that of the NME eoneemed. 
However, the authorities of the two countries interpret and apply the rule in different 
ways in practice. First, unlike the EU, Japan does not frequently apply its antirdumping 
instrument as a protectionist measure for its domestic industry against imports from 
NMEs. Though Japan compiled its anti-dumping law a long time ago, it seldom uses it. 
Up to I June 2001, only six anti-dumping petitions had been filed against foreign 
products, and three of them were finally withdrawn. 21 Second, the Japanese authority in 
practice adopts fairly flexible methods to assess normal values of imports from 
transitional economies like the People's Republic of China. 
Both of the two facts bring out quite different outcomes of the legislaticn of Japan and the 
EU with regard to their anti-dumping measures taken towards transitional economies. 
This will be illustrated through a case study later. 
/I. Different methods to Identify non-market economy (NME). 
Generally speaking, NME refers to the country where goods and resources are allocated 
by government planning agencies rather than by prices freely set in a market. 22 The 
classification of NME and ME is not scientific nor reasonable in the reality of today, 
because there is no purely free market nor totally centrally controlled economy. 
23 Further 
and worse, since the GATT did not provide any definition of MEs and NMEs nor any 
21 , WTO Anti-Dumping Statistics', fn 19 above. 
22 J. H. Jackson (co-editor), Legal Problems of International Economic Relations 3 Id edn., (New York: 
West Publishing, 1995), 1139. 
23 This issue is analyzed in more detail in section IV of chapter one. 
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guidance as to the categorization, Members of its current successor, the WTO, categorize 
MEs and NMEs according to their own criteria. 
Since former Communist countries used to have severe state control towards their 
economy, they are regarded as having been NMEs, while the developed western countries 
are viewed as being MEs. 24 As a result, EU defined China as an NME in the EU 
anti-dumping legislation in 1994.25 Though it eliminated China from the list of NMEs in 
1998 '26 it currently still applies traditional NME treatment towards Chinese exports in 
most of its anti-dumping proceedings. 27 
A. The U. S. 
The EU does not have any clear standard to determine what constitutes a market-oriented 
country, 28 while the U. S. sets several criteria to determine whether a country should be 
treated as an ME or NME, and China is regarded as an NME under the criteria. They 
include: 29 
I) The extent to which the currency of the country is convertible; 
2) The extent to which wage rates are determined by free bargaining between labour 
and management; 
24 Ibid. 
25 Council Regulation (EC) No 519/94, OJ 1994 L67/89. 
26 Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98. 
27 This issue has been further examined in chapter three. 
28 In Council Regulation (EC) No 519/94, the EU considers following countries as NMEs for the 
purpose of the EC anti-dumping laws: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Estonia, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kyrgystan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, the Russian 
Federation, TaJikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. OJ No L67.10.3.1994, 
p. 89. 
29 Section 1677b (c) (1), Title 19, U. S. Code. Available from 
<http: //Iaw2. house. gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb. exe? getdoc+uscview+tl 7t2O+2200+14++%28anti-dumpi 
ii(l", o29%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20> 
(I December 2002). 
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3) The extent to which joint ventures or other investments by firms of other foreign 
countries are permitted; 
4) The extent of government ownership or control over the means of production: 
5) The extent of government control over the price and output decisions of 
enterprises; 
6) The degree of centralized governiment control over the allocation of resources or 
inputs. 30 
No single criterion can conclusively indicate a market or an NME. In considering 
criterion I and 3, the Department of Commerce has stated that both currency 
convertibility and degree of foreign investment are macroeconomic indicators and have 
little effect on internal market forces. Therefore, it is acknowledged that such indicators 
cannot serve as definitive tests of ME status. However, compared with the EU, such 
identification will benefit transitional economies to be reclassified as market 
economies, 31 since it is more reasonable and practical in application. 
B. Australia. 
Unlike the EU, Australian legislation provided two criteria to define a country as an 
NME: 
1) 'The government has a monopoly, or substantial monopoly of the trade of 
the country; and 
30 Petroleum Wax Candles from the People's Republic of China: Anti-Dumping Final Determination 
of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Suspension of Liquidation, 51 Fed. Reg. 
25085, July 10,1986. 
31 Cynthia Horne, 'The Politics Behind the Application of Anti-Dumping Laws to Nonmarket 
Econornies: Distrust and Informal Constraints' (paper prepared for graduate student retreat 
for 
cornparative research, Society for Comparative Research, 
UCLA), pp 32 & 34. 
<Iittp: //www. sscnet. ucla. edu/soc/groups/scr/horne. pdf> (I December 2002). 
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2) The government determines or substantially influences the domestic price 
of goods in that country. 532 
Before China was reclassified as a transitional economy in 1999, Australia regarded it as 
an NME, under which traditional NME Treatment was applied to Chinese exports in 
anti-dumping investigations. 33 
C. Japan 
Japan has no definition of NME in its anti-dumping legislation. However, in accordance 
with the second interpretative note to paragraph I of Article VI in Annex I to the GATT 
1994, Japan provides a set of special ruleS34 to determine the normal value of imports 
from 'a country which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and 
where all domestic prices are fixed by the State'. 35 Therefore, whether a country is an 
NME and whether to apply the special rules to the exporters under investigation will be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. 
D. New Zealand. 
New Zealand has no classification of NMEs any more since it has removed specific 
provisions determining normal values of imports from NMEs and EIT. 
36 Recognizing the 
dramatic progress gained in economic reforms of these countries in the past decades, 
New Zealand consider it difficult to meet the conditions provided in the Interpretative 
32 , Australia's Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Administration' at p6 
<http: //www. customs. gov. au/resources/files/antidumping. pdf> (I December 2002). 
33 'Ministerial Price Control Guidelines - Economies in Transition', 
--http: //www. customs. gov. au/site/index. cfi-n? area_id=5&nav_id=296> 
(I December 2002). 
34 Art. 2, Cabinet Order Relating to Anti-Dumping Duty. 
35 Para. I of Art. VI in Annex I to the GATT 1994. 
36 , Anti-Dumping Law and Practice in New Zealand', fn 16 above. 
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Note 2 37 to paragraph I of Article VI of GATT 1994. Therefore, in case of dcmestic 
prices or factor costs of the products concerned might not be based on market 
considerations, standard provisions of the Dumping Act will be applied case by case. Its 
current legislation applicable to EIT will be analyzed with case later in this chopter. 
III. Different NME Treatments under the GATT anti-dumping legislative 
framework 
Under the GATT anti-dumping legislative framework, WTO Members are allowed to 
adopt price factors from an ME rather than domestic prices to determine the normal 
values of imports from an NME. This is the NME Treatment. Today, exporters from 
NN4Es who fail to get conditional MET in anti-dumping investigations are still subject to 
the traditional NME Treatment. In that case, the anti-dumping authority will adopt 
different methods to determine the normal value of imports from an NME with the price 
factors from an ME. It may be analogue country method and constructed value method. 
Such practice has the following significant disadvantages in making accurate judgements 
in anti-dumping investigations. 
1) It will inflate the actual normal value of the imports from an NME; 
2) In most cases, the NME concerned has certain comparative advantages for its 
exports in international trade, while the selected ME does not have; 
3) The choice of an analogue producer is very unpredictable and often depends on 
practical considerations which have little to do with the purpose of anti-dumping 
37 GATT Ad Art. VI Paragraph 1.2 provides: 'It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a 
country which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of 
its trade and where all domestic 
prices are fixed by the State, special difficulties may exist in 
deten-nining price comparability for the 
purposes of paragraph 1, and in such cases importing contracting parties may 
find it necessary to take 
into account the possibility that a strict comparison with 
domestic prices in such a country may not 
always be appropriate' 
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investigations, i. e. accurate judgements of dumping determination. An example of 
such considerations is finding a producer who is willing to cooperate. 
Though there are unreasonable factors in the traditional NME Treatment as analyzed 
above, the specific institutions that the U. S. applies (constructed value method) will lead 
to more accurate judgements than that of the EU (analogue country method) in 
anti-dumping investigations for imports from NMEs. As to other countries such as 
Australia, though it also contains the traditional NME Treatment for NMEs in its 
anti-dumping legislation, it provides more specific guidelines for such practice. All of 
these will be examined country by country through the following analysis. 
A. The EU's analogue country method. 
According to the current EU anti-dumping legislation, the normal value of imports from 
NMEs shall be determined on the basis of- 
The price or constructed value in an ME third country, or the price from such a third 
country to other countries, including the Community, or where those are not possible, 
on any other reasonable basis, including the price actually paid or payable in the 
Community for the like product. 38 
In that case, the selection of the third country is crucial to the outcome of an an6durnping 
investigation. However, the selection process undertaken by the EU authority is 
essentially empirical. The law only stipulates that 
An appropriate ME third country shall be selected in a not unreasonable manner, due 
account being taken of any reliable information made available at the time of selection. 
Account shall also be taken of time limits; where appropriate, a market economy third 
38 Art. 2.7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96. 
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country which is subject to the same investigation shall be used. 39 
Under the rule, the authority should select an ME, in which the like product is produced 
with the same manufacturing processes and technical standards as in the NME concerned. 
However, in fact, many other factors determine the selection. 
In most cases, the analogue country is selected by common arrangement between the 
parties, most often expressed on a tacit basis, for instance, where suggestions made by the 
complainant or the Commission are not objected to by the other side. 40 
In some cases, the selection of an analogue country is affected by the attitude of the 
producers in the third country under consideration; if they refuse to cooperate, another 
country will have to be used; 
In cases involving both MEs and NMEs, the Commission often tends to use one of the 
MEs concerned as an analogue in order to reduce its workload; 
A mere perusal of the list of market economy countries selected as analogues shows 
that the relative level of economic development or GNP per capita plays virtually no 
role in an EEC anti-dumping proceeding. Countries at all levels of economic 
development have been chosen as analogues for any particular non-market economy 
country. 
41 
Due to the randomness of the selection by the EU, the dumping determinations can reach 
a peak of artificiality. On the other hand, it is virtually impossible for exporters in NMEs 
to determine how to avoid dumping. 
39 
Ibid. 
40 John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst, Anti-Dumping Law and Practice: A Comparative Stliql,. 
(University of Michigan Press: 1990), 77. 
41 
Ibid. 
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B. The U. S.: constructed value method + surrogate country method 
Unlike the EU, the U. S. mainly adopts the constructed value method for NME exporters 
who fail to meet the criteria of conditional MET in anti-dumping investigations. Only in 
exceptional cases when there is not sufficient information available for constructed value 
method, surrogate country method (which is similar to the EU's analogue country 
method)42 will be applied. 
1. Constructed value method or factor test 
As early as 1988, in Section 1316 of its Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, the U. S. 
made an effort to alleviate the unfairness inherent in surrogate country method by 
adopting the Constructed Value or Factor Test as the preferred method of calculating 
normal value of imports from NMEs. 43 Under the factor test, the Department of 
Commerce must use the value of the factors of production used in producing the 
merchandise in the NME. So the Factor Test is a two-step approach. At first, it needs to 
identify and qualify the factors of production used in the NME in producing the products 
under investigation. Then, it will evaluate these factors in an appropriate ME. 
In the current U. S. anti-dumping legislation, the rule is provided in Section 1677b (c) (1), 
Title 19 of the U. S. Code. It stipulates that: 
The administering authority shall determine the normal value of the subject 
merchandise on the basis of the value of the factors of production utilized in producing 
the merchandise and to which shall be added an amount for general expenses and profit 
plus the cost of containers, coverings, and other expenses. Except as provided in 
42 Both methods use the third country price proxies for NMEs. However, the U. S. authority tends to 
stress the importance of having surrogates at similar levels of developing while the EU authority 
does not consider it at all. This will be further examined in the next part. Factors that the EU 
considers when it selects analogue countries have been analyzed in the previous section. 
43 John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst, fn 40 at p 450. 
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paragraph (2), the valuation of the factors of production shall be based on the best 
available information regarding the values of such factors in an ME or MEs considered 
to be appropriate by the administering authority. 44 
The factors of production utilized in producing merchandise include: 
a. hours of labor required, 
b. quantities of raw materials employed, 
c. amounts of energy and other utilities consumed, and 
d. representative capital cost, including depreciation. 45 
The administering authority, in valuing factors of production shall utilize, to the extent 
possible, the prices or costs of factors of production in one or more MEs that are: 
a. at a level of economic development comparable to that of the nonmarket economy 
country, and 
b. significant producers of comparable merchandise. 46 
For purposes of valuing the factors47 with the constructed value method, the U. S. authority 
observes the following rules: 48 
44 Section 1677b (c) (1), Title 19 of the U. S. Code. 
45 Section 1677b (c) (3), Title 19 of the U. S. Code. 
46 Section 1677b (c) (4), Title 19 of the U. S. Code. 
4-1 They include factors of production, general expenses, profit, and the cost of containers, coverings, 
and other expenses. 
48 Section 351.408(c)(4), 19 CFR. Document No: G/ADP/N/l /USA/l/SuppI. 2, 
<http: //docsonline. wto. org/gen_search. asp> (I December 2002). 
200 
a. Information used to value factors. 
If a factor or a portion of the factor is purchased fiom an ME supplier and the remainder 
from an NME supplier, the authority normally will value the factor using the price paid to 
the ME supplier. 
b. Valuation in a single country. 
Except for labour which is provided in the next paragraph, the ýuthority normally will 
value all factors in a single surrogate country. 
c. Labour. 
For labour, the authority uses regression-based wage rates - essentially an average of the 
wage rates in MEs viewed as being economically comparable to the NME. It used to 
utilize the wage and gross domestic product (GDP) data of at least 45 market economies 
collected from publicly available sources such as the International Labour Organization 
and the World Bank/Intemational Monetary Fund. However, beginning with May 2000, 
it chose to use per capita gross national product (GNP) instead of GDP . 
49The data is 
available to the public via the Import Administration's (IA) website5o and also at IA's 
Central Records Unit. 
d. Manufacturing overhead, general expenses, and profit. 
41) , Expected Wages of Selected Non-Market Economy Countries', <http: //ia. ita. doc. gov/wages> (I 
December 2002). 
so , Expected Wages of Selected Non-Market Economy Countries 1998 Income Data Revised May 
2000', <http: //ia. ita. doc. gov/wages/98wages/gdpOOweb. htm> (I December 2002). 
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For manufacturing overhead, general expenses, and profit, the Secretary normally vAII 
use non-proprietary information gathered from producers of identical or comparable 
merchandise in the surrogate CoUntry. 51 
In short, the major difference between the U. S. constructed value method and the EU 
analogue country method is that after selecting a third MIE, the U. S. values the factor 
inputs individually while the EU utilizes the actual price of the like product in the 
analogue as a price proxy for the NME under investigation. In particular, the U. S. takes 
the GNP and labour costs of the third ME(s) into account. As a result of this methodology, 
the comparative advantages of developing countries in international trade will be 
considered in anti-dumping investigations. It undoubted increases the fairness and 
accuracy of the authority's anti-dumping practice. 
2. Surrogate country method 
Surrogate country method uses the price proxies in a third ME to calculate the normal 
values of imports from an NME, which is similar to the EU's analogue country method. 
However, the U. S. authority applies the methodology less frequently than the EU, and it 
follows different criteria to select the third country. 
With regard to imports from NMEs, only when there is not adequate information 
available to adopt the constructed value method, the U. S. authority will determine their 
normal values on the basis of the domestic prices of the like products of a third ME. 
In that case, the merchandise whose price will be referred is required to be comparable to 
the subject merchandise. Besides, it should be produced in one or more ME countries that 
are at a level of economic development comparable to that of the NME, and it is sold in 
51 Section 351.408(c)(4), 19 CFR. 
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other countries, including the United States. 52 
In determining whether a country is at a level of economic development comparable to the 
NME, the U. S. places primary emphasis onper capita GDp53 as the measure of economic 
comparability. The International Trade Administration (ITA) in the Commerce 54 
implements the surrogate country method, and it has five criteria to govern such practice: 
per capita GNP, growth rate of per capita GNP, significance as a producer of a like 
product, and the distribution of labor between the agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors. 55 
The above analysis shows that the U. S. evaluates the individual factor inputs rather than 
the actual price of the like product in third MEs, and it tends to stress the importance of 
having surrogates at similar levels of development in anti-dumping investigations against 
NMEs. The overall level of economic development is the key consideration for the 
selection of the surrogate. This is helpful to get a better evaluation of labour cost, which is 
an important comparative advantage of developing countries such as China in 
international trade. As a result, the U. S. methodologies not only increase the fairness and 
accuracy of determination of the existence of dumping in anti-dumping investigations, 
but also provide a more predictable standard for exporters from NMEs to avoid dumping. 
From this point, such methodologies towards NMEs are more scientific and flexible than 
the EU's analogue country method, which is mainly based on the availability of 
information and cooperation, similarities of manufacturing process and technical 
52 Section 1677b (c) (2), Title 19 of the U. S. Code. 
53 From May 2000, the U. S. authority chose to use per capita gross national product (GNP) instead of 
GDP. 
54 i. e. U. S. Department of Commerce. 
55 56 FR 60969.1991. 'Final Results of Anti-Dumping Duty Administrative Review: Shop Towels 
of Cotton from the People's Republic of China. ' United 
States Federal Register November 29. 
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standards. 56 Therefore, the U. S. antýdumping practice towards NMEs is a step forward in 
the right direction. 
C. Australia: domestic selling prices or constructed prices. 
According to Australian anti-dumping legislation, if a country is regarded as an NME, the 
normal value of its exports will be determined by reference to domestic selling prices or 
to constructed prices based on cost of production or third country sales. 57 However, 
compared with the EU, Australia has more specific guidelines of the selection of the third 
country. 
Under the law, the normal value from an NME is decided according to whichever is the 
most appropriate of the following methods. 
A value of like goods sold in another (or analogue) country in the ordinary course of 
trade and at arms length; 
A value of like goods sold by the analogue country to another country in the ordinary 
course of trade and at arms length; 
A value equal to the cost to make and sell like goods in the analogue country, including 
any determined profit rate; or 
A value of like goods produced and sold in Australia in the ordinary course of trade and 
at arms length. 
58 
As to the selection of an analogue country, Customs provides the following guidelines: 
56 EU's guidelines to select analogue countries are analyzed in more detail in chapter three. 
57 Moulis, Hollingdale & Canaberra, fn 14 above at p 54. 
58 , Australia's Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Administration', fn 32 above at p 6. 
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When selecting a third country, it should have a similar costing structure and, if 
possible, be at a similar stage of economic development to the country concerned, 
particularly in regard to the industry under inquiry. In making a comparison, factors 
such as gross national product, infrastructure development, manufacturing processes, 
technical standards and scales of production may be taken into account. 
Where there is a selection of market and NMEs already included in the complaint, the 
Australian Customs Service (ACS) may consider using one of the market economy 
countries already involved. 59 
D. Japan: surrogate country method. 
According to Article 2.2 of the Cabinet Order, the Japanese authority may determine 
normal values of imports from NMEs based on price information of the like products in a 
third ME. Like the U. S., Japan stresses that the economic development stage of the 
selected country should be the closest comparable to that of the NME under investigation. 
IV. Legislative amendments made or new approach adopted due to China"s 
economic reform. 
A. The EU: stringent approach to the conditional MET. 
In order to match the progress obtained from economic reforms of the former NMEs, the 
EU, the U. S., Australia, New Zealand and Japan have adopted new an6clumping 
approaches - conditional MET. However, compared with the EU, the criteria provided by 
these countries for conditional MET in anti-dumping investigations are less stringent. 
Furthermore, their new approaches have been applied in a more flexible way by the 
authorities in anti-dumping investigations. 
59 Moulis, Hollingdale & Canaberra, fn 14 above at p 55. 
205 
According to the depth of economic reform, the EU gradually eliminated the following 
countries from its NME list: China, Russia, 60 Ukraine, Vietnam, Kazakhstan and 
countries currently classed as NMEs for anti-dumping purposes but who are Members of 
the WTO. Exporters from these countries will be granted conditional MET, i. e. domestic 
prices of their exports can be used to determine their normal value if they are able to meet 
the five criteria provided in Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98. 
B. The U. S: the Market Oriented Industry (MOI) Test. 
Compared with the EU, the similar regime in the U. S. is more positive and practical. Both 
the U. S. Department of Commerce and the U. S. Congress acknowledge the possibility 
that certain sectors or regions in a transitional economy will face market prices or begin to 
operate under hard budget constraints more quickly than others: 'attempts by traditional 
NMEs to evolve towards market-oriented economies may result in a situation in which a 
sector of an NME may be sufficiently free of NME distortions so that the actual prices 
and/or costs incurred in the NME could be used in dumping calculations and render 
meaningful results. 61 Therefore, in order to make more accurate and fair judgement in 
anti-dumping investigations, the sectors could potentially be treated differently from 
other exporters in the country. 
Based on this reason, in 1988, the U. S. Congress amended the anti-dumping law with 
section 773(c)(1)(b) permitting standard ME methodologies in NME cases under limited 
circumstances, and the Congress began to consider the situation of a 'bubble of 
capitalism' within an NME. In that case, if an industry in an NME is able to prove that its 
inputs and pricing structures are completely market determined, it would be subject to 
60 Russia was recognized as an ME for the purpose of anti-dumping by Council Regulation (EC) No 
1972/2002 of 5 November 2002 amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on the protection against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community. OJ 2002 L305/1. 
61 , Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination: Oscillating Ceiling Fans from the People's 
Republic of China', 57 Fed. Reg. 24018, June 5,1992. 
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anti-dumping procedures similar to those for market economies. In the case of Sparklers 
from the People's Republic of ChindS2 and Oscillating Fans From the People's Republic 
of China, 63 the U. S. Department of Commerce clarified its position on bubbles of 
capitalism. 
64 
In 1992, ITA announced certain criteria to determine whether an industry in an NME is 
sufficiently market-oriented. They include : 65 
1. The virtual absence of government involvement in setting prices or production levels; 
2. The industry is characterised by private or collective ownership; and 
3. The industry pays market prices for all significant input. 
Under the MOI test, industries in a transitional economy like China could have more fair 
and predictable treatment in anti-dumping investigations. The enterprise which passes the 
test will be allowed to use the domestic price to determine the normal value of its exports. 
As a result of the MOI test method, the number of positive final deten-ninations of 
dumping against NME industries has decreased. 66 Therefore, the comparative advantages 
of the industry/enterprise are affirmed in international trade. 
C. Australia: Special rules for Economies in Transition (EIT). 
This is the most significant difference between Australian and the EU antirdumping 
legislation towards China and other EIT. Australia has added and amended relevant rules 
62 56 Fed. Reg. 20588, May 6,1991. 
63 56 Fed. Reg. 55274, October 25,1991. 
64 Cynthia Horne, fn 31 above at p 24. 
65 Jianyu Wang, 'A Critique of the Application to China of the Non-Market Economy Rules of 
Antidumping Legislation and Practice of the EU. ' (1999) 33(3) J. W. T., 117 at p 139. 
66 Cynthia Horne, fn 31 above at p 25. 
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according to the changes of economic status in China's and other EIT since 1998. As we 
will find out from a recent case later in this chapter, the current legislation matches these 
changes very well. Compared with the corresponding rules of the EU, it is not only more 
specific, but also more reasonable and realistic in practice. 
1. The Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Act 1975 as amended by the Customs 
(Anti-dumping Amendments) Act 1998. 
The Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Act 1975 as amended by the Customs 
(Anti-dumping Amendments) Act 1998 introduced an alternative approach to determine 
normal values of allegedly dumped goods for countries in the process of a transition from 
a centrally controlled economy to an ME. 
Australia's legislation provides for normal values to be assessed through a hierarchy 
of methodologies with Customs working progressively through each until a point is 
reached where the normal value can be determined. 67 
The revised law is more flexible and practical than the old one when determining normal 
values for imports from transitional economies. 
Considering the possibility that EIT may have some sectors which have already moved to 
the ME level, Australian Customs admit that it is inappropriate to apply the same rules for 
NMEs to imports in these sectors of EIT. According to the law, an assessment of the 
influence or control a government has over domestic selling prices and the method used 
for determining normal values is made on a case-by-case basis. Based on the different 
economic development level of an economy in transition, Customs may use alternative 
methods to calculate its normal values. There will be one of the two situations. 
67 John Carroll, fn 13 at p 2. 
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a. When it finds out in the process of an anti-dumping investigation that the domestic 
selling prices of such products concerned are subject to price control, the normal 
values will be determined on a basis of information obtained from both an analogue 
country and a transitional economy. 
b. If the Customs find there is no price control, it may proceed to examine the cost of 
production of the imports from EIT. In case of raw materials being supplied by a state 
wholly owned enterprise, 68 a substitute raw material cost may be used in the 
calculation of the normal value. 
The method of determining the substitute raw material cost will depend on the 
circumstances of each case. The legislation provides for the substitute raw 
material cost to be based on one of the following options: the raw material price in 
the domestic market of a analogue country; the raw material export price from a 
analogue country to an appropriate third country; the cost to make and sell the raw 
material in a analogue country; or the selling price of the raw material in 
Australia. 
The normal value for goods that are found to incorporate raw materials from a 
state wholly owned enterprise may be determined having regard to all relevant 
information. This can include the sum of: the cost of the substitute raw material; 
the actual costs of production of the exported goods (excluding the actual costs for 
the affected raw material); and the administrative, selling and general costs and 
profit associated with the export sale. 69 
2. More specific rules for EIT - Australian Customs Dumping Notice No. 
68 i. e. a raw material input to the manufacture of the exported goods, that accounts for more than 10% 
of the costs of production, is supplied by a state wholly owned enterprise. 
69 & Australia's Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Administration', fn 32 at p 7. 
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2000160.70 
On 7 December 2000, the Minister for Justice and Customs issued the following 
guidelines in relation to a price control situation in an economy in transition. Under this 
law, exporters in such a country have the opportunity to submit claims to establish that a 
price control situation does not apply to the goods under consideration. In that case, the 
producer or exporter bears the burden of proof, and should provide the information to 
show that a price control situation does not exist. There are four criteria to judge whether 
a price control situation exists. 
a. Decisions of the relevant producers or exporters relating to prices, costs, 
inputs, sales and investments are made in response to market signals and 
without significant state interference. 71 
To meet this criterion, four factors should be found: 
i) genuinely private companies or parties hold the majority shareholding of the 
relevant producer or exporter; ii) state or provincial officials appearing on the 
board or in key management positions are in a clear minority; iii) the relevant 
producer or exporter has the guaranteed freedom to carry on business activities 
as evidenced by the following: there is no restriction on selling on the domestic 
market, the right to do business cannot be withdrawn outside proper contractual 
terms, and in the case of joint venture companies, profits can be exported and 
capital invested can be repatriated; iv) major production inputs of the relevant 
producer or exporter are not supplied by state owned or controlled enterprises at 
prices which do not substantially reflect free market conditions. Inputs shall 
70 4 Ministerial Guidelines - Section 269tac(5e), Customs Act 
1901', available from: 
<http: //www. customs. gov. au/notices/acdnOO/acdnOO60. htm> (I December 2002). 
71 Ibid. 
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include, inter alia, raw materials, labour, energy and technology costs. 
b. One clear set of basic accounting records is kept by the relevant producer or 
exporter and is independently audited and is maintained in accordance with 
either generally accepted accounting principles in the country of export or in 
line with international accounting standards. 
c. The production costs and financial situation of the relevant producer or 
exporter are not subject to any significant distortions carried over from the 
non-market economy system. 
d. The relevant producer or exporter is subject to bankruptcy and property laws, 
which guarantee legal certainty and stabil ity. 72 
According to the Notice, the following factors should be taken into account before 
determining whether a price control situation exists. 
i) The relevant producer or exporter of the goods under consideration forms part of a 
broader market or sector in which the presence of a State owned enterprise or 
enterprises has influenced prices; ii) The supply of utilities should be guaranteed on 
the basis of contracts that reflect normal commercial terms and prices which are 
generally available throughout the economy; iii) The land on which facilities of the 
company are built should be rented from the State at conditions comparable to those 
in an ME (e. g. Proper contractual leases); iv) The company should have the right to 
hire and dismiss employees and the right to fix salaries. 
73 
The above legislation towards EIT shows that Australian anti-dumping authority 
is fully 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
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aware of the important fact that in the broad spectrum of economic development, 
different sectors in EIT may be at different economic development levels. Since the law 
provides different rules applicable to these different levels, it well matches this feature of 
the EIT. In addition, because it is more specific, the anti-dumping authority has less 
discretion when it judges the facts about dumping. As a result, it enables the assessment 
of dumping towards imports from Chinese to be impartial and fair. This can be perceived 
from the following case study. 
3. Case study 
a. Brief introduction to the case. 
This is a recent Australian anti-dumping case against imports from the People's Republic 
of China. It is a typical case to analyze because the investigation was initiated soon after 
the rules for EIT was enacted. Therefore, it shows how the Australian Customs utilize the 
updated legislation to determine the normal values of imports from China as a transitional 
economy, and thereafter arrive at a reasonable conclusion in anti-dumping investigations. 
On 14 May 2001 Monsanto Australia Limited (Monsanto), the predominant 
manufacturer of glyphosate in Australia, lodged a Customs application for a dumping 
duty notice in respect of glyphosate exported to Australia from China. 74 Monsanto 
claimed that the goods had caused material injury to the Australian industry producing 
like goods. It also claimed that the glyphosate market in China was subject to price 
control and was,, for this and other reasons, unsuitable to assess normal values with 
Chinese domestic prices. It asked that Customs assess normal values using India as an 
analogue country. 
74 6 Australian Custorns Dumping Notice - 2002/12 - Wednesday 27 February 2002, Customs Act 
1901 - part xvb Notice pursuant to Section 
269TL Finding on Glyphosate Exported from the People's 
Republic of China'. Available from 
<Iittp: //www. customs. gov. aul'site/index. cfm? area_id=5&content_id= 13 3972> (I December 
2002). 
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Customs initiated its investigation into Monsanto's allegations on 12 June 2001. After 
assessing the information submitted by Chinese exporters and consulting with the 
Chinese government and representatives of the Chinese glyphosate industry, Customs 
concluded that the Chinese glyphosate market was not subject to price controls. 
Therefore, it decided that the domestic market prices were suitable for assessing normal 
values. As a result of the investigation, the Chinese products were not dumped, and no 
anti-dumping measure would be taken. 
b. Detailed analysis of the procedures and methods taken to determine the 
normal value of the case. 
i. Legal basis. 
In this case, the legal basis to determine the normal value of Chinese products include 
Subsection 269TAC(5D), Subsection 269TAC(5E) and Subsection 269TAC(5G) of the 
Customs Act 1901 (Act). 
Subsection 269TAC(5D) covers price control situations in EIT. Subsection 269TAC(5E) 
of the Act defines a price control situation in relation to the domestic price of like goods 
as where exporters or other sellers of like goods and the domestic prices of the like goods 
in the country are controlled or substantially controlled by the government of that 
country. 
If the domestic sales of like goods by the exporter or other sellers in the country of export 
do not exist, Subsection 269TAC(5D) of the Act can not be applied. In that case, Customs 
will examine the source of raw materials used in the production of the exported good and 
their costs according to 269TAC(5G) of the Act. Where the supply of raw materials used 
in producing the exported goods is affected by the government of the export country, and 
the cost actually incurred by that producer in procuring that raw material so supplied 
exceeds 10 percent of the costs actually incurred by the producer 
in producing the 
213 
exported goods, the normal value of the goods must be constructed in accordance with the 
method set out in paragraphs (f) to (h) of s. 269TAC(5G) of the Act. 
ii. Findings of the investigation. 
After receiving exporter questionnaires from Chinese glyphosate manufacturers and 
exporters, Australian Customs visited five of them to verify the information provided. It 
also sought information about the economic development level of the country and the 
industry from the Chinese government and various Chambers of Commerce and industry 
representative organisations, including MOFTEC (Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation) and CCPIT (China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade Sub-Council of Chemical Industry). Based on the facts, Customs arrived at the 
following conclusions. 
- No price control situation exists in respect of China's 
domestic market for 
agricultural chemicalS. 75 
- There were insufficient sales of like goods on the 
domestic market in China that 
would be relevant for determining normal values under Subsection 269TAC(l) of 
76 
the Act. 
- No raw materials which accounted 
for more than 10 percent of production costs 
incurred in manufacturing the exported product were supplied by an enterprise that 
was wholly owned by any level of government. 
77 
Therefore, under Subsection 269TAC of the Act, provisions 
for determining normal 
values in respect of economies in transition are not applicable 
in this case. That is to say, 
75 8 (3)(7) 'Customs' Conclusions re price control', ibid. 
76 8 (3)(8) 'Domestic Sales of Like Goods', ibid. 
77 8 (3)(9), 'Source of Significant Inputs', ibid. 
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the corresponding methods for Market Economies will be adopted here. Customs 
calculated weighted average export prices and normal values for the five Chinese 
companies, and then determined dumping margins for each of them. As a result of the 
investigation, four companies had negative dumping margins, and the other had a slight 
dumping margin of 5.81 percent. 78 
In addition, Customs examined reasons for the injury claimed by Monsanto (Monsanto 
Australia Limited) in its anti-dumping investigation application, and confirmed that it 
was not the alleged dumped goods that caused the material injury. Based on the above 
facts, Customs recommends that the Minister shall not publish a dumping duty notice in 
respect of the goods. 
It is noticed that Australian Customs findings differ from those of the EU in its recent 
investigation of alleged dumping of glyphosate exported from China. The significant 
difference in the two findings is that Australian Customs used information verified in 
China to establish normal values and the EU used an analogue (surrogate) country. This 
difference arose as a result of differences between relevant EU and Australian legislation 
in respect of the treatment of economies in transition. 
Both the Australian and EU authorities will examine the economic status of relevant 
Chinese companies respectively before they determine the method to calculate normal 
value of Chinese imports concerned. However, the Australian Customs have a 
better and 
correct understanding of this issue. It can be shown by another case study. 
A very important factor to assess the economic status of a company 
is substantial 
interference by government or state. In this case, a Chinese joint venture 
Is investment up 
to Renminbi (RMB) 50m was approved by the provincial government, over 
RMB 200m 
78 fii 74 at p 25. 
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by the State Council and RMB 50m to RMB 200m by State Planning and Development 
Commission. The Customs found out through investigation that these approvals only 
related to investment and did not restrict production quantities. For approval of 
investment the parties must submit a business plan. Such a business plan may include 
projected production, but did not restrict production. The purpose of the plan was to 
demonstrate that the proposed investment was sound. Based on this fact, it did not 
become the barrier for the joint venture to obtained MET in the antýdumping 
investigation. 
However, such an approval of investment by the state may lead to different judgement 
under the EU institutions. It can be regarded as substantial state interference and NME 
behaviour by the EU according to its conventional practice towards Chinese exporters. 
Therefore, the joint venture's application for MET is likely to be rejected by the EU. That 
is to say, prices from a third ME rather than the domestic sales prices will be used to 
determine the normal value of the joint venture's exports. Afterwards, a very high 
anti-dumping duty will be imposed following the artificially maximized dumping margin 
as the result of the investigation. 
From the above case analysis, we can perceive the most important differences between 
the Australian and the EU anti-dumping legislation towards the People's Republic of 
China. The former has more detailed and reasonable provisions to determine normal 
values of imports from China. Therefore, its authorities (Customs) enjoy less discretion 
when determining dumping and injury in an anti-dumping investigation. Besides, 
Customs calculate dumping margins for each exporter concerned, which means that 
individual treatment is applied in every case. All of these can meet the needs in reality, i. e. 
the great complexity of anti-dumping cases involving economies in transition. Therefore, 
compared with the EU law, the Australian legislation ensures a more accurate and fair 
judgement of dumping and injury in such anti-dw-nping investigations. 
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D. New Zealand 
Unlike the EU, New Zealand has removed specific provisions determining normal values 
of imports from NMEs and EIT. Recognizing the dramatic progress gained in economic 
reforms of these countries in the past decades, New Zealand considers it difficult to meet 
the conditions provided in the Interpretative Note 2 79 to paragraph I of Article VI of 
GATT 1994. Therefore, in case of domestic prices or factor costs of the products 
concerned might not be based on market considerations, standard provisions of the 
Dumping Act will be applied case by case. On a few occasions, price and cost 
information from analogue countries might still be used where exports from an NME is 
under anti-dumping investigation. However, such a situation will be the exception rather 
than the rule . 
80 Besides, in cases of recent years, 81 Chinese companies were granted 
individual treatment by the New Zealand authority automatically. Thus, dumping 
margins of dumped goods are calculated on an individual basis. In addition, the authority 
pays great attention to explore the exact reasons of depression of its domestic industry in 
anti-dumping investigations, so that the injury caused by dumped goods can be examined 
properly. 
All of these are helpful to get an accurate assessment of dumping facts without 
overestimating them in anti-dumping investigations. Therefore, they bring out 
79GATT Ad Art. VI Paragraph 1.2 provides: 'It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country 
which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are 
fixed by the State, special difficulties may exist in determining price comparability for the purposes of 
paragraph 1, and in such cases importing contracting parties may find it necessary to take into account 
the possibility that a strict comparison with domestic prices in such a country may not always be 
appropriate' 
80 Anti-Dumping Law and Practice in New Zealand', fn 16 above. 
81 Glass, Clear Float; from China, Indonesia and Thailand' (New Zealand anti-dumping case, 
completed on 12 May 1998), <http: //www. med. govt. nz/busIt/trade_rem/reports/gIass. 
htm1> (I 
December 2002). 
'Lead Acid Batteries from the People's Republic of China', (New Zealand anti-dumping case, 
completed on 22 July 1999), <http: //www. med. govt. nzlbusIt/trade_rem/reports/cbatterm. 
htmI> (I 
December 2002). 
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completely different judgments towards Chinese companies, which shows the very 
difference between New Zealand and the EU anti-dumping legislation towards NMEs 
and EIT. It will be illustrated further in the following case. 
Case Study. 
This is a New Zealand anti-dumping case against imports from the People's Republic of 
China. During the investigation, the authority specifically examined Chinese domestic 
cement market and concluded that it is not significantly affected by the government at any 
level. Therefore, it is a typical case to show how the New Zealand authority of today 
determines the normal values of the Chinese products according to the latter's economic 
status as a transitional economy. As a result of such practice, the authority is able to get a 
right conclusion of dumping facts in anti-dumping investigations. 
1. Brief introduction to the case. 
On 8 October 1997, Golden Bay and Milburn (the New Zealand Portland Cement 
industry) submitted an anti-dumping investigation application to the Ministry of 
Commerce. It stated that imports of Portland cement from China were being dumped, and 
threatening to cause material injury to the New Zealand industry. 82 
In accordance with section 10 of the Dumping and Countervailing Duties Act 1988 ("the 
Act"), on 20 November 1997, the Secretary of Commerce formally initiated an 
investigation. Both the existence and effect of the alleged dumping of Portland cement 
from China were found as a result. Therefore, the New Zealand industry requested in its 
application that provisional measures be imposed. However, on 18 February 
1998 the 
Minister of Commerce declined the request on the ground that action under section 
16 
was not necessary to prevent material injury being caused 
during the remaining period of 
82, Portland Cement from China', (New Zealand anti-dumping case, completed on 14 
May 1998), 
<http: //www. med. govt. nz/buslt/trade_rem/chinacement/final/index. 
html> (I December 2002). 
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the investigation, and even further imports were unlikely to cause material injury to the 
New Zealand industry during this period. Consequently, no anti-dumping measures were 
taken towards imports from China. 
2. Methods taken to determine the normal value of Chinese products in the case. 
During the anti-dumping investigation, the authority found the following facts: first, sales 
of Portland cement on the Chinese domestic market are not set or influenced by the 
Government (at any level), and that prices are established according to the market. 
Second, sales are not made at a loss, and are made in sufficient quantities to be used to 
establish normal values. Based on above points, Normal values are determined in 
accordance with section 5 of the Act which states (inter alia) as follows: 
Subject to this section, for the purposes of this Act, the normal value of any goods 
imported or intended to be imported into New Zealand shall be the price paid for like 
goods sold in the ordinary course of trade for home consumption in the country of 
export in sales that are arm's length transactions by the exporter or, if like goods are 
not so sold by the exporter, by other sellers of like goods. 
Therefore, the domestic sales prices of Chinese cement were adopted to calculate the 
normal values and dumping margins. Dumping margins have been calculated on a per 
tonne basis for cement packed in 40kg bags and in one tonne bags for the export shipment 
made to New Zealand during the period of investigation of I October 1996 to 30 
September 1997. As a result, the cement in 40kg bags was found to be dumped with a 
dumping margin, i. e. 5 percent of export price. 
However, in the injury investigation, the New Zealand authority concluded that there is 
no evidence that material injury is being threatened as a result of the probable volume 
effects of further imports. There is evidence of a likely loss of market share, decline in 
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profits, a reduction in utilization of production capacity, a decline in employment levels, 
and a reduction of cash flow, but the likely impact is not so significant as to threaten 
material injury. Therefore, no anti-dumping measure was taken towards the Chinese 
goods. 
In this case, methods that the New Zealand authority adopted to determine the normal 
value of imports from China is high-lighted, because it is crucial to determine the dumping 
margin and assess the actual effect of the dumped goods on the New Zealand industry. 
After making sure of the non- interference from government to Chinese domestic cement 
market, the authority applied MET to determine normal values and dumping margins of 
the goods concerned. Consequently, the effects of the dumped goods to New Zealand 
industry were assessed in a proper manner, and no anti-dumping measure was taken. 
On the contrary, if it were the EU who would decide this case, it would make a 
completely different judgement towards Chinese companies. According to its routine 
practice, it is likely to adopt the analogue country method (i. e. refer to the domestic sales 
prices of a third ME) to calculate the normal values of Chinese goods. As a result, normal 
values and dumping margins of the imports concerned can be artificially enhanced. Thus, 
the injury caused by the dumped goods will be maximized. In the meantime, under 'one 
country one duty' principle of the EU, a unified and high anti-dumping duty will be 
imposed on all Chinese companies related to the dumped goods. 
E. Japan: less stringent and more practical approach towards Chinese 
exports. 
Japan 1) s anti-dumping policy towards NMEs seems similar to that of the EU in words. 
However,, there are two significant differences in practice. 
First, unlike the EU, Japan does not frequently apply its antýdumping 
instrument as a 
protectionist measure for its domestic industry against 
imports from NMEs. Though 
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Japan compiled its anti-dumping law a long time ago, it seldom uses it. Up to I June 200 1. 
only six anti-dumping petitions had been filed against foreign products, and three of them 
were finally withdrawn. 83 
Second, the Japanese authorities in practice adopt fairly flexible methods to assess 
normal values of imports from transitional economies like the People's Republic of China. 
This can be seen in the following case. 
Both of the two facts bring out quite different outcomes of the legislation of Japan and the 
EU with regard to their anti-dumping measures taken towards EIT. 
Ferro- si I ico-manganese was the first case leading to anti-dumping measures by the 
Japanese government. 84 It is also a typical case which can show how the Japanese 
government determines normal value of imports from the People's Republic of China as a 
transitional economy. 
1. Brief introduction to the Ferro-silico-manganese case. 
On 8 October 199 1, the Japanese Ferro-Alloy Association initiated anti-dumping 
petitions against ferro-silico-manganese imported from the People's Republic of China, 
the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of South Africa, because the Japanese industry 
of ferro-silico-manganese argued that it was threatened by the low priced imports. The 
anti-dumping investigation was carried out on 29 November 1991. As a result of a 
positive dumping finding, anti-dumping measures were taken towards different Chinese 
companies respectively. 
2. Method to calculate the normal value of imports from Chinese companies- 
83 'WTO Anti -Dumping Statistics', fn 19 above. 
84 Ministry of Finance, Customs Weekly Reports, 12 February 1993, No 
2089, pp. 1-3. 
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conditional MET 
In the process of the dumping investigation, the Japanese government determined the 
normal value of the Chinese products with the same method applicable to MEs (i. e. use 
domestic price) due to two facts. 85 
- Ferro-silico-manganese is one of the 'free items' exempt from State control. 
- Though Chinese producers concerned are province-owned or collective-corporate 
operated, they decide the sales prices and pay a corporate tax independently. 
After an on-the-spot investigation, the Japanese authority considered the direct domestic 
sales prices were reliable. Therefore, normal value of the imported 
ferro-silico-manganese was calculated at a direct sales level from producers to domestic 
users in China. 
3. Methods to determine dumping margin and anti-dumping duty rates - 
individual treatment. 
Since the domestic sales prices adopted to calculate the normal value were different and 
were supplied by several Chinese exporters, the Japanese authority determined dumping 
margin and duty rates for those companies respectively. Here, different methods were 
taken towards three groups of Chinese exporters. 
a. Considering seven Chinese exporters who have cooperated to supply 
information 
during the investigation, anti-dumping dutY rates were determined on an individual 
basis, i. e. 4.5-19.1 percent 
b. As to non-co-operators, dumping margins and duty rates were 
based on best available 
85 Norio Komuro, 'Japan's First Anti-Dumping Measures in the Ferro- Si 
li co-Managanese Case', 
1993) 27 J. W. T., 6 at p 18. 
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information, which exceeded the highest rates in the former case, i. e. 27.2 percent. 
c. As to new producers who began to manufacture the same products after the 
anti-dumping investigation, dumping margin was the weighted average margin for 
co-operators in the first case, i. e. 8.9 percent. 
Here, the method adopted by the Japanese government to determine normal value and 
dumping margin of the Chinese products is noticeable, because the EU would take 
different methodology in that case. The ownership of the Chinese producers concerned 
(province-owned and collective-corporate operated) will become the trigger for the EU to 
apply traditional NME treatment to them mechanically. In EU practice, the normal value 
of the Chinese products will be calculated with the domestic price paid (or the export 
price to third countries) of like products in an analogue market-economy country. A 
maximized dumping margin is likely to appear afterwards, and then a single high 
anti-dumping duty will be imposed on all relevant Chinese producers. 
Compared with the EU, the methods taken by the Japanese authority have brought out an 
accurate and fair outcome in this case. In addition, since dumping margins for 
non-co-operators are based on the best information available, and they are higher than 
those of cooperating exporters, it will actually encourage foreign exporters to cooperate 
in future anti-dumping investigations. All of these show the significant differences 
between Japan and the EU's anti-dumping policy against imports from transitional 
economies like the People's Republic of China. 
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V. Different methodologies to determine anti-dumping duty rates 
for dumped Chinese exporters. 
A. The EU's one country one duty rule and individual treatment. 
The EU's anti-dumping Regulation stipulates that in the cases of imports from NMEs, a 
single average rate of duty is applied to all imports from that country. 86 In practice since 
the early 1990s, the Commission has stressed repeatedly that in anti-dumping 
proceedings with regard to imports from NMEs, it will generally impose a single 
anti-dumping duty on all exports from such countries on a country-by-country basis. 87 
Due to the favourable progress gained in the economic reform of original NMEs such as 
the People's Republic of China, the EU provided conditional individual treatment. If an 
NME exporter can meet the criteria of the treatment to show that its export activities are 
not subject to state interference, its anti-dumping duty will be determined on an 
individual basis according to its export price. The latest legislation was updated in 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002 . 
88 It sets five criteria for the conditional 
individual treatment. 
(a) in the case of wholly or partly foreign owned firms or joint ventures, exporters are 
free to repatriate capital and profits; 
(b) export prices and quantities, and conditions and terms of sale are freely determined; 
(c) the majority of the shares belong to private persons. State officials appearing on the 
86 Art. 9 (5), Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98. 
87 Jianyu Wang, fn 65 above at p 123. 
88 Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002 of 5 November 2002 amending Regulation (EC) No 
384/96 on the protection against dumped imports 
from countries not members of the European 
Community. OJ 2002 L305/1- 
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board of Directors or holding key management positions shall either be in minority or 
it must be demonstrated that the company is nonetheless sufficiently independent from 
state interference; 
(d) exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate; and 
(e) State interference is not such as to permit circumvention of measures if individual 
exporters are given different rates of duty. 89 
The conditional individual treatment seems to be much more flexible and reasonable than 
the one country one duty rule. However, even the EU itself admit that the criteria of the 
treatment are so strict that very few exporters has been granted the treatment in practice 
since the method was stipulated. Under the regime, within three years since the method 
was firstly provided in 1997, only 3 out of 27 Chinese companies qualified for individual 
treatment. 90 Therefore, it is applied as an exception rather than a general rule. 
Furthermore, Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002 explicitly provides that only 
wholly or partly foreign owned firms or joint ventures are eligible to apply for the 
individual treatment. This, compared with the corresponding legislation of the U. S., 
Australia, New Zealand and Japan, is an additional requirement which is far from 
reasonable. 
B. The U. S. Australia, New Zealand and Japan's individual treatment for 
imports from NMEs or transitional economies. 
Unlike the EU, the U. S. adopts individual treatment towards NMEs in a more flexible and 
realistic way. Once a company from an NNIE can demonstrate that it operates 
89 Art. 1(6), Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002. 
90 Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on protection against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community /* COM/2000/03 6-3 ) final 
- ACC 2000/0160 */ pp. 3,5 
& 13. 
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independently and is free of government control from both law and fact aspects, its 
anti-dumping duty will be determined by the U. S. authorities on an individual basis. As a 
result, towards imports from the People's Republic of China, the U. S. grants individual 
treatment almost in every case, including Chinese state-owned enterprises. 9' 
In the Silicon Carbide case, 92 the U. S. anti-dumping authorities made an investigation of 
both law and facts, and concluded that ownership by all the people is not synonymous to 
central government control. The state-controlled companies concerned were no longer 
subject to government control in law or in fact. Therefore, they were granted individual 
treatment. 
Following the idea, recognizing the changes gained in China's economic reform, the rule 
of individual treatment has been confirmed in numerous U. S. anti-dumping cases. On the 
contrary, the EU authorities have systematically refused to grant individual treatment to 
Chinese exporters, even to China-foreign joint ventures. From this point of view, we can 
see that though both the U. S. and the EU have similar provision for individual treatment 
in law, the way they apply it makes a significant difference to the outcomes. 
As to other developed countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan, their 
anti-dumping authorities grant individual treatment automatically to Chinese exports to 
determine their respective duty rate in anti-dumping proceedings. 
From the above analysis, it is apparent that the EU adopts an overly strict approach to 
apply individual treatment to Chinese exporters. It not only unreasonably exerts an extra 
burden of proof on them, but also is likely to bring out rather high an&dumping duty as a 
result of the investigation. 
91 JIanyu Wang, fn 65 above at p 139. 
92 Silicon carbide from the People's Republic of China, U. S. Federal 
Register, Vol. 59,2 May 1994, p. 
22587. 
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Conclusion. 
This chapter compares the anti-dumping legislation (towards NMEs and EIT) of the EU 
and the U. S., Australia, New Zealand and Japan. It indicates the differences between the 
EU and the other four countries' anti-dumping rules by analysing them from both legal and 
practical aspects (see Table 5.1). It particularly focuses on the different methods and 
attitudes that these countries take when they determine normal values and anti-dumping 
duties towards the People's Republic of China as a transitional economy in anti-dumping 
investigations. 
Table 5.1. Summary of the different approaches to anti-dumping legislation applicable to 
China. 
Country EU U. S. Australia N Z93 Japan 
Determination of Default 
94 ACM95 CVM+SCM ACM MET SCM 
Normal Value Exception 96 MET MET MET 97 MET 98 
Determination of Default OCODR IT IT IT IT 
AD duty Exception IT 
In summary, compared with the EU, the U. S. Australia, New Zealand and Japan have 
adopted less stringent but more practical approach towards imports from China through 
93 N. Z: New Zealand. 
94 If Chinese exporters do not apply or fail to reach certain criteria, such a methodology will be applied 
automatically. 
95 ACM: analogue country method; SCM: surrogate country method; CVM: constructed value method; 
MET: market economy treatment; OCODR: one country one duty rule; IT: individual treatment. 
96 Exception here means those methods applied as exceptions rather than rules by anti-dumping 
authorities, because exporters bear the burden of proof, and it is very difficult for them to meet the 
criteria. 
97 Under Australian anti-dumping law, Chinese exporters bear the burden of proof to get MET. 
However, the law provides more specific and practical criteria so that most Chinese exporters can get 
MET in investigations of recent years. 
98 Japanese anti-dumping law does not grant MET to Chinese exporters automatically. However, 
Japanese authority adopts a more flexible and less stringent approach to assess Chinese exporters 
econornic status in anti-dumping proceedings. 
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their anti-dumping legislation. 
1. They have much more detailed provisions in anti-dumping investigations, which 
match the complexity of the broad spectrum of transitional economies. That is to say, 
under the law, normal values of exports from specific industries which developed at 
an advanced economic level in a transitional economy can be determined with more 
accuracy. 
2. They have more substantive and procedural rules regulating their authority's practice 
in anti-dumping investigations. The authorities are endowed with less discretion while 
determining dumping and injury. According to the laws, they are required to examine 
more essential facts before reaching a conclusion, and this brings out a more accurate 
and reasonable judgement in anti-dumping investigations. 
3. They apply the new approaches 99 to Chinese exports more often than the EU at least 
from a statistical point of view. In other words, the new treatment is adopted by these 
four countries as a rule rather than exceptions in practice. As a result, more Chiriese 
companies have been granted MET and individual treatment in anti-dumping 
investigations. This fact shows that the amended law actually meets its target, i. e. to 
match the favourable changes achieved in China's economic reform. 
In short, this chapter makes an effort to understand the most appropriate approaches to 
determine normal values and dumping duties for Chinese exports in anti-dumping 
investigations. Therefore, by analyzing other developed countries' antiýdumping policy 
towards China, it provides a necessary and comprehensive study for the conclusion of 
this thesis, which will set out proposals on certain key issues in the EU's current 
anti-dumping legislation applicable to exports from the People's Republic of China. 
99 i. e. conditional MET and individual treatment. 
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Annex 
Table 5.2. Anti-Dumping: Initiations: by reporting party from 01/01/95 to 30/06/01 
Reporting Party 1995 19961 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Totals 
Argentina 27 221 15 8 24 45 10 151 
Australia 5 171 42 13 241 15 to 126 
Brazil 5 18 11 18 16 11 3 82 
Canada 11 5 14 8 18 21 23 100 
Chile 4 3 0 2 0 5 0 14 
Colombia 4 1 1 6 2 3 0 17 
Costa Rica 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 6 
Czech Republic 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 3 
Ecuador 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Egypt 0 0 7 12 5 1 0 25 
European Community 33 25 41 22 65 31 13 230 
Guatemala 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
India 6 21 13 27 65 41 16 189 
Indonesia 0 11 5 8 10 3 1 38 
Israel 5 6 3 7 0 1 2 24 
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Korea, Rep. of 4 13 15 3 6 2 3 46 
Malaysia 3 2 8 1 2 0 0 16 
Mexico 4 4 6 12 11 7 1 45 
New Zealand 10 4 5 1 4 10 1 35 
Nicaragua 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Panama 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Peru 2 7 2 3 8 1 0 23 
Philippines 1 1 2 3 6 2 0 15 
Poland 0 0 1 0 7 0 0 
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Reporting Party 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Totals 
Sl i - - oven a 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
S th Af i ou r ca 16 33 23 41 16 1 21 5 155 
Th il d a an 0 1 3 0 01 0 1 5 
T i id - r n ad and To ago 0 1 0 4 31 1 0 
Turkey 0 0 4 1 8 2 1 16 
U. S. 14 22 15 36 47 47 39 220 
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 01 1 2 3 
Venezuela 3 21 6 10 7 1 30 
Totals for 01/01/95 - 30/06/01 157 224'1 243 2541 356 272 134 
Source: WTO Secretariat. 100 
Table 5.3 Anti-dumping (AD) investigations V measures taken by European Union, 
United States, Australia, New Zealand and Japan towards imports from China during I 
January 1995- 30 June 2002. 
Importing country AD investigations launched Definitive measures taken 
European Union 38 25 
United States 37 32 
Australia 14 3 
New Zealand 4 0 
Japan 0 0 
Sources: WTO Reports on anti-dumping (G/ADP/N series). WTO trade data. Author's 
computations. 
100 WTO Anti-Dumping Statistics, fn 19 above. 
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Table 5.4 New definitive anti-dumping measures (exclude reviews) taken and 
undertakings accepted during I January 1998 - 31 December 2002 against imports from China by European Union, United States, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. 
I ti P d , mpor ng 
countries 
ro uct Date of 
initiation 
Definitive duty Effective 
date 
European Steel ropes and cables 20.05.99-- 60.4% 17.08.99 
Union Hot-rolled flat products of 
non-alloy steel 
13.05.99 8.1% net 
free-at-Cty-frontier 
price , 
before duty 
10.08.2000 
Malleable cast iron tube or pipe 
fittings 
29.05.99 49.4% 18.08.2000 
Electronic weighing scales 16.09.99 0-30.7% 30.11.2000 
Coke of coal in pieces with 
diameter of more than 80 mm 
16.09.99 equal to fixed amount 
of EUR 32.6 per tonne 
of dry net weight 
15.12.2000 
Aluminium foil 
' 
18.02.2000 
- 
15% 17.05.2001 
Colour television receivers 71 . 
04.2000 24,5-44,6%, 
undertakings accepted 
29.08.2002 
integrated electronic compact 
fluorescent lamps 
17-05-2000 0,0-66,1% 19.07.2001 
Ferro-molybdenum 9.11.2000 22.5% 6.2.2002 
Zinc oxides 20.12.2000 6-28% 5.3.2002 
Sulphanilic acid 6.7.2001 21% 25.7.2002 
United States Preserved Mushrooms 02.02.98 154-198% 19.02.99 
Creatine Monohydrate 10.03.99 0.00-50.32% 04.02.00 
Aspirin 23.06.99 16.51-144.02% 11.07.00 
Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate 25.06.99 20.64-23.54% 27.09.00 
Concentrated Apple Juice 06.07.99 0.00-51.74% 05.06.00 
Synthetic Indigo 28.07.99 79.7-129.6% 19.06.00 
Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars 25-7.2000 133.00% 07.09.01 
Foundry Coke 17.10-00 76.19-214.89% 17.09.01 
Honey 26.10.00 25.88-183.80% 10.12.01 
Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon 
Steel Flat Products 
04.12.00 64.20-90.83% 29.11.01 
Pure Magnesium 14.11.00 24.67-305.56% 19.11.01 
Folding Gift Boxes 19.03.01 1.67-164.75% 08.01.02 
Automotive Replacement Glass 
Windshields 
27.03.01 3.71-124.50% 04.04.02 
Folding Metal Tables and 
Chairs 
24.05.01 0.00-70.71% 27.06.02 
Structural Steel Beams 20.06.01 15.23-89.17% 18.06.02 
Certain Circular Welded Carbon 
Quality Steel Pipe 
21.06.01 0.00-36.42% 24.05.02 
Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat 
Products 
26.10.01 105.35% 03.10.02 
Ferrovanadium 26.12.01 13.03-66.71% 29.11.02 
Australia Steel shelving kits 15.09.00 38-114% 
03.10.01 
Sodium metabisulfide 12.09.01 83% 
04.06.02 
New Zealand 
1 
-3 No new anti-dumping measure was taken towards China 
during I January 1998 
December 2002. 
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Japan No new anti-dumping measure was taken towards China during I January 1998-31 
December 2002. 
Sources: WTO Reports on anti-dumping (G/ADPN series). WTO trade data. Author's 
computations. 
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Chapter Six 
New Issues with regard to the EU's Anti-Dumping 
Practice towards Imports from China after the 
Latter's accession to the VffO 
Introduction 
Anti-dumping decisions of the European Union (EU) are made by the European 
Commission and Council. Under Article 230 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, the European Court of Justice has the jurisdiction to review the legality of 
acts of the Council and the Commission. An application can be lodged by a Member State, 
the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an 
essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating 
to its application, or misuse of powers. If a measure is of direct and individual concern to 
a natural or legal person, he can challenge it before the Court as well. ' 
In the field of anti-dumping, the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to hear such 
2 
applications. Therefore, before China entered the World Trade Organisation (WTO), if 
there was any dispute relating to the EU's anti-dumping measures imposed on Chinese 
exports, these decisions could be challenged before the Court of First Instance by Chinese 
exporters, European importers or complainants under Article 23 0.3 
I Para. I of Art. 230 (ex Art. 173), Treaty establishing the European Community. 
2 Ivo Van Bael & Jean-Francois Bellis, Anti-Dumping and other Trade Protection Laws of the EC 3rd 
edn. (Bicester: CCH Europe, 1996) at p 10. 
3, The case law of the Court has now developed to the point where it may 
be said that, as a general rule, 
complainants, exporters and importers have standing under 
Article 173', Ivo Van Bael & 
Jean-Francois Bellis. fn 2 above at p 330. 
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Since the first anti-dumping investigation against Chinaý was initiated by the EU in 
August 1979, six measures relating to Chinese exports have been challenged before the 
Court of First Instance. Among these cases, two were brought by European importers 
against the European Commission and the Council, and the contested Regulations were 
declared to be invalid in both cases. 5 However, as to the other four measures challenged 
by Chinese exporters (including two Hong Kong exporters), 6 all of them failed. 
It is interesting to note that only cases brought by European exporters have been 
successful, and it could be argued therefore that the Court reflects the trade interests of the 
EU itself. It is also recognized that, in practice, the Court is unwilling to interfere in the 
7 detailed determinations of the Commission and the Council. 
China entered the WTO on II December 200 1. This changes the processes and 
procedures of the settlement of anti-dumping disputes with EU, because now China is 
entitled to the rights for WTO developing country Members. In the context of WTO 
membership, new issues and disputes may arise with regard to the EU's antimdumping 
practice. First, under the WTO trade and legal system, the EU bears the obligation in 
anti-dumping proceedings to treat China in a way consistent with the GATT and WTO 
laws from both a procedural and substantive prospectives. Second, China enjoys the 
4 80/1116/EEC: Commission Decision of 4 December 1980 accepting undertakings offered by the 
exporters of saccharin and its salts originating in China and the 
United States of America and 
terminating the proceedings concerning imports of saccharin and its salts from China, 
Japan and the 
United States of America. OJ 1980 L 331/41. 
5 Case 16/90, Detlef Nblle, trading as 'Eugen N61le' v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen, ECR 1991 
1-05163. Case 358/89, Extramet Industrie SA v Council of the European Communities, ECR 
1992 
1-03813. 
6 Case 75/92, Gao Yao (Hong Kong) Hua Fa Industrial Co. Ltd v Council of the European 
Union, ECR 
1994 1-03141. Case 161/94, Sinochem Heilongjiang v Council of the European 
Union, ECR 1996 
11-00695. Case 155/94, Climax Paper Converters Ltd v Council of the European 
Union, ECR 1996 
11-00873. Case 170/94, Shanghai Bicycle Corporation v Council of the 
European Union, ECR 1997 
11-01383. 
7 Ivo Van Bael & Jean-Francois Bellis, fn 2 above at p 335. 
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special and differential treatment for developing countries provided by the WTO 
agreements. Third, the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO is based on the 
principle that any Member can challenge trade measures taken by any other Member, so 
that even those countries that are economically weak can challenge the more 
economically powerful. 8 Therefore, China can make use of the system to solve disputes 
with other Members. 
This chapter examines these issues in four sections. It analyzes the special and differential 
treatment provisions contained in the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) and the 
Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes (DSU). 
Section one analyzes Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which provides a 
developed country Member's obligation to actively consider the possibility of 
constructive remedies prior to imposition of an anti-dumping measure that would affect 
the essential interests of a developing country. In order to explain its implications in 
practice, the interpretation given by the WTO Panel in the Indian Bed Linen case is 
analyzed. 9 
In the second part, I illustrate the special and differential treatment for developing and 
least-developed country Members under the WTO dispute settlement system. 
Corresponding provisions are contained in the DSU, including Article 3(12), Article 4 
(10), Article 8(10), Article 12(l 0), Article 12(11), Article 21.2,21(7) and 21(8), Article 
8 Julio lacarte-Muro & Petina Gappah, 'Developing Countries and the WTO Legal and Dispute 
Settlement System: a View from the Bench' (2000) 3(3) Journal of International Economic Law, 395 
at p 395. 
91 European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India", 
Report of the Panel, WTO document code: WT/DS141/R. Available by searching through 
<http: //docsonIine. wto. org/gen_search. asp> (I December 2002). 
235 
24 and Article 27(2) of the DSU. In this part, I also analyze the application of the DSU in 
the context of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
Two types of foreseeable EU-China anti-dumping disputes after China's accession to the 
WTO are enumerated in the third section. They include disputes involving normal value 
calculation for the imports in question, and disputes based on the EU's practice of use-out 
domestic data and zeroing methodology in its anti-dumping investigations. 
In the last part of the chapter, I indicate the potential difficulties for China to invoke the 
WTO special and differential treatment provisions to protect its trade interests against the 
EU's anti-dumping decisions. Generally speaking, these are also the difficulties that other 
developing countries face when they try to seek proper dispute settlements under DSU 
and other WTO laws. 
In short, this chapter focuses on new issues that may arise with regard to the EU's 
anti-dumping practice towards China. It illustrates the WTO special and differential 
treatment provisions that China may invoke after its accession to the WTO, and several 
foreseeable disputes that may arise in future. In this way, it deepens the study of this 
thesis from a prospective point of view. 
1. Article 15 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. 10 
A. General introduction. 
Article 15 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that: 
It is recognized that special regard must be given by developed country 
Members to the 
10 WTO Anti-Dumping refers to the Agreement on Implementation of 
Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. 
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special situation of developing country Members when considering the application of 
anti-dumping measures under this Agreement. 
Possibilities of constructive remedies provided for by this Agreement shall be explored 
before applying anti-dumping duties where they would affect the essential interests of 
developing country Members. 
The number of anti-dumping measures against imports from developing countries and the 
adverse effects of these measures have increased. Thereforeq WTO developing country 
Members have emphasized that Members should take any anti-dumping action with care 
and responsibility, and ensure that any such action should be in compliance with the 
Agreement, so as not to disrupt trade between Members unnecessarily. " Based on this 
idea, particular attention was given to Article 15 of the WTO An&Dumping Agreement 
in the WTO Doha 4th Ministerial Conference in 2001. During the session, it was 
emphasized that Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is a mandatory provision, 
and the modalities for its application would benefit from clarification. In the meantime, 
the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices was instructed, through its working group on 
Implementation, to examine this issue and to draw up appropriate recommendations 
within twelve months on how to operationalize this provision. 12 
11 1 Concerns Regarding Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and 
Decisions', WTO document code: WT/COMTD/W/66. Available by searching through 
<http: //docsonline. wto. org/gen_search. asp> (I December 2002). 
12 , WTO Ministerial Conferences - Doha 4th Ministerial - Implementation-Related 
Issues and 
Concerns, Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declarations and Decisions', WTO document 
code: WT/MIN(O 1)/DEC/I 7. Available 
from: 
<http: //www. wto. org/wto/english/thewto-e/minist-e/minO I _e/mindecl_implementation_e. 
htm> 
December 2002). 
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B. Interpretation of Article 15 in the Indian bed linen case 
The Indian Bed Linen case is a good example to analyze Article 15. First, the WTO Panel 
interpreted the provision in great detail, which gives important reference and guidance to 
its future application. Second, India's claim based on the rule was sustained. The WTO 
Panel decision is beneficial to the Indian textile industry, which is crucial to the country's 
economy. Third, this case has had a great influence. It has led to several amendments of 
the EU's anti-dumping regulations. ' 4 The chain of events and culminating acts are unique 
in the legal history of the European Community 15 and also rather rare in that of the 
WTO. 16 
Furthermore, it is significant to examine The Indian Bed Linen case when we analyze the 
future application of Article 15 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement by China. India is 
a huge developing country among WTO Members, with a high percentage of linen and 
textile among its exports. China is in the same situation as India at this point, so the WTO 
ruling is an important reference to similar cases involving China in the future. 
13 'European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India', 
fn 9 above. 
14 Regulation (EC) 2398/97 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties against imports of bed linen 
originating in India, Egypt and Pakistan, OJ 1997 L332/1, as last amended by Regulation (EC) 
554/2000, OJ 2000 L68/1. 
Council Regulation (EC) 1644/2001 of August 7,2001 amending Regulation (EC) 2398/97 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton type bed linen originating in Egypt, India and 
Pakistan and suspending its application with regard to imports originating in India, OJ 2000 L219/1. 
15 Since 'European Community' and 'European Communities' are used in the WTO documents 
relating to dispute settlement, I will use these terms rather than the 'European 
Union (EU)' when I 
analyze the Indian Linen case in this chapter. 
16 Dan Horovitz, 'International Trade (Editorial) A Regulated Scope for E. U. Compliance with WTO 
Rulings', (2001) 7(6) Int. T. L. R., 153 at p 153. 
238 
1. Background. 
On 28 November 1997, the European Community adopted Council Regulation (EC) No 
2398/97, imposing final anti-dumping duties on imports of cotton--type bed linen from 
India. 17 The Indian government thought that the measure was inconsistent with the WTO 
Anti-Dumping Agreement, and its due benefits under the WTO Agreement had been 
nullified or impaired as a result. Therefore, on 3 August 1998, it requested consultations 
with the European Community pursuant to Article 4 of the DSU, Article XXIII of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ('GATT 1994') and Article 17 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement. ' 8 
On 18 September 1998 and 15 April 1999, India and the European Community held 
consultations in Geneva, but they failed to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of the 
matter. According to Article XXIII: 2 of GATT 1994, Article 6 of the DSU and Article 17 
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, India requested the establishment of a Panel to examine 
the matter on 7 September 1999.19 Based on the request, the Dispute Settlement Body 
established a Panel on 27 October 1999.20 
In India's submission to the Panel, it requested that the Panel find that the an6clumping 
measure taken by the European Communities violated many provisions of the WTO 
17 Council Regulation (EC) 2398/97 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties against imports of bed 
linen originating in India, Egypt and Pakistan, OJ 1997 L332/1 
18 'European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed-Linen from India 
- Request for Consultations from India', WTO document code: WT/DS 141 /1. Available by searching 
through <http: //docsoniine. wto. org/gen_search. asp> (I December 2002). 
19 , European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bedlinen from India - 
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by India', WTO document code: WT/DS 141/3. Available by 
searching through <http: //docsonIine. wto. org/gen_search. asp> (I December 2002). 
20 , European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bedlinen from India - 
Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of India - Note by the Secretariat', WTO 
document code: WT/DS 141/4. Available by searching through 
<http: //docsonline. wto. org/gen_search. asp> (I December 2002). 
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Anti-Dumping Agreement such as Article 15, under which, India claimed, the EC failed 
to explore possibilities of constructive remedies before imposing anti-dumping duties, as 
the rule requires. 
Here, I should indicate that The Indian Bed Linen case is rather complex as a whole, and 
the proceeding is ongoing. The WTO ruling is not only based on the consideration of 
Article 15, but also other provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 21 For the purposes 
of this chapter, I will only examine India's claim under Article 15, and the corresponding 
interpretation given by the WTO Panel. 
2. Understanding of the first sentence of Article 15 of the WTO Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. 
The first sentence provides: 'It is recognized that special regard must be given by 
developed country Members to the special situation of developing country Members 
when considering the application of anti-dumping measures under this Agreement. ' 
India argued that this sentence states a preference that the special situation of developing 
countries should be an element to be weighed when a developed country makes that 
evaluation. Therefore, the first part of Article 15 does not impose any specific legal 
obligation. 22 Both the Panel and the EU agreed with this interpretation. 
3. Understanding of the second sentence of Article 15. 
The second sentence provides that 'possibilities of constructive remedies provided for by 
this Agreement shall be explored before applying anti-dumping duties where they would 
21 In the first submission of India of 6 March 2000, India claims 31 inconsistencies of the EU's 
practice with the WTO Anti -Dumping Agreement. 
22 6.2 1, 'European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen 
from 
India', fn 9 above. 
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affect the essential interests of developing country Members. ' 
India's claims under Article 15 are mainly based on this part of the provision. India 
indicated that the second sentence contains a stricter obligation than the first one, because 
it uses the word 'shall', which shows a clear and specific legal obligation to 'explore 
possibilities' by developed country Members. 
From this point of view, in its submission to the Panel, India first stressed the importance 
of the bed linen and textile industries to its economy as a developing country, and that the 
EU's anti-dumping duties would 'affect' these essential interests. However, the 
Commission did not even mention it, or consider the possibilities of constructive 
remedies. 23 
Second, India suggests that the reference to remedies provided for by the AntiDumping 
Agreement indicates that such remedies may consist in the non-imposition of 
anti-dumping measures or in the acceptance of an undertaking. Texprocil, the Cotton 
Textiles Export Promotion Council of India, acting on behalf of Indian producers and 
exporters, tried to offer price undertakings. However, these were rejected by the 
European Communities without substantive consideration. Therefore, India asserted that 
the European Communities acted inconsistently with Article 15 of the AntiDumping 
Agreement. 
4. WTO Panel's interpretation and recommendation. 
The Panel noted that both parties agree that the second sentence of Article 15 imposes 
legal obligations on developed country Members. With regard to India's first claims, 
there is no dispute that the application of anti-dumping duties would affect the essential 
interests of India as a developing country. As to the second point, however, both parties 
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disagreed on what constitutes 'constructive remedies provided for by this Agreement' and 
what is required by the obligation to 'explore' the 'possibilities' of such remedies. 24 
After examining the wording of the provision in the context of the WTO An&Dumping 
Agreement, the Panel disagreed with India's suggestion that a 'constructive remedy' 
might be a decision not to impose anti-dumping duties at all. Instead, it indicated that 
imposition of a lesser duty or acceptance of a price undertaking would constitute 
C 25 constructive remedies' within the meaning of Article 15 . 
The Panel further explained that Article 15 imposes no obligation to actually provide or 
accept any constructive remedy that may be identified and/or offered. 26 It does, however, 
impose an obligation to actively consider, with an open mind, the possibility of such a 
remedy prior to the imposition of an anti-dumping measure that would affect the essential 
interests of a developing country. 
Based on this understanding, the Panel pointed out that the key issue in this case is 
whether the EU authorities actively considered with an open mind the possibilities of 
price undertakings with Indian exporters prior to the imposition of final anti-dumping 
23 Recital 6.219, ibid. 
24 Recital 6.227, ibid. 
25 Recital 6.229, ibid. 
26 In footnote 92 of the Panel Report (ibid), it provided following explanation: We note that our 
interpretation of Art. 15 in this regard is consistent with that of a GATT Panel which considered the 
predecessor of that provision, Art. 13 of the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code, which provision is 
substantively identical to present Art. 15. That Panel found: 
'The Panel noted that if the application of anti-dumping measures 'would affect the essential interests of 
developing countries', the obligation that then arose was to explore the 'possibilities' of 'constructive 
remedies'. It was clear from the words 'possibilities' and 'explored' that the investigating 
authorities were not required to adopt constructive remedies merely because they were proposed. 
' 
EC - Imposition of Anti-Dumping 
Duties on Imports of Cotton Yarn from Brazil, Panel Report, 
ADP/ 13 7, adopted 30 October 1995, para. 5 84 (emphasis added). 
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measures in the bed linen investigation. 27 Due to the bare rejection of Texprocil's 
undertaking by the European Communities, the Panel found nothing would demonstrate 
that the EU had actively explored the possibilities of constructive remedies. Therefore, 
the EU failed to act consistently with its obligations under Article 15 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement. 28 
C. Article 15 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and China 
From the Indian Bed Linen case, it is clear that 'constructive remedy' does not refer to 
complete elimination of anti-dumping duties. However, imposition of a lesser duty, a 
price undertaking or other acceptable actions might be adopted as a 'constructive remedy' 
within the context of Article 15. 
In recent years, if Chinese products are found to have been dumped in an&dumping 
investigations, anti-dumping duties will be imposed subsequently regardless 
undertakings offered by exporters. In fact, statistics shows that from 1990, the 
Commission seldom accepts undertakings proposed by Chinese exporters. It gives the 
reason that undertakings are not normally accepted from companies operating in NMEs 
due to the high risk of circumvention . 
29However, such argument hardly can be justified 
under WTO trade laws. 
China entered the WTO on II December 2001 as a developing country. Therefore, in 
future anti-dumping proceedings initiated by developed country Members such as the EU, 
it is entitled to the special treatment provided by Article 15. This will make a welcome 
27 Recital 6.234, ibid. 
28 Recital 6.238, ibid. 
29 Council Regulation (EC) No 393/98 of 16 February 1998 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on imports of stainless steel fasteners and parts thereof originating 
in the People's Republic of China, 
India, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand, OJ 1998 L50/1. 
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difference for China in anti-dumping proceedings launched by WTO developed country 
Members, including EU's obligation to consider the acceptance of undertaldngs offered 
by Chinese producers. 
In the EU's anti-dumping investigations in the past, the Commission never mentioned 
China's status as a developing country. But it has to do so now, and to further explore 
possibilities of constructive remedies. Otherwise, it will be regarded as a violation of 
Article 15 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
IL The WTO Dispute Settlement System. 
'Dispute settlement system is generally considered to be one of the cornerstones of the 
multilateral trade order. ' 30 As a great success of the Uruguay Round and the 
establishment of the WTO, it has been significantly strengthened and streamlined through 
the DSU. 31 
The WTO dispute settlement system ensures that commitments and obligations 
negotiated and agreed upon will be respected and enforced. In case of disputes which may 
arise in the course of implementing WTO agreements, it does not impose new obligations, 
but it does enforce those already agreed by providing Members with a clear legal 
framework to achieve a desirable solution. 
The WTO dispute settlement system is able to protect weaker Members against unilateral 
action by the strongest under DSU and other WTO laws. Therefore, after China's 
accession to the WTO, it can resort to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism to claim its due 
30 ,A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round', 
<http: //www. wto. org/english/docs-e/legal_e/ursum-e. htm#Understanding> (I December 2002). 
31 Annex 2, to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO in the Results of the Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts GATT/WTO Secretariat, 
Geneva (1994). 
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rights in trade disputes against other Members. Furthermore, as a developing country, 
China is entitled to the special and differential treatment for developing countries 
provided by the DSU on a procedural level, together with those substantive rules offered 
in WTO Agreements contained in Annex I to the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization. 
What are the basic requirements and rules of DSU? What are provisions of the special and 
differential treatment for developing country Members contained in the DSU? How does 
China invoke them to settle disputes in case of anti-dumping proceedings initiated by 
developed country Members such as the EU? I will answer these questions in the 
following part. 
A. Brief introduction to the Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). 
The DSU is a horizontal WTO agreement. It sets up procedures for solving disputes 
which may arise among WTO Members in the implementation of different WTO 
32 
agreements. For this purpose, a Dispute Settlement Body includes representatives of all 
WTO Members and is established to be responsible for the management of the DSU. It is 
empowered to establish Panels of experts to examine a case, adopt Panel and Appellate 
Body reports, monitor the implementation of Panel recommendations and authorize the 
suspension of concessions when a country does not comply with a ruling. 
33 
The DSU emphasizes that Members shall not themselves make determinations of 
violations or suspend concessions, but shall make use of the 
dispute settlement system. 
So, it specifies detailed time-frames and procedures throughout the whole process of 
32 Art. 1 (1), Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes. 
33 Art. 2 (1), Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes. 
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dispute settlement, including consultation, Panel recommendation and Appellate 
review. 34 It also sets out rules for compensation or the suspension of concessions in the 
event of non- implementation. In the meantime, as an important feature of the DSU, it 
provides a number of provisions taking into account the specific interests of the 
developing and the least-developed country Members. 
B. Special and differential treatment provisions for developing and the 
least-developed countries contained in the DSU. 
The DSU has established a number of provisions in accordance with special and 
differential treatment for developing and the least-developed country Members with 
regard to dispute settlement. They include Article 3(12), Article 4(10), Article 8(10), 
Article 12(10), Article 12(11), Article 21(2), 21(7) and 21(8), Article 24 and Article 27(2) 
of the DSU. 
1. Article 3(12) 
Article 3(12) of DSU provides when a developing country Member brings a complaint 
against a developed country Member under a relevant WTO agreement, it has the right to 
invoke the provisions contained in the Decision of 1966 
35 as an alternative to those of the 
DSU. In case of conflicts of the two sets of rules, the Decision of 1966 will precede. 
However, Article 3(12) has never been invoked by any developing country Member 
because the new rules offer similar or even better treatment in practice. 
36 
34 'WTO Settling Disputes, the Panel Process', 
<http: //www. wto. org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif e/disp2_e. 
htm> (I December 2002). 
35 Decision of 5 April 1966 on Procedures under Art. XXIII, 
BISD 14S/l 8. 
36 Mary E. Footer, 'International Trade Developing Country Practice 
in the Matter of WTO Dispute 
Settlement', (2001) 35(l) J. W. T., 55 at p 63. 
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2. Articie 4 (10) 
It stipulates that Members should give special attention to particular problems and 
interests of developing country Members during consultations. 
3. Article 8(10) 
It relates to the composition of the Panel. It enables a developing Member, upon its 
request, to have at least one of the three Panel members from a developing country 
Member in case of disputes with developed country Members. This provision is well 
observed, under which developing country Member's interests can be better considered. 
4. Article 12 
Under Article 12(10), sufficient time must be given to a developing country 
Member to prepare its argument when it is a defendant in a dispute. 
Article 12(11) provides that the Panel should explicitly indicate the relevant 
provisions of special and differential treatment contained in the agreements that have 
been raised. 
5. Article 21. 
Article 21.2 asks for particular attention to be paid to matters affecting developing 
countries with regard to the surveillance of the Dispute 
Settlement Body 
recommendations. 
This Article was invoked in the Indonesian Automobile case in July 
1998,37 in which 
'; 7 Indonesia - Certain Measures 
Affecting the Automobile Industry, complaint by the European 
Community, WTO document code: WT/DS54/R. Available 
by searching through 
<http: //docsonIine. wto. org/gen_search. asp> (I December 
2002) 
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Indonesia's request for an extension of extra six months to implement the rulings of the 
Dispute Settlement Body was supported. 
Article 21(7): 'If the matter is one which has been raised by a developing country 
Member, the Dispute Settlement Body shall consider what further action it might take 
which would be appropriate to the circumstances. ' 
Article 21(8) requires the Dispute Settlement Body to consider not only the trade 
coverage of measures complained of, but also their impact on the economy of 
developing country Members concerned before it decides what appropriate action 
might be taken. 
6. Article 24: Special Procedures Involving LeastDeveloped Country Members 
Article 24.1 asks for particular consideration to be given to the special situation of the 
least-developed countries (LDCs) and due restraint to be exercised towards them by 
developed country Members in dispute settlement proceedings. 
Article 24.2 provides where consultations involving an LDC have not been successful, 
special procedures such as the intermediation of the WTO Director-General can be 
introduced before a Panel is established. 
However, since no LDC has been involved in WTO disputes so far, Article 24 has never 
beeninvoked. 38 
38 M. E. Footer, fn 36 at p 73. 
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7. Article 27(2) 
Article 27(2) specifies the WTO Secretariat's obligation to provide additional legal 
advice and assistance or a qualified legal expert from the WTO technical cooperation 
services to any developing country Member at its request in respect of dispute settlement. 
However, such legal assistance is not satisfactory from the developing country Members' 
point of view. They consider that its quality and quantity is insufficient. 
Based on the above description, it is clear that, in theory, developing country and 
least-developed country Members' interests are given special consideration in dispute 
settlement proceedings under the DSU. However, the developed country Members' 
performance in practice is far from satisfactory as to this point, mainly because most of 
the special and differential treatment provisions in the DSU are too general and loose to 
become compulsory. So, there is a need and trend for the improvement of the DSU with 
regard to special and differential treatment to developing country and least-developed 
country Members. 
This is an interesting issue, but as it is not relevant to this thesis, it will not be explained 
further. What I want to stress through the above illustration is that after China's accession 
to the WTO, it can make use of these special and differential treatment provisions of DSU 
in cases of anti-dumping disputes against a developed Member such as the EU. In spite of 
the existing deficiencies of the DSU, China will benefit more and more from the WTO 
dispute settlement system following its reform and improvement. 
C. Application of the Dispute Settlement Understanding under the WTO 
Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
Article 17 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement is about Consultation and Dispute 
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Settlement. Article 17.1 establishes the general principle that the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding is applicable to anti-dumping disputes. 
However, it is noticeable that Article 17.6 provides a special standard of review by Panels 
in examining disputes in anti-dumping cases with regard to both matters of fact and 
questions of interpretation of the Agreement. As to the establishment of facts, if it was 
found proper and the evaluation was unbiased during a Member's anti-dumping 
investigation, even though the Panel might have reached a different conclusion, the 
evaluation shall not be overturned. In addition, a Panel's interpretation of a provision of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement according to customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law39 shall also be in conformity with the Agreement. When a provision in 
question has several permissible interpretations, if the one on which the antýdumping 
authority's measure is based is consistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, then the 
Panel must adopt this very interpretation. 
This provision may limit the Panel's power in the WTO dispute settlement process, and 
there has some controversy about its side effects . 
40 Nevertheless, such a review defends 
factual decisions and legal interpretations of national authorities, and is intended to 
prevent dispute settlement Panels from making decisions purely based on their own 
views. 
39 Arts. 31 & 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
40 Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, 'International Law WTO Dispute Settlement in the Field of Anti-Dumping 
Law', (1998) 1(2) J. I. E. L. pp. 259-276. 
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Ifl. Foreseeable EU-China anti-dumping disputes after China's 
accession to the WTO. 
There are two types of disputes which are likely to arise in the EU's antimdumping 
proceedings involving Chinese products. The first one relates to the implementation of 
the Protocol published upon China's accession to the WTO (Protocol) 41 which contains 9 
provisions governing other WTO Members' practice to determine normal values of 
imports from China without using price information from China in anti-dumping 
investigations. The second kind of disputes are those already in existence but have not 
been settled properly yet. 42 Due to China's WTO membership, these issues can now get a 
clear solution under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and relevant special and 
differential treatment provisions for developing and least-developed country Members. 
A. Disputes based on provisions of normal value calculation contained in 
the Protocol upon China's accession to the WTO (Protocol). 
New EU-China anti-dumping issues may arise under the Protocol. In the 'Report of the 
working party on the accession of China', 43 China agreed that other WTO Members may 
not adopt the domestic prices or costs of Chinese products to determine their normal 
values in anti-dumping investigations. 44 As a part of the report, the 'draft protocol on the 
accession of the People's Republic of China' provides that: 
The importing WTO Member may use a methodology that is not based on a strict 
41 , Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China', I October 2001. WTO 
document code: 
WT/ACC/CHN/49. Available by searching through <http: //docsoniine. wto. org/gen_search. asp> (I 
December 2002). 
42 They will be analyzed later in this chapter. 
43 , Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China', fn 41 above. 
44 Fn 41 at p 79. 
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comparison with domestic prices or costs in China if the producers under investigation 
cannot clearly show that market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing 
45 the like product with regard to manufacture, production and sale of that product . 
It is agreed that the above provision will be valid for 15 years after China entered the 
WTO. 46 This concession was made by China as part of the conditions on its accession. 
Under the legislation, the EU's analogue country method of determining the normal 
values for Chinese products is explicitly legalized until its provision expires. However, 
China also specifies the following requirements in order to prevent other WTO Members 
from abusing their rights: 
(a) The WTO Member which initiates the anti-dumping investigation shall establish and 
publish in advance the criteria for determining whether the application of market 
economy treatment (MET) is appropriate and the methodology in determining price 
comparability. (Summary of the original text. ) 
(b) The importing WTO Member should ensure that it had notified its 
market-economy criteria and its methodology for determining price comparability 
to the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices before they were applied. 
47 
(c) The process of investigation should be transparent and su icient opportunities 
should be given to Chinese producers or exporters to make comments, especially 
comments on the application of the methodology 
for determining price 
comparability in a particular case. 
48 
45 Section 15. a. (ii), 'Draft Protocol', ibid. 
46 Section 15. d, ibid. 
47 Recital 15 1, 'Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
China', fn 41 above. 
48 Ibid. 
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(d) The importing WTO Member should give notice of information which it 
required and provide Chinese producers and exporters an ample opportunity to 
present evidence in writing in a particular case. 49 
(e) The importing WTO Member should provide Chinese producers and exporters a 
full opportunity for the defence of their interests in a particular case. 50 
(f) The importing WTO Member should provide a sufficiently detailed reasoning of 
its preliminary and final determinations in a particular case. 51 
In summary, these six requirements ask for more consideration to be given to Chinese 
producer interests, and more transparency for both the anti-dumping proceedings and the 
anti-dumping authority's decisions when WTO Members use other methodologies rather 
than the Chinese product's domestic prices to determine their normal values. 
However, examining these provisions carefully, two issues stand out. First, they use 
'should' rather than 'shall' in the wording, so they do not actually impose exact 
obligations on the WTO Members, strictly speaking. Second, their content is too general, 
with a lack of necessary definition and explanation. For example, subparagraph (e) 
stipulates that the importing WTO Member should provide Chinese producers and 
exporters a full opportunity for the defence of their interests in a particular case. However, 
it does not specify what constitutes a 'full opportunity'; the criteria given by an importing 
country and exporting country can be quite different due to their contrary interests in an 
anti-dumping proceeding. Likewise, subparagraph (f) asks for 'sufficiently detailed 
reasoning' of determination, but does not offer a detailed explanation. 
49 
Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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These problems will be reflected in anti-dumping investigations involving Chinese 
products after China's accession to the WTO. At that time, implementation of the 
aforementioned provisions may bring out new issues and disputes. As a result, EU's 
anti-dumping proceeding towards imports from China may become more complex than 
ever. Under such circumstances, both China and the EU may resort to the WTO dispute 
settlement system for a clear solution to discrepancies under the An&Dumping 
Agreement. 
B. Other disputes in EU-China anti-dumping proceedings that can be 
settled under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
Under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, if a Member considers that its due benefit is 
being nullified or impaired directly or indirectly by another Member, it may ask the 
Member for consultation or refer such matters to the Dispute Settlement Body. 52 In that 
case, the respondent country of the anti-dumping proceeding may build its claim on the 
ground that it finds the authority's measure is inconsistent with one or more provisions of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
In addition, there remain ambiguities in the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, and it still 
leaves room for significant differences in approach to the enforcement of antimdumping 
laws. These differences are likely to bring out disputes, because the investigating side and 
the respondent side may disagree about the approach, due to their respective interests. 
The respondent country may bring such disputes to the Dispute Settlement Body. 
53 
It is impossible to enumerate all anti-dumping disputes and their causes in this chapter. 
52 Art. 17, WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
53 M. Koulen, 'The New Anti-Dumping Code through its Negotiating History' in J. J. J. Bourgeois, 
F. Berrod, E. Gippini (eds), The Uruguay Round: A European Lawyers' Perspective (EUP: Brussels 
1996) 152 at p 195. 
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Therefore, only two of them will be examined here, both of which are likely to arise in 
respect of EU's anti-dumping practice against imports from China, and in which China 
may have solid reasons to support its claim under the WTO DSU and An6Dumping 
Agreement. 
1. Dispute over use-out domestic data methodology. 
Disputes over use-out domestic data methodology may only arise in cases of imports 
from China or other countries54 subject to the EU's conditional MET. 55 According to the 
EU's anti-dumping policy towards China, use-out domestic data methodology refers to 
the practice when a Chinese exporter A gets MET in an antiýdumping investigation 
(which means the normal values of the products will be based on their domestic sales 
56 prices). Instead of using the price elements of Company A, the authority will adopt the 
data from a third market economy (ME) to determine normal values for other Chinese 
exporters. 
In the EU's anti-dumping investigations in the past, Chinese exporters found use-out 
domestic data methodology extremely unacceptable, mainly because it is unreasonable 
both in theory and in practice, and it is likely to bring out artificially higher dumping 
margins and heavier anti-dumping measures as a result. 
a. Use-out domestic data methodology is unreasonable. 
54 Art. 1, Council Regulation (EC) No 2238/2000 of 9 October 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 
384/96 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European 
Community, OJ 2000 L257/2. 
55 Art. 2, Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98 of 27 April 1998 amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 
on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the 
European Community. OJ 
1998 L 128/18. 
56 This issue is fully illustrated in section 11 of chapter three. 
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In theory, the use-out domestic data methodology deliberately keeps the flaws of the EUs 
traditional analogue country method. The rationale for the analogue country method is 
based on the presumption that price information from non-market economies (NMEs) is 
unreliable due to strict state control. Therefore, data from a third ME will be used to 
calculate normal values for imports from NMEs, because they can reflect market signals 
better. As discussed in chapter three of this thesis, the analogue country method normally 
brings out artificially high dumping margins due to the actual differences in the 
development levels of two countries. In order to minimize such differences, Article 2 
(A)(7) of the EU's Anti-Dumping Regulation 57 provides that 'an appropriate market 
economy third country shall be selected in a not unreasonable manner'. However, the 
flaws of the analogue country method can be completely avoided if the authority adopts 
the domestic price from the Chinese company who get MET to calculate normal values 
for other Chinese exporters in the same anti-dumping investigation. Since the 
development levels of these enterprises in a country are quite similar, the price from the 
company who gets MET is the best reference to determine normal values for others. As a 
result, it will bring out dumping margins which are closest to fact in an&dumping 
investigations. 
Surprisingly, the EU authority refuses to do so and insists on applying the use-out 
domestic data methodology towards imports from China in anti-dumping investigations. 
58 
In an interview with an official of the EU trade Directorate General (DG), he explained 
that the authority's practice of the use-out domestic data methodology is consistent with 
the current Anti-Dumping Regulation . 
59First, the Regulation does not specify that the 
authority shall use one Chinese exporter's domestic price to determine normal values 
for 
57 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports 
from countries not members of the European Community, OJ 1996 
L 56/1. 
58 Interview with the Administer of the European Commission, DG Trade, 
Brussels, 12 July 2002. 
59 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96. 
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others if it gets MET. Second, in accordance with the legislation, a third ME is selected 
before the decision of MET is made by the Commission. Therefore, the Commission will 
not have enough time to calculate the normal value for other Chinese exporters again by 
using the domestic sales price of the company which gets MET. Besides, the Commission 
should ask the European industry to comment in that case, and it will make the 
proceeding take longer. At that stage, it is simply impossible to recalculate normal values 
for all other Chinese exporters. 
Chinese exporters may find the above theoretical explanation unacceptable. With regard 
to the first reason, it can argue that the EU's current legislation also does not explicitly 
prohibit the use of a company's price information as reference to others in an 
anti-dumping proceeding. With regard to another reason based on time sufficiency, it is 
clear that use of existing domestic price of the exporter who gets MET can rule out all 
inconvenience and difficulties to get similar information from a third economy, so it will 
actually save time and cost for the authority. 
b. Use-out domestic data methodology leads to artificially higher antidumping 
duties. 
As explained before, use-out domestic data methodology keeps the flaws of analogue 
country method, i. e. to maximize dumping margins of the imports concerned, so it will 
result in heavier anti-dumping measures to be imposed on Chinese products. 
In the Chinese fluorescent lamps case of 2001 '60 two 
Chinese exporting producers were 
granted MET, and some of the others requested the Commission to use the 
domestic sales 
prices of those two companies to determine the normal values of their products. 
However, 
60 Council Regulation (EC) No 1470/2001 of 16 July 2001 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty 
and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on 
imports of integrated electronic compact 
fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's Republic of China OJ 2001 L 195/8. 
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the Commission rejected the proposal on the ground that 
Article 2(7) of Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 provides that in the case of imports 
from countries like the PRC, the normal values are to be established on the basis of the 
price or constructed value in an ME third country unless an exporting producer meets 
the criteria set out in subparagraph (c) of paragraph 7 of that Article. 61 
Therefore, Mexico was selected as an analogue country in this case. As the result of 
use-out domestic data methodology, the two Chinese companies who got MET were 
found not to be dumped, while others were imposed with different anti-dumping duties as 
high as 66.1 percent. 
The issue whether use-out domestic data methodology is consistent with the WTO 
Anti-Dumping Agreement needs more detailed interpretation, and this can be achieved 
through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Since it is easy to find out that if the two 
Chinese companies' price information is adopted as reference to others exporters, a lesser 
duty could be concluded as the result of an anti-dumping investigation, the Chinese 
exporter's proposal might be supported under Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
Under that provision, if China can convince the dispute settlement authority that the 
imposition of anti-dumping duties will affect its essential interests, the EU will have the 
obligation to explore the possibility of constructive remedies, 
including the application of 
the use-out domestic data methodology which can bring out 
less anti-dumping duties. 
2. Dispute over the EU authority's zeroing methodology. 
Unlike disputes of use-out domestic data methodology, disputes on the 
EU authority's 
61 Recital 11, Council Regulation (EQ No 1470/200 1. (Emphasis not in original) 
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zeroing methodology may be put forward by any country when the EU authority adopts 
zeroing methodology in anti-dumping investigations to calculate dumping margins, i. e. 
make comparison between normal values and export prices of the imports in question. 
a. Concept and effect of zeroing methodology. 
The practice of 'zeroing' arises in situations where an investigating althority makes 
multiple comparisons of export price and normal value, and then aggregates the results 
of these individual comparisons to calculate a dumping margin for the product as a 
whole. 62 
Sometimes the imports in question include several modes of the products, so comparisons 
will be made for each mode at first, then the authority will get a total dumping amount by 
aggregating the outcomes of all comparisons. As the result of a single comparison, the 
export price may be either lower or higher than the normal value. It is called a 'negative' 
margin when the export price is higher than normal value. With regard to the European 
Communities' practice, it counts a negative margin as zero of the dumping amount in 
course of comparison, then arrives at the total dumping amount by aggregating the results 
of comparisons of all modes of imports. This is the so-called 'zeroing methodology'. 
As a result of such calculations, the overall dumping amount will be larger than it actually 
is, due to the exclusion of those negative dumped values (see Table 6.1). The authority 
will divide the total dumping amount by the value of all imports to get dumping margins. 
The larger dumping amount is, the higher the dumping margin will be. Since the zeroing 
method artificially increases the dumping amount, it results in a bigger dumping margin 
than the actual one. Consequently, a more sever anti-dumping measure may be imposed 
62 'European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type 
Bed Linen from India', 
fn 9 above at p 32. 
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on imports than is necessary (see Table 6.2). 
Table 6.1. 
Product mode Dumping amount (DA) 
1 $100 
-$50 
Table 6.2. If the total export value (EV) is $150, then 
Zeroing method 
Non-zeroing Method 
Total dumping amount (TDA) 
$100 + $0 = $100 
$100 - $50 = $50 
DA under zeroing method 
$100 
so 
Dumping Margin (TDA/EV) 
1001150 = 66.67 percent 
50/150 = 33.33 percent 
b WTO Panel's opinion towards zeroing methodology in the Indian Bed Linen 
case. 
63 
In the Indian Bed Linen case, the European Communities compared weighted averages of 
export prices and the normal value for each of several models or product types of bed 
linen. 64 The authority adopted the zeroing methodology to arrive at a total dumping 
amount, and then divided it by the value of the exports involved, including the value of 
those models for which the individual margin was negative. 
The EC's practice of zeroing methodology was challenged by India under Article 2(4)(2) 
of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. 65 India indicated that the use of the word 
63 6 European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India', 
fn 9 above at p 32. 
64 Council Regulation (EC) No 2398/97 of 28 November 1997 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan, OJ 1997 L 332/1. 
65 Art. 2. (4)(2) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides: 'Subject to the provisions governing fair 
comparison in [Article 2.4], the existence of margins of dumpin& during the investigation phase shall 
normally be established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a 
260 
ýaverage' and 'all' in Article 2(4)(2) clearly precludes excluding certain amounts from the 
calculation simply because they showed 'negative' dumping. Therefore, India argued that 
the practice of zeroing methodology is not consistent with the requirement set forth in 
Article 2(4)(2) that the comparison should take into account the 'weighted average of 
prices of all comparable export transactions'. 
According to Article 2 (4) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires that 'a fair 
comparison shall be made between the export price and the normal value', the Panel 
interpreted Article 2(4)(2) as obligating an investigating authority to make its 
determination in a way which fully accounts for the export prices on all comparable 
transactions. However, an overall dumping margin calculated on the basis of zeroing 
4negative' margins is not based on comparisons which fully reflect all comparable export 
prices. 
Based on the above points, the Panel concluded that the European Communities acted 
inconsistently with Article 2(4)(2) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in establishing the 
existence of margins of dumping on the basis of a methodology, which included zeroing 
negative price differences calculated for some models of bed linen. 66 As a result, in order 
to comply with the ruling and its WTO obligations linked to such rulings, the E. C. was 
obliged to take steps to rectify the illegality of the initial 1997 bed linen Regulation. 67 
weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of normal value 
and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis. A normal value established on a weighted jn 
average basis may be compared to prices of individual export transactions if the authorities nd a 
pattern of export prices which differ significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods, 
and if an explanation is provided as to why such differences cannot be taken into account 
appropriately by the use of a weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-transaction 
comparison. ' 
66 'European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type 
Bed Linen from 
India', fn 9 above at p 38. 
67 Council Regýlation (EC) No 160/2002 of 28 January 2002 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
2398/97 imposin a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in 
Egy. pt, India anTPakistan, and terminating the proceeding with regard to 
imports originating in 
Pakistan, OJ2002 L 26/1. 
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c. Disputes about zeroing methodology in future. 
Article 2(4)(2) of WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement provides for three possibilities to 
establish a dumping margin: 
A comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted 
average of prices of all comparable export transactions; 
A comparison of normal value and export prices on a 
transaction-to-transaction basis; or 
A comparison of the normal value established on a weighted average 
basis to prices of individual export transactions (in certain specific 
cases). 
In the Indian Bed Linen case, the European Communities applied the first option in 
establishing the dumping margin for Indian products, and its practice of the zeroing 
methodology was halted by the Panel. However, the WTO ruling does not limit the 
application of zeroing method in the second and the third options. This implies that in 
future anti-dumping proceedings, the EU authority will possibly not use the zeroing 
method when comparing a weighted average normal value with a weighted average of 
prices of all comparable export transactions, but alternatively, it may continue such a 
practice fo r comparisons of normal value and export prices on a 
transaction-to-transaction basis or comparison of the normal value established on a 
weighted average basis to prices of individual export transactions. 
If this happens in anti-dumping proceedings towards Chinese products, using the Indian 
Bed Linen case as a good example, China may ask for a clear interpretation and ruling 
through the dispute settlement system under the WTO DSU and Anti-Dumping 
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Agreement. 
More and more disputes based on different reasons will come up in the EU's 
anti-dumping proceedings concerning imports from China. What I have analyzed above 
are just two of them, which are very likely to be put forth by China and to be settled under 
the DSU after her accession to the WTO. 
IV. Potential difficulties for China to invoke VVTO laws to protect 
its interests against EUs anti-dumping decisions. 
With WTO membership, China now can make use of special and differential treatment 
provisions contained in the Anti-Dumping Agreement and DSU to protect its trade 
interests and settle disputes occurring in the EU's anti-dumping proceedings. However, 
difficulties may arise when such an attempt is made. Generally speaking, these are 
common to many developing countries, and they are reasons why only a small number of 
cases are presented by developing country Members under DSU and other WTO laws. 68 
A. Shortage of necessary human resources. 
A developing country such as China lacks the necessary human resources and 
administrative structures to detect possible inconsistencies with WTO agreements and 
then to maximize their use of the WTO dispute settlement system effectively. It is noticed 
that the most frequent users of the dispute settlement system have extensive human and 
financial resources to bring and defend complaints. They cooperate with export 
interest 
groups very well, and they have global commercial and diplomatic representation, which 
68 4 Up to September 2000, only 53 claims were presented by developing countries among total 
207 
requests for consultations'. 
Jose Luis Perez Gabilondo, 'International Trade Developing Countries 
in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Procedures'. (2001) 35(4) J. W. T., 483. 
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allows extensive contacts within and outside the Geneva circUit. 69 So, shortages of 
relevant human resources and institutions will become key impediments to the capacity 
of China to benefit from international trade and technical assistance. 
B. Deficiencies of the WTO Dispute Settlement System. 
Other major difficulties for China in making good use of the special and differential 
treatment provisions in case of anti-dumping disputes with the EU are the deficiencies of 
the current WTO dispute settlement system. 
1. Time consuming procedures. 
The duration of a dispute settlement and enforcement is too long to be good for the party 
to a dispute even if a favourable ruling is made in the end. A standard and complete 
procedure needs one year and three months in total '70 but in practice, it normally takes 
much longer to achieve a solution. Considering the high-speed rhythm of today's global 
trade, the side effects due to the timing of the WTO dispute settlement system are worth 
noting. 
2. Ineffective enforcement of the WTO rulings. 
The actual enforcement of the WTO ruling can make dispute settlement more 
complicated and time consuming. For example, in the Indian Bed Linen case, 
71 the 
proceedings began on 7 August 1998, and the Panel Report, favourable to India, was 
69 Horn, H. and Mavroidis, P., 'Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System and 
Developing 
Country Interests', Paper for the World Bank (I I April 1999) at p 28. <http: //www. worldbank. org> 
(21 July 2002). 
70 , WTO Settling Disputes, the Panel Process', fn 34 above. 
71 Section 6.102, 'European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of 
Cotton-Type Bed 
Linen from lndia, '_fn 9 above at p 32. 
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published on 30 October 2000.72 However, the dispute has not been settled properly so far 
due to the EU's unsatisfactory implementation of the WTO ruling. 
3. Trend towards stricter or narrower interpretation of special and differential 
tre, ratment provisions. 
When we examine these special and differential treatment provisions carefully, it is easy 
to see that some of them are too general to be invoked directly. Under such circumstances, 
a proper interpretation is needed. However, developing countries may feel the trend 
towards stricter interpretation by the WTO Panel when they try to make use of these rules 
73 to protect their trade interests against developed Members . The stricter the 
interpretation is, the less likely that the developing country concerned is able to invoke it. 
So, it is no doubt that a stricter interpretation of such provisions given under the WTO 
dispute settlement system will prevent developing and least-developed countries to 
benefit from the original intention of the special and differential treatment. 
From this point of view, China may find it difficult when it tries to invoke special and 
differential treatment provisions contained in the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and 
DSU to protect its interests against the EU's antimdumping decisions. However, with its 
continuous replenishment of the human resource in the field of WTO laws, and following 
the irresistible trend of the WTO dispute settlement system's reform, China will be able to 
benefit more and more from the WTO trade system while seeking settlement of 
anti-dumping disputes with the EU. 
72 , Request for Consultations by India on 7 August 1998', 
<http: //mkaccdb. eu. int/dsu/doc/ds 14 1-I. doc> (I December 2002). 
73 M E. Footer, fn 36 at p 84. 
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Conclusion. 
As a developing country, China's WTO membership entitles it to special and differential 
treatment and the right to solve disputes with other Members through the WTO dispute 
settlement system. As a result, new issues and disputes may arise with regard to the EU's 
anti-dumping practice towards China. 
Special and differential treatment provisions that China may invoke to protect its 
trade interests against the EU's anti-dumping decisions include Article 5 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 3(12), Article 4 (10), Article 8(10), Article 
12(10), Article 12(11), Article 21.2.21(7) and 21(8), Article 24 and Article 27(2) of 
the DSU. 
Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement specifically considers the interests of 
developing Members. Under this provision, the EU has the obligation to actively consider 
the possibility of constructive remedies prior to imposition of an anti-dumping measure 
that would affect the essential interests of China. In the meantime, China can suggest the 
imposition of a lesser duty, a price undertaking or other acceptable actions that might be 
adopted as 'constructive remedy' within the context of Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
With regard to the WTO dispute settlement system, the DSU has established a number of 
provisions in accordance with special and differential treatment for developing and 
least-developed country Members. China may invoke them to seek proper settlement of 
anti-dumping disputes with the EU. Such disputes may be caused by the EU's practice of 
Normal value calculation, use-out domestic data and zeroing methodology in its 
anti-dumping investigations. 
Like other developing countries, China may find it difficult to invoke these special and 
differential treatment provisions in practice due to the shortage of necessary expertise and 
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the existing deficiencies of the WTO dispute settlement system. However, such a 
situation may be improved by China's attempts to develop capacity in this area and the 
irresistible trend towards the WTO dispute settlement system's reform. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions 
1. The EUs anti-dumping approach to imports from China and 
underlying reasons. 
From I January 1995 to 31 December 2001, the European Commission initiated 36 
anti-dumping investigations against imports from China, which accounts for 24 percent 
of the EU's total anti-dumping proceedings for the same period. ' However, at present, 
imports from China only account for around 7 percent of all exports to the EU. 2 In 
addition, over the past twenty years, the overall number of EU's antýdumping cases has 
gone down, while those against China has risen sharply especially in the past ten years. 
Furthermore, as the result of the EU's antimdumping investigations, most Chinese exports 
were found to be dumped and high definitive anti-dumping duties were imposed on them. 
These show that the EU has launched a disproportionately large amount of antýdumping 
investigations towards imports from China and imposed severe anti-dumping measures 
on them afterwards. The reasons for this should be found by examining issues arising 
both in the EU and in China. 
A. On the EU side. 
With regard to the EU, its current approach is to be found in its anti-dumping legislation, 
II Initiations: by Importing Country from 01/01/95 to 30/06/02'(2002) WTO Anti-Dumping Statistics 
<http: //www. wto. org/englishltratop_e/adp_e/adp-stattab2_e. htm> (I December, 2002). 
2, Trade in Goods Statistics' (2001) <http: //europa. eu. int/comm/trade/goods/stats. htm> (I December, 
2002) 
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in particular, how this legislation is applied in practice with regard to Chinese exports. 
The EU treats China as a non-market economy (NME) in anti-dumping proceedings. As 
analyzed in the first chapter, due to a lack of concrete provisions in the WTO 
anti-dumping legal framework to determine normal values and anti-dumping duty levels 
of imports from NMEs, the EU adopts a hybrid regime towards China. It includes the 
analogue country method, one country one duty rule, conditional market economy 
treatment (MET) and individual treatment. 
The first two are the traditional methods used by the EU in relation to NMEs. The others 
are renewed policies now applied due to the dramatic progress achieved by China's 
economic reforms. In the EU's anti-dumping investigations, traditional NME treatment 
will be applied to imports from China automatically, unless Chinese exporters can meet 
the criteria set for conditional MET or individual treatment. Traditional NME treatment 
maximizes dumping margins artificially, therefore, it creates huge unfairness to Chinese 
exporters. Conditional MET and individual treatment are welcome amendments made for 
the old policy, but they have been adopted as the exception rather than the rule since 
published. So, all of the four methodologies contain unreasonable factors either in theory 
or in practice. 
1. The analogue country method! 
This is the method that the EU authority, the Commission routinely adopts to determine 
the normal values of imports from China. The analogue country is a very vague concept, 
and it brings out a series of questions without answers in the law. For example: what is the 
basis for the analogue? Should it be the development of the country concerned, or the 
respective production process, or the comparability of the products, or the comparability 
3 Art 2(7), Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped 
imports frorn countries not Member of the European Community, OJ 1996 L56/1. 
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of the respective industry? All of these issues are not specified in the EU anti-dumping 
legislation. Therefore, the problem of comparing prices on different markets is 
compounded under the analogue country method. Even worse, an analogue country is 
firstly proposed by the complainant in the anti-dumping investigation, and the selection 
of such a country does not consider the relative level of economic development or GNP 
per capita of the third ME. As a result, the analogue country method brings to the 
anti-dumping authority an additional complex procedure to select a third market 
economy (ME). In the meantime, it results in huge unfairness to Chinese exporters. 
a. It maximizes the dumping margin artificially in anti-dumping investigations. 
b. It absolutely offsets NME's comparative advantages in international trade. 
c. The time limit for NMEs to comment is over strict. 
d. It makes the outcome of the selection to be unpredictable, so that NME exporters will 
never know how to avoid 'dumping' their goods. However, there is a need for certainty 
both in law and in the terms of trade. 
2. One country one duty rule. 
Like the analogue country method, the one country one duty rule applies to 
imports from 
China automatically. Under this rule, all Chinese exports which are 
found dumped by the 
Commission in the anti-dumping investigation will be subject to the same rate of 
anti-dumping duty. The general rate will be the highest of all. 
To Chinese exporters, the 
rule is unacceptable because it neglects the 
fact that they operate independently of 
government control after China's enterprise reform. 
Besides, since all Chinese exporters 
receive the same duty under the one country one 
duty rule, it is unfair to those who make 
4 Art. 9(5), Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96. 
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great efforts to cooperate with the Commission in anti-dumping investigations, because 
their duty rates should be based on their own dumping margin and information provided. 
3. Conditional MET. 5 
In April 1998, the EU amended its anti-dumping legislation, and provided conditional 
MET for China and Russia. Under the new rule, if Chinese exporters can meet the five 
criteria, 6 demonstrate that they operate under market conditions without significant state 
interference, then their domestic sales prices will be adopted to determine the normal 
values of their products. 
In an anti-dumping investigation, Chinese companies hope to get MET, because it will 
normally bring low dumping margin or no dumping as a result. This can be seen from the 
following case. 7 
5 Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98 of 27 April 1998 amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on 
protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community. OJ 1998 
L128/18. 
6 Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98 provides the five criteria for conditional market economy 
treatment: 
'- decisions of firms regarding prices, costs and inputs, including for instance raw materials, cost of 
technology and labour, output, sales and investment, are made in response to market signals reflecting 
supply and demand, and without significant State interference in this regard, and costs of major 
inputs 
substantially reflect market values, 
- firms have one clear set of basic accounting records which are 
independently audited in line with 
international accounting standards and are applied for all purposes, 
- the production costs and financial situation of 
firms are not subject to significant distortions carried 
over from the former non-market economy system, in particular 
in relation to depreciation of assets, 
other write-offs, barter trade and payment via compensation of 
debts, 
- the firms concerned are subject to 
bankruptcy and property laws which guarantee legal certainty and 
stability for the operation of firms, and 
- exchange rate conversions are carried out at 
the market rate. ' 
7 Council Regulation (EC) No 1470/2001 of 16 July 2001 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty 
and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on 
imports of integrated electronic compact 
fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's Republic of China, OJ 2001 L 195/8. 
271 
Table 7.1 A comparison of different levels of anti-dumping duty under the analogue 
country method and the MET. 
Ownership of the manufacturer Method adopted to Rate of anti-dumping 
determine the Non-nal Value duty (percent) 
Wholly foreign owned MET 0 
company 
I 
Chinese firms (State-owned) na a= logue country method 
[66.1 
, -ýOource: UJ 2UUI L195/8. 
The conditional MET was provided to accommodate the new changes in China's 
economic development. However, since the law entered into force in 1998, less than 15 
percent of Chinese exporters get such treatment. 8 From this point of view, the change of 
the law does not meet its objective. 
As the anti-dumping authority, the Commission usually refuses to grant MET to Chinese 
companies for four reasons. They are namely, information insufficiency, state 
interference, beyond deadline and non-standard accounting records. Examining these 
closely, it can be seen that the Commission interprets the criteria for MET excessively 
strictly. 
a. information insufficiency. 
Information provided to the Commission by any firm applying for MET must encompass 
the entire industry of which it is a part. Even if only one firm exports to the EU, that firm 
must convince the entire industry to provide information about financial activity to the 
EU. Otherwise, it will be deemed as information insufficiency. But the fact is that it is 
extremely difficult to obtain industry wide information within the time 
deadlines 
8 The data is collected by the author based on the EU Official Journal from April 1998 to April 2002. 
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specified by law. In the Glycine case of 2000,9 five Chinese companies were refused 
MET, one of the reasons given is that they could not provide information on the entire 
chemicals industry in China. 
b. State interference. 
In practice, Chinese state-owned companies never get MET, because the EU thinks that 
such ownership means significant state interference. As to other companies, if they sell 
part of their products to the state, its application for MET will be rejected, because the 
Commission presumes that the price of sales to the state would not be at market 
determined prices, therefore, it has indirect state interference in its industry pricing. If one 
of the inputs is state-controlled, the company will not get MET as well, because the EU 
think that such prices are determined by the state rather than the market This conclusion is 
unreasonable because Member States of the EU have many state controlled firms, such as 
utilities and transportation companies, and this does not negate their market treatment. 
Industries can sell their output to the government at preferential prices, and not be 
considered non-market. In the EU, there is also state ownership of some public goods, 
such as fisheries, which does not make the fishing industry non-market. From this point 
of view, normal business contact with the state should not be the reason for the 
Commission to reject a Chinese company's application for MET. 
c. Beyond deadline. 
Another reason of the rejection of MET is that Chinese companies failed to submit all the 
information needed within the time limit. In an anti-dumping investigation, exporters 
from ME shall submit their questionnaires within 40 days after initiation. If Chinese 
9 Recital 11, Commission Regulation (EC) No 1043/2000 of 18 May 2000 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of glycine originating in the People's Republic of 
China, OJ 2000 
L 118/6. 
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companies apply for MET, their burden of proof is even heavier, but the application and 
all information deemed necessary have to be given to the Commission within 21 days 
after the initiation. There is no apparent reason for this difference, so this is unfair as well. 
d. Non-standard accounting records. 
To grant conditional MET to Chinese exporters, the Commission requires that companies 
have one clear set of basic accounting records; these records must be independently 
audited in line with international accounting standards; and these records must be applied 
for all purposes. 'O 
These requirements have been rigorously enforced and have been the justification for the 
rejection of the majority of applications for the conditional MET, mainly because they are 
cumulative in nature but all must be satisfied at the same time. " In addition, the 
completeness of accounting records is an issue relating to the firm's management rather 
than its economic nature. Some European firms do not have sound accounting records 
due to poor management, but we cannot therefore affirm that they operate on an NME 
basis. Likewise, if a Chinese company does not have a clear set of accounting records or 
if it has not been audited, it does not necessarily mean that the firm is of NME nature. 
However, in Malleable Cast Iron Tubes and Pipe Fittings case in 2000,12 the Commission 
refused to grant MET to three Chinese exporters simply because they could not meet all 
the three requirements enumerated above at the same time. 
10 Art. 2.7 (c), Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98. 
11 Robert M. MacLean, 'Evaluating the Impact of the E. C. 's Conditional Market Economy Principle in 
Chinese and Russian Anti-Dumping cases' (2001) 7(3) International Trade Law & Regulation 65 at 
70. 
12 Commission Regulation (EC) No 449/2000 of 28 February 2000 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of malleable cast iron tube or pipe fittings originating 
in Brazil, the 
Czech Republic, Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand and 
accepting an undertaking offered by an exporting producer in the Czech Republic, 
OJ 2000 L55/3. 
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From the above analysis, it can be seen that main reason that only a few Chinese exporters 
get MET is because the criteria and the way the Commission interpret and apply them in 
anti-dumping investigations is too stringent. 
4. Individual treatment. 
When a Chinese exporter fails to get MET, it can still apply for individual treatment in 
order to have its individual anti-dumping duty based on its own dumping margin. 
However, like the conditional MET, the problem of individual treatment is that the 
Commission applies the rules in an excessively strict way in practice. Even the EU itself 
has to admit the overlap in the criteria of individual treatment has resulted in the fact that 
only those exporters that can fulfil the requirements for conditional MET are able to 
qualify for individual treatment. 13 
From this point of view, the main stream of the EU's current an&dumping policy towards 
China is the traditional NME Treatment. Though the amendments of conditional MET 
and individual treatment are positive progresses in legislation, the Commission does not 
make their application to be consistent with the objective, i. e. to adapt to the change of 
economic status due to China's economic reform. 
5. Non-use of anti-subsidy measures towards China. 
In addition to the above unreasonable factors of the EU's current an&dumping legislation 
towards China, the EU's non-use of countervailing measures may be another reason 
leading to the disproportionately high amount of the anti-dumping proceedings towards 
China. 
13 Recital 53, Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on protection 
against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community /* COM/2000/0363 
final - ACC 2000/0160. 
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According to the provisions of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, a countervailable subsidy exists if the following facts are found. 
a. There is a financial contribution by the government, and 
b. The subsidy is directed at specific industries or sectors or at exports; 
c. There is a net benefit to the recipient and the conditions of normal competition must 
be adversely affected. 
14 
Under the WTO legal framework, dumping and subsidy are two different concepts and 
they are governed by different sets of rules. However, as a result of subsidy, the export 
price may be lower than the normal value of an import, which also constitutes dumping. 
In that case, the importing country may impose either countervailing duties or 
anti-dumping measures on the import in question. 15 
Unlike its anti-dumping Regulation, the EU's Regulation on subsidy and countervailing 
measures 16 does not provide any special provision for NMEs in countervailing duty 
investigations. This tacitly implies that 'such cases are not to be initiated against 
countries that are on the EU's NME list' because 'the subsidies concept had no meaning 
outside the context of a market-based economic system. 17 
Consequently, there is hardly any countervailing duty investigation initiated towards 
imports from China within the past ten years. Instead, the EU has launched increasing 
14 Arts l(l), 1 (2) and (5), 'Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures' The Results of the 
Uruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade Negotiations (GATT, Geneva, 1994).. 
15 A_rt. V1 (5), GATT. 
16 Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not 
members of the European Community, OJ 1997 L 288/1. 
17 Alexander Polouektov, 'Non-Market Economy Issues in the WTO Anti-Dumping Law and 
Accession Negotiations. Revival of a Two-Tier MembershipT (2002) 36 J. W. T I at pp. 23 & 25. 
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anti-dumping proceedings against these Chinese products. 
B. On the side of China. 
On the one hand, the EU's policy results in the large number of anti-dumping proceedings 
against imports from China and subsequently high anti-dumping duties. On the other 
hand, Chinese exporters are responsible for their own faults which have made things 
worse. They are mainly non-cooperation, untechnical response and genuine dumping in a 
few cases. 
1. Non-cooperation. 
Exporter's non-cooperation exists in any country's anti-dumping investigation, so it is not 
an exception in the case of the EU's anti-dumping proceedings towards China. However, 
statistics show that anti-dumping investigations against Chinese products are defended by 
the least number of manufacturers and exporters. 18 
Non-cooperation of those Chinese exporters in the EU's anti-dumping investigation may 
be attributed to two reasons. First of all, most of them are angry at the unfair treatment of 
NNIE that Chinese exporters normally get in the EU's antiýdumping investigations. Due 
to the extremely low percentage to get the MET and individual treatment in the past cases, 
they foresee the unfavourable judgement made under the analogue country method and 
the one country one duty rule, plus the high cost and difficulty of timely cooperation, they 
finally decide to give up their business in the European market as a result of 
non-cooperation. 
In a few cases of non-cooperation, those Chinese exporters simply 
do not know the 
importance to respond to the Commission's questionnaires due to their lack of common 
18 Robert M. Maclean, fn II above at 35. 
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knowledge Of international trade. 19 However, such cases become fewer and fewer due to 
the Chinese government's great effort to popularise this knowledge. 
Without close cooperation with the European Commission in its anti-dumping 
investigations, Chinese exporters are subject to the analogue country method and the 
highest anti-dumping duty. The devastating consequences are increasingly known to 
Chinese exporters. Therefore, the number of cases of non-cooperation by Chinese 
companies has decreased sharply in recent years. 20 
2. Untechnical response. 
This happens when Chinese exporters cooperate with the Commission, while they are 
unable to provide favourable or timely information simply because their lawyers lack the 
necessary techniques to handle anti-dumping cases. 
Considering the tight time limit and huge amount of information required, satisfactory 
completion of the EU's anti-dumping questionnaires in the case of imports from NMEs is 
a hard task. Good lawyers who are familiar with anti-dumping rules and international 
trade laws are necessary in that circumstance. Such professionals are not rare in foreign 
international law firms like those in Brussels, but there are not many in China. It is no 
doubt that China has a large quantity of good lawyers, but compared with those foreign 
ones, most of them are less experienced in the field of an&dumping. 
Normally, the problem for Chinese exporters to resort to these foreign law firms in 
response to anti-dumping proceedings is the high costs. The average charge of 
anti-dumping cases is above $100,000 by a foreign law firm, while the cost asked by 
19 This is analyzed by experienced anti-dumping lawyers during several interviews conducted in 
different law firms in Brussels, June 2002. 
20 This is found by analyzing the EU's anti-dumping cases before and after 1995. 
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Chinese domestic law firms can be $5,000 or even lower. Given the difficultY for Chinese 
exporters to get conditional MET and individual treatment in the EU's an&dumping 
investigations even with the help of foreign law firms in the past, most Chinese 
companies, especially small ones, are not willing to turn to foreign law firms when they 
receive anti-dumping questionnaires from the Commission. 
Unprofessional lawyers are unable to make use of international trade law and principles 
freely to protect the interests of their client. As a result, an untechnical response from 
Chinese exporters may be deemed as inadequate cooperation by the Commission in 
anti-dumping investigations, and finally brings a less favourable outcome to them. 
3. Lack of standard accounting records. 
The second criteria of the MET requires that firms have one clear set of basic accounting 
records which are independently audited in line with international accounting standards 
and are applied for all purposes. 21 To Chinese exporters, the lack of such accounting 
records is one of the most frequent reasons leading to the rejection of MET in practice. 
Besides, it constitutes the main reason for the Commission to reject undertakings offered 
by Chinese companies. 
4. Genuine dumping in a few cases. 
In a few cases, high anti-dumping duties have been imposed on Chinese exporters since 
their products are actually dumped. 22 The motive of such selling under cost is not because 
those manufacturers want to exclude competitors from the European market with a low 
21 Art. 2(7)(c), Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98. 
22 This was indicated by an anti-dumping lawyer during an interview in Brussels, June 
2002. It is also 
the reason why the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of the 
People's Republic of 
China enacted the Interim Regulation of Punishing Companies which Export Products with 
Low 
Prices on 20 March 1996. 
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price strategy. Instead, it results from the side effect of Chinese government's 
encouraging export policy. 
Following China's economic reform and the policy of opening up international trade, the 
government has realized more and more the importance of international trade and its 
advantages. Exports therefore become central to develop the country's economy. In order 
to promote export volumes, the Chinese government has developed policies to encourage 
exports. For example, under these rules, Chinese producers can have the tariffs on their 
exports partly reimbursed, and they can keep their foreign currency account, which is not 
available without certain amount of exports. Likewise, a high quantity of exports can help 
the company get other similar favourable treatment from the government, which might be 
beneficial to its development of other sectors. 
Due to the above reason, it is easy to understand that a small number of Chinese 
companies are willing to sacrifice a part of profits from their exports, i. e. to dump the 
products, in order to increase the export volume, and then to be entitled to certain policies 
which might be favourable to their overall development. Therefore, genuine dumping 
sometimes can be found in the EU's anti-dumping investigations towards China. 
/I. Reform of the EUs anti-dumping policy. 
A. Reasons for reform. 
Considering the unreasonable factors in the EU's current anti-dumping policy towards 
China, there are essential economic interests and political reasons which call for reform. 
1. To meet the objective of the amended anti-dumping policy towards China. 
The EU amended its anti-dumping legislation in 1998, and the conditional MET was 
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provided for Chinese exporters as a result . The intention of the change 'w 
23 
as in response 
to the ongoing reforms in those countries and the fact that some Russian and Chinese 
companies operate in market economy conditions and therefore their prices and costs 
may be appropriate for the calculation of normal value. 24 
However, due to the huge discretion exercised by the Commission and the strict 
interpretation given in specific cases, MET is seldom granted to Chinese exporters in 
practice. Therefore, the 1998 amendment and its application cannot reflect the change of 
China's economic reform, and further reform both in law and in practice is needed to 
meet the objective of the law. 
2. For a better EU-China trade relationship and a stronger Europe 
Facing powerful competitors such as the U. S. and Japan in the world economy, the EU 
needs the cooperation of new rapidly developing economies to enhance its share of 
international trade and enhance its strength from both the political and economic 
perspective. 
As analyzed in Chapter 4, China is one of the countries which has the fastest economic 
growth in the world. Its current average gross domestic product (GDP) growth is 7.55 
percent per year, 25 and its average growth of export to the EU is 24.42 percent per year in 
the past three years. 26 Such trend of growth will be further strengthened by China's 
accession to the WTO, with which its share of world trade may double between 1995 and 
23 Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98. 
24 Fn 13 above at pp. 2&I 
25 China's real GDP growth is 7.8 percent in 1998,7.1 percent in 1999,8.0 percent in 2000 and 7.3 
percent in 2001. <http: //europa. eu. int/comm/trade/> (I December 2002). 
26 The value of imports from China to the EU is 49.7 billion Euro in 1999,70.3 billion Euro in 2000 
and 75.5 billion Euro in 2001, from: <http: //europa. eu. int/comm/trade/goods/stats. htm> (I December 
2002). 
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2005.27 
It is estimated that China's real imports from Western Europe will increase from 28,571 
Million US Dollars in 1995 to 50,182 Million US Dollars in 2005 28 Therefore, China 
should be the best new trade partner to the EU in the near future. Besides, since China and 
the EU's economic development are at different levels, trade between them will greatly 
benefit both sides and therefore is sustainable from a long term point of view. 
A sound trade relationship between China and the EU is essential to the increasing trade 
opportunities for both sides. However, the EU's anti-dumping policy towards China 
constitutes a threat to the further development of such a relationship. In fact, 
anti-dumping is a very sensitive issue. In particular, under the EU's current policy which 
empowers wide discretion to the Commission, nearly every Chinese export in the 
European market 'is potentially vulnerable to dumping accusations and calculations of 
inflated dumping margins. 29 For this reason, the current anti-dumping legislation and the 
way that the EU authority applies it should be improved, and a less stringent and more 
impartial anti-dumping policy towards China is necessary for a better future. 
3. Need to restore fair competition in intemational trade. 
The intention of anti-dumping legislation is to restore fair competition in international 
trade. Anti-dumping measures should be targeted only to offset the unfavourable effects 
produced by dumped imports rather than give protection to domestic industry. 
However, as the result of improper policies, excessive use of antimdumping measure may 
27 D Bhattasali and M Kawai, 'Implications of China's Accession to the World Trade Organization' at 
p 1, < http: //www. worldbank. org. cn/English/content/wto-implications. pdf> 
(I December 2002). 
28 D Bhattasali and M Kawai, ibid at p 18. 
29 Alexander Polouektov, fn 17 above at p31. 
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turn the outcome upside down. The EU's antimdumping policy towards China maximizes 
the dumping margin of the imports in anti-dumping investigations. It actually expels 
those Chinese products out of European market with severe anti-dumPing measures. It 
also should be borne in mind that the impact of these measures is not only confined to 
Chinese industry itself. European importers, distributors and agents involved in the 
selling of Chinese products inside the EU internal market will be affected adversely as 
well. To a certain extent, the commercial interests and confidence of their business can be 
spoiled by the unpredictable anti-dumping proceedings of the EU. In the meantime, 
European industries which use Chinese products as inputs, components or parts for 
manufacturing other goods will suffer the increased production costs if anti-dumping 
measures are taken towards these imports. Therefore, excessive use of these measures by 
the EU devastates business both in China and inside the European market. 
Fair competition of international trade calls for correct use of anti-dumping instruments. 
From this point of view, the EU's anti-dumping policy towards China should be reformed 
to be more reasonable and impartial. 
4. The need for gradual reform of the EUs current anUdumping policy before the 
final withdrawal of the NME treatment in 2015. 
As a part of concessions, China agreed to the EU keeping its current an6dumping policy 
for 15 years after China's accession to the WTO. 
30 In my opinion, this implies the 
maximum 15 years time limit for the EU to reform 
its anti-dumping policy, and 
completely eliminate the analogue country method and one country one 
duty rule from its 
anti-dumping legislation towards China. Without gradual reform 
beforehand, sudden 
withdrawal of the NME Treatment may let the EU's anti-dumping authority 
and certain 
30 Section 15. d, Draft protocol on the accession of the People's Republic of 
China, (Annex to Report of 
the working party on the accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49). 
<http: //www. wto-org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e. htm> (I December 
2002). 
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domestic industries feel it hard to react before the new and less protective legislation. 
5. China's resort to the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism may accelerate the 
speed of reform of the EUs anti-dumping policy. 
The EU's current anti-dumping legislation towards imports from NMEs is quite general, 
and it lacks concrete provisions to govern specific issues. Before China became a 
Member of the WTO, the European Commission enjoyed huge discretion on all of these 
disputes in its anti-dumping investigations. However, China's current WTO membership 
makes it eligible to bring disputes arising from the EU's antiýdumping decisions to the 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Under the WTO trade laws and principles, if the Panel 
decides to support China's argument, the EU should be responsible for the measures 
taken and revise the corresponding decisions. As a result, these proceedings may 
accelerate the reform of the EU's anti-dumping policy towards China. 
B. Proposals for the EU. 
Based on the analysis above, the following proposals are suggested to the EU with regard 
to its anti-dumping policy towards China. 
1. Proposals towards NME status. 
The first suggestion for the EU is to treat China as an ME. This idea sounds quite radical 
at first glance. However, it is reasonable considering the 
fact that Russia has been 
recognized as an ME by the EU since 5 November 2002,31 and the 
MET are now applied 
to Russian exporters automatically in the EU's anti-dumping proceedings. 
China's WTO 
membership indicates that the level of its economic 
development is much higher than 
31 Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002 of 5 November 2002 amending Regulation 
(EC) No 384/96 
on the protection against dumped imports from countries not members 
of the European Community 
OJ 2002 1-305/1. 
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Russia. Based on this point, it should be treated as an ME for the purpose of dumping 
determination as well. In that case, all disadvantages of the analogue country method can 
be avoided, and all Chinese exporters will get MET automatically in antimdumping 
investigations. 
2. Proposal for the analogue country method. 
To be more realistic, the Commission should minimize the use of the analogue country 
method and its side effects produced on Chinese exporters in antirdumping proceedings. 
When one Chinese company gets MET, its domestic sales price should be adopted to 
determine normal values for other Chinese exporters in the same anti-dumping 
investigation. 
If no Chinese company gets conditional MET in the EU's antýdumping investigation, a 
third 1\4E which is at a similar economic development level should be selected. In that 
case, the country which has a similar gross national income (GNI) to China should be 
regarded as an appropriate analogue country. 
When cooperation from such a third ME is not available, the Constructed Value Method 
may be preferred and more than one third MEs price information should be refeired in 
that case. 
32 
The EU should have more specific guidance to govern the selection of a third ME when 
the analogue country method has to be applied. Since it is a very complex procedure, and 
the choice is significant to the outcome of the anti-dumping investigation and the 
essential interests of exporters, less discretion should be given to the Commission as the 
32 For example, use the labour cost of country A and the production cost information of country 
B, 
because each of them has similarities with China from different perspectives. 
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anti-dumping authority. 
In addition, Chinese exporters should be given more time to comment on the selection of 
the third economy, because even the Commission itself admits that it is impossible to 
collect necessary information and give any advice within a mere 10 days. 33 
3. Proposal for one country one duty rule and individual treatment 
The one country one duty practice should be abandoned completely towards a Member of 
the WTO such as China, which has already demonstrated its economic status and strength 
before accession. Like the anti-dumping authorities of the U. S., Australia, New Zealand 
and Japan, the Commission should determine the anti-dumping duty rate for different 
exporters according to their own dumping margins. That is to say, individual treatment 
should be granted to Chinese exporters automatically without burdensome application. 
4. Proposal for the conditional MET 
In the EU's anti-dumping investigation towards imports from China, the Commission 
should assess Chinese exporter's application for the MET impartially. Particularly, their 
normal business contact with government and state-owned companies should not result in 
the rejection of application for the MET. In the meantime, trade behaviours with the state 
which may lead to the rejection of the MET should be specified in law rather than 
determined case by case by the Commission. 
The EU's anti-dumping authority should interpret and apply the legislation of the 
conditional MET less stringently in practice. For example, it should accept the 
application from a Chinese company and grant them MET if it can meet most of the five 
criteria. Considering the unreasonable factors of the MET provisions discussed above, 
33 Interview with the Administer of the European Commission, DG Trade, Brussels, 12 July 2002. 
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the Commission should not refuse to grant MET to Chinese exporters simply because 
they fail to meet one of the five criteria. 
In addition, the Commission should consider Chinese exporter's application for 
conditional MET during sunset reviews. At present, the Commission refuses to introduce 
the methodology of the conditional MET in sunset reviews carried out after the new 
legislation came into force . 
34 It argues that existing anti-dumping measures can be 
modified only during interim reviews . 
35 However, under the EU legislation. ) 
36 the criteria 
to initiate an interim review are very stringent. As a result, Chinese exporters normally 
cannot apply for the new approach of the MET in proceedings with regard to the existing 
anti-dumping measures. The EU's practice is rather unfair to these exporters which may 
obtain fundamental progress from economic reforms of the past five years. Like other 
Chinese firms, they should have the same opportunity to apply for conditional MET. 
From this point, after five years elapses since the anti-dumping measures were taken, the 
EU authority should either allow the exporters to apply for conditional MET in sunset 
reviews, or consider their application in interim reviews which are initiated with less 
stringent criteria. 
5. Acceptance of undertakings. 
The Commission should accept undertakings from Chinese companies which have a 
sound management history. Undertakings are not normally accepted 
from companies 
AS 
37 
operating in NME - Due to the 
Commission's distrust, few undertakings from Chinese 
34 This issue has been analyzed in details in chapter three, section II. D. 5. 
35 Para. 19, Council Regulation (EC) No 312/2002 of 18 February 2002 imposing a 
definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks 
(3,5 microdisks) originating in Japan and the 
People's Republic of China and terminating the proceeding in respect of 
imports of 3,5 microdisks 
originating in Taiwan. OJ 2002 L 50/24. 
36 Art. 11 (3), Council Regulation (EC) No 3 84/96. 
37 Recital 58, Council Regulation (EC) No 393/98. 
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exporters have been accepted since 1990. However, undertakings from Chinese 
companies with standard accounting records should be considered, and the prejudice 
must be corrected after China's accession to the WTO. Otherwise,, it will be regarded as a 
violation of the WTO's non-discrimination principle by the Panel in the case of dispute 
settlement. 
M. Proposals to China. 
As the direct victim of the EU's over severe anti-dumping policy, China should take 
corresponding strategies to claim its due rights and protect its trade interests. 
A. Proposals to the government. 
1. Capacity building. 
Capacity building is the most important and effective strategy for China to protect its 
trade interests in anti-dumping proceedings launched by other countries. Here, it refers to 
the development of human capital, specialised in WTO anti-dumping legislation and 
other international economic laws and principles. 
First of all, professional anti-dumping lawyers are essential to help exporters obtain 
proper treatment in anti-dumping investigations. Since they are familiar with the 
legislation and the anti-dumping authority's traditional practice, they not only can 
provide accurate information required on time and claim due rights for their clients on the 
base of law, but also can be very sensitive to any illegal point of decisions made by the 
authority, and then reply on a legal basis. 
Besides, as analyzed in Chapter six, after China's accession to the WTO, it can resort to 
the Dispute Settlement Mechanism to resolve anti-dumping disputes with the EU. 
288 
However, China lacks necessary human resources and administrative structures to detect 
possible inconsistencies with the WTO agreements, and then to maximize their use of the 
WTO dispute settlement system effectively. Such a shortage will become key 
impediments to its capacity to benefit from the international trade system and the WTO's 
differential and favorable treatment for developing countries. 
All of the above calls for capacity building urgently. China should emphasize the 
development of these human resources,, and build extensive cooperation with other 
foreign experts in international organizations with sufficient financial backup. Only by 
doing this, can it defend its due rights properly under the WTO trade laws. 
2. Encourage and attract European investment. 
Considering companies which get the MET in the EU's antýdumping investigations, all 
except one are foreign owned firms orjoint ventures, which represent whole or part of the 
European investor's economic interests. Likewise, among six anti-dumping appeal cases, 
only two of them succeeded, 38 which were both brought by European importers. 
These facts show that the EU's anti-dumping decisions are always based on its own 
essential commercial interests, and they are favourable to domestic industries or 
European investors. Therefore, if the Chinese government encourages and attracts 
European investment in the form of joint ventures in China, when these companies 
participate in the EU's anti-dumping proceedings, they may be treated more 
favourably 
than others. As a result, the part of interests of Chinese shareholders in the joint ventures 
can be protected simultaneously to a certain extent. 
38 Case 16/90, Detlef N61le, trading as "Eugen N61le" v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen, ECR 1991 
1-05163 and Case 358/89, Extramet Industrie SA v Council of the European Communities, 
ECR 1992 
1-03813. 
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3. Regulate the order of export transactions. 
The Chinese government should regulate the normal order of export transactions. Normal 
export should be encouraged as an important part of the Opening Policy, but at the same 
time, the Chinese government should prohibit exporters from dumping their products in 
order to get other benefits. China enacted the Interim Regulation of Punishing Companies 
which Export Products with Low Prices in 1996 . 
391-lowever, there are few exporters 
punished accordingly since the law published. Therefore, the government really should 
put more emphasis to the implementation of such Regulations. 
4. Continuous negotiation with the EU for ME status. 
The Chinese government should negotiate with the EU authorities continuously for ME 
status. Considering the EU's recent change to recognize Russia as an ME, China's WTO 
membership is the best justification to ask for the same treatment. 
B. Proposals for Chinese exporters. 
1. Sound management of the company. 
In the context of the EU's five criteria established to grant the MET, sound management 
particularly emphasizes a clear set of basic accounting records, which are 
in line with 
international accounting standards and principles. Since the legislation of the MET was 
enacted in 1998, lack of clear accounting records has become the main reason to prevent 
Chinese exporters from getting the MET. 
According to China's accounting legislation as well as interviews with a 
Chinese 
39 It was enacted on 20 March 1996 by the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation, PRC. 
This regulation is applicable to all foreign trade enterprises 
in China. 
<http: //www. people-com. cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/1/1-2-39. 
html> (I December 2002). 
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economic analyst and experienced anti-dumping lawyers, 40 it becomes clear that the 
accounting method adopted by Chinese companies is basically consistent with 
international standards. However, the Commission examines the accounting records so 
strictly that even some European companies may find it hard to provide the satisfactory 
accounting records required. 
Therefore, Chinese companies should keep accurate and standard accounting records, 
which can withstand the Commission's careful assessment. 
2. Sufficient cooperation with the Commission in anti-dumping investigations. 
The prerequisite for exporters to protect their trade interests in anti-dumping 
investigations is to cooperate with the authority. With regard to the EU's antýdumping 
proceedings towards China, sufficient cooperation means submitting anti-dumping 
questionnaireS41 timeously to the Commission, and try to give any other information 
needed. Cooperation is necessary for Chinese companies to get individual anti-dumping 
duty rate and even MET in anti-dumping investigations if the Commission thinks that the 
firm operates by itself without significant state interference, i. e. it meets the five criteria 
for the MET. 
Based on this point, Chinese exporters should be encouraged to cooperate with the 
Commission in anti-dumping investigations. In the meantime, necessary guidance and 
help should be provided by the Chamber of Commerce of the industry corcerned. 
In fact, China has enacted legislation to prohibit non-cooperation of its exporters in 
40 Interview with analyst, Research Institute of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation, People's Republic of China, Beijing, July 2001; Interviews with experienced 
anti-dumping lawyers were conducted in different law firms in Brussels, June 2002. 
41 Questionnaires include normal 'Anti-Dumping Questionnaire' and 'Form for Companies claiming 
Market Economy Status and/or Individual Treatment in Anti-Dumping Proceedings. 
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anti-dumping proceedingS, 42 and the Chambers of main industries have made efforts to 
offer training and to strengthen anti-dumping knowledge for Chinese enterprises. As a 
result of this effective strategy, there are fewer and fewer cases of non-cooperation of 
Chinese exporters today. These Chambers, therefore, should now turn to stress the 
important role that professional anti-dumping lawyers play in anti-dumping 
investigations, and try to give them some advice to find the right lawyer to ensure 
sufficient cooperation and technical response in anti-dumping investigations. 
3. Build infonet of the same industry worldwide. 
Under the EU's current anti-dumping legislation, if Chinese exporters fail to get 
conditional MET, they are still subject to the analogue country method. In that case, the 
European Commission gives the exporters 10 days to comment on the third ME 
envisaged. 43 In practice, Chinese exporters cannot give any constructive comment before 
the deadline because the time limit is too tight. 44 
In the Zinc Oxides case of 2001 9 
45 the Commission showed its intention in the notice of 
initiation to use the United States (U. S. ) as an appropriate analogue country for tl-e 
purpose of establishing normal value for imports from China. Chinese exporting 
producers disagreed with this proposal by arguing the different 
levels of economic 
42 The fifth Command of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of the 
People's 
Republic of China in 2001 - Regulation Governing 
Chinese Exporter's Response Towards 
Anti-Dumping Investigations Initiated By Other Countries. It entered into force on 
I December 200 1. 
<http: //www. moftec. gov. cn/article/200207/20020700031595_1. xml> 
(I December 2002). 
43 Art. 2 (7), Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96, O. J. 
44 This issue has been analyzed in chapter three, Section Lc Theoretical and practical analysis of 
the 
rule.. 
45 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1827/2001 of 17 September 2001 
imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain zinc oxides originating 
in the People's Republic of China. OJ 
2001 L248/17. 
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development, Position in the market, 46 end-useS47 and cost structures48 betxý, 'een the U. S. 
and China. Instead of the U. S., they suggested South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan. 
or Thailand as the analogue country, but they could not substantiate their proposals. The 
Commission subsequently sent a request for information on sales and market conditions 
to these MEs. Unfortunately, only two producers in the countries suggested by Chinese 
exporters were willing to cooperate with the Commission, but they were not selected as 
the analogue country due to the low volumes of production and domestic sales. As a 
result, the Commission retained its initial decision to use the U. S. as the analogue country 
for Chinese products. 
However, if the Chinese exporters had the information of producers worldwide of the 
same industry, their comment on the selection of the analogue country will be more 
persuasive. Furthermore, if they already had a sound relationship with the major foreign 
producers in the world, the latter might be willing to cooperate with the Commission 
when they were requested. In both circumstances, 49 there is a bigger possibility that the 
exporters' proposals could be adopted by the EU, and a relatively appropriate analogue 
country would be selected for them as a result. 
46 The U. S. producer's oligopolistic position on the US market which was alleged to 
lead to artificially 
high prices. 
47 As the rubber industry is the major US market for zinc oxide whereas 
Chinese exports to the 
Community seem to be used primarily in the ceramic industry. 
48 Different cost structure. It was claimed that the cost structure in the USA could not 
be compared 
with that in China, where labour costs, environmental compliance costs, etc. are 
lower than in the 
USA. 
49 of course, such information exchange should not develop into a possible cartel arrangement which 
might fall foul of competition rules. 
293 
Summary 
While exploring the genuine reasons why the EU's current anti-dumping policy after 
amendments cannot meet its objective to accommodate the change of China's economic 
status from an NME to a transitional economy as a result of its two decades' reform. it is 
particularly important for us to examine a fact - 'Commission officials admit that the 
formal rule change was more in name than in substance'. 50 The change of the rules was 
structured to allow the Commission to interpret the law as it saw fit on a case-by-case 
basis, and the Commission officials had no intention of administering the more beneficial 
rules to Chinese firms .51 Therefore, the EU bears most of the responsibility for the 
unfairness and the unfavourable impact produced by its anti-dumping policy towards 
China. 
Not only Chinese exporters but also different European economic operators which are 
involved in the selling of Chinese products are unfavourably affected by the EU's 
excessive use of anti-dumping measures towards China. Such an impact will be enlarged 
following China's increasing exports to the European market after its accession to the 
WTO. 
For this reason, proposals are made for both EU and China in this thesis based on the 
following research. 
a. An analysis of China's economic reforms and prospects backed 
by its national 
legislation, its WTO accession agreement and facts provided by international 
50 Cynthia M. Horne, 'Belief Stasis as an Impediment to Policy Implementation: Non-Market 
Economies and Western Trade Laws', paper prepared for American Political 
Science Association 
Conference, San Francisco, CA, August 30 - September 2,2001, P. 
24. 
<http: //pro. harvard. edu/papers/0 16/01601 OHomeCynth. pdf> (I December 
2002). 
51 Ibid. 
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organizations such as the World Bank; 
b. A comparative study of other major WTO developed country Member's 
anti-dumping Policies towards China. 
However, anti-dumping is the governmental protection of its domestic industry against 
dumped imports, and anti-dumping legislation is a political tool functioning in the field of 
the economy. Like other legislation, one country's anti-dumping policy towards another 
actually is the outcome of the contrast of the two sides' political and economic strength. 
Apparently, it is a very complex issue, and amendment of the legislation or change of the 
policy needs huge political impetus based on mutual economic interests. 
Therefore, my research is not going to achieve the above task. To be more realistic, it 
proposes some practical suggestions for EU and China from an academic point of view, 
which may ensure that the implementation of the EU antimdurnping legislation be 
impartial to both sides. 
Of course, only time can tell whether the Commission will adopt a less stringent approach 
to its anti-dumping policy towards China, but from a personal point of view, I believe 
some positive developments are essential in order to build stronger 
EU-China relations. 
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